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Abstract
In contrast to traditional CPS where a designer can specify an action plan for
each agent, in CPS with strategic agents, every agent acts selfishly and chooses his
strategy privately so as to maximize his own objective. In this dissertation, we study
problems arising in the design and analysis of CPSs with strategic agents.
We consider two classes of design problems. In the first class, the designer utilizes
her control over decisions and resources in the system to incentivize the agents via
monetary incentive mechanisms to reveal their private information that is crucial for
the efficient operation of the system. In particular, we consider market mechanism
design for the integration of renewable energy and flexible loads into power grids.
We consider a model that captures the dynamic and intermittent nature of these
resources, and demonstrate the advantage of dynamic market mechanism over static
market mechanisms that underly the existing architecture of the electricity markets.
In the second class of design problems, the designer utilizes her informational ad-
vantage over the agents and employ informational incentive mechanisms to disclose
selectively information to the agents so as to influence the agents’ decisions. Specifi-
cally, we consider the design of public and private information disclosure mechanisms
in a transportation system so as to improve the overall congestion.
We also study the analysis of CPS with strategic agents as a stochastic dynamic
game of asymmetric information. We present a set of conditions sufficient to char-
acterize an information state for each agent that effectively compresses his private
and common information over time. This information state provides a sufficient
statistic for decision-making purposes in strategic and non-strategic settings. Ac-
cordingly, we provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic game over time,
and formulate a dynamic program that enables us to determine a set of equilibria
of the game. The proposed approach generalizes and unifies the existing results for
xii






In recent years, societal and environmental changes along with advances in com-
munication and information technologies have led to the emergence of new dynamic
multi-agent systems in which a group of autonomous selfish decision makers (DMs)
interact with one another, as well as their surrounding environment, over time. For
instance, the traditional government-regulated electricity markets have been trans-
formed to competitive electricity markets where revenue-maximizing generators com-
pete with one another to sell electricity to loadserving entities over the power network
[57, 58]. Another example is the advent of navigation applications (e.g. Google map,
Waze, etc.), which have been developed following the commercialization of GPS tech-
nology and smart phones, and provide traffic information and routing suggestions to
drivers in transportation networks [10].
The above-emerging systems can be modeled as cyber-physical systems (CPSs)
with strategic DMs. By cyber-physical system, we refer to the integration of phys-
ical and cyber components of a dynamic system, each operating in different spatial
and temporal scales. In a traditional CPS where decisions and/or information are
decentralized only due to the limitation/cost in communications and processing, a
designer has control over the operation of every local component of the system, and
thus, can design (in principle) its components using techniques from control and
1
optimization theories. However, in designing a CPS with strategic DMs, a designer
cannot dictate the behavior of DMs. In a CPS with strategic DMs, each DM acts
autonomously considering his1 knowledge about the overall operation of the CPS
as well as other DMs’ behavior over time. Each DM makes private (imperfect) ob-
servations about the current state of the CPS as well as other DMs’ behavior over
time. Combining this information along with his anticipation about the other DMs’
behavior, each agent makes decisions in real time trying to maximize his own objec-
tive. The agents’ decisions, in turn, affect the evolution of the CPS over time, and
thus, determine its overall performance. Therefore, it is important to understand
how strategic DMs interact with a CPS and develop analysis and design approaches
to CPSs that incorporate the DMs’ selfish behavior in real time.
The main focus of this dissertation is to work towards developing analysis and
design approaches to CPSs with strategic DMs. We study specific problems that are
motivated by theoretical challenges in the study of CPSs with strategic agents as
well as particular applications where these systems are prevailing. We discuss below
the general framework that underlies the problems we study in this dissertation.
1.2 Research Framework
Throughout this dissertation, we assume that DMs who interact with a CPS are
rational Bayesian agents [50]. We call a DM a Bayesian agent if he forms his belief
about the current state of the CPS by using Bayesian inference. We call a DM a
rational agent if whenever he makes a decision he is not limited by the complexity of
the decision problem he faces, a cognitive limitation (e.g. imperfect recall), or time
available to make a decision.
A CPS with strategic agents can be described by a game that has the following
two key components:
(i) A decision tree G that determines agents’ feasible actions at any time, system
dynamics given the agents’ actions, and agents’ utility along each path of the CPS’s
1Throughout this dissertation we refer to the designer/principal as “she” and to agent/DM as
“he”.
2
evolution. As seen in Figure 1.1, the primitive random variables that appear in the
evolution of the CPS can be modeled as nature’s actions.
(ii) An information structure S that determines the information that each agent
knows about the current state of the CPS, as well as other agents’ information, at
any time (see Figure 1.2).
Figure 1.1: An example of decision tree G with two agents.
Figure 1.2: An example of information structure S with two agents.
The above components of a CPS capture the two main elements present in any
decision making problem: decisions and information (see Figure 1.3). It is the
interplay between decisions and information that determines the outcome/evolution
of a CPS with strategic agents. The interplay between decisions and information is
more subtle and essential in a CPS with strategic agents and asymmetric information.
In CPS with strategic agents and asymmetric information, agents’ decisions influence
the information that each agent has about the current state of the system and other
agents’ information and decisions over time. This is known as signaling. Moreover,
when agents are strategic with misaligned objectives, each agent has an incentive
3
to make decisions so as to manipulate the information of other agents and influence
their behavior, in an attempt to maximize his own objective.
Figure 1.3: The main two components of a CPS with strategic agents
1.3 Problem Formulations and Thesis Outline
In this dissertation, we study three classes of problems concerning the analysis
and design of CPS with strategic agents using the framework described above. To
design a CPS, a designer can alter its decision tree G and/or its information structure
S depending on his resources and control over various components of the CPS in the
specific application of interest. In the first class of problems, we consider monetary
incentive mechanisms where a designer alters the decision tree G by modifying the
agents’ payoffs through payments. In the second class of problems, we consider
informational incentive mechanisms where a designer alters the information structure
S by disclosing information to the agents. In the third class of problems, we consider
the analysis of a CPS when the decision tree G and information structure S are fixed,
and we want to evaluate the overall outcome of the strategic agents’ interaction with
the CPS.
1.3.1 Monetary Incentive Mechanisms
There are many instances of dynamic CPSs where strategic agents possess private
information that is crucial for the efficient operation of the system. In these instances,
the designer (principal) has authority/control over the decisions and resources but
does not know all information that is necessary to evaluate the performance of every
decision available to her over time. For instance, in a power grid, the independent
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system operator needs to know the private production cost of all generators so as to
solve the optimal power flow problem and determine the energy generation for each
of them. In these instances, the designer (principal) can utilize his authority over
the decisions and resources in the CPS and alter the decision tree G so as to induce
the agents to reveal (directly or indirectly) the information she needs to know for
the operation of CPS.
We note that when agents are non-strategic, a system designer faces a problem
that is equivalent to a resource allocation problem. Therefore, the mechanism design
problem described above can be interpreted as the strategic analogue of resource
allocation problems when the agents are strategic.
In a strategic setting where the agents’ objectives are different from that of the
designer, they do not necessarily follow the strategy that is prescribed by her and
reveal their private information. Therefore, the designer needs to provide incentives
so that the agents are willing to follow her proposed strategy prescriptions.
Providing monetary incentive payments is a common instrument the designer
can utilize to incentivize the agents to reveal their information truthfully and follow
her proposed strategies. However, not all strategy prescriptions can be incentivized
through monetary payments. Moreover, when determining the monetary payments,
the designer may further need to consider a tradeoff between the desired outcome
and the resources required to achieve it. Therefore, to determine an optimal strategy
prescription for the agents the designer needs to take into account the feasibility of
the prescribed strategies and the corresponding incentive payments.
In the first two chapters of this dissertation, we study the application of mone-
tary incentive mechanisms in the design of electricity markets for the integration of
renewable energy and flexible load into power grids.
1.3.1.1 Market Mechanisms for Renewable Energy and Flexible Loads
The current electricity market architecture is mainly designed for conventional
generators with slowly varying cost and static information structure, and assume
that the major uncertainty in balancing the demand and supply in a power grid is
5
due to the mismatch between the load forecast and load realization in real time. In
contrast to the production from conventional generators, the energy production from
renewable resources and the availability of flexible loads participating in demand re-
sponse programs depend on variables that are intermittent and become available
dynamically over time. For example, an accurate prediction of wind energy genera-
tion is only feasible within a few minutes of the generation time [56]. Moreover, the
flexibility of thermal loads participating in demand response programs depends on
variables such as temperature that can only be predicted within a few hours [82].
The current practices for the integration of intermittent renewable energy and
flexible loads into the electricity markets are to incorporate them into the existing
two-settlement market architecture (a forward market followed by a real-time market)
along with various subsidies and credits that encourage the investment in renewable
energy generation and flexible loads. However, as the share of renewable energy
generation and flexible loads increases and the supportive program and subsidies
phase out the current practices cannot be sustained [56, 30, 126], and we need to
investigate market mechanisms that are appropriate for the integration of these new
resources and revisit the electricity market structure. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3
of this dissertation, we study two mechanism design problems for electricity markets
that aim to provide insight into an appropriate market architecture for the integration
of intermittent renewable energy and flexible loads to the power grid.
We consider a dynamic model that accounts for the dynamic and uncertain nature
of energy production from renewable resources and the availability of flexible loads.
In this model, a renewable generator/flexible load receives information about its
generation capacity/flexibility level over time. Using this dynamic setting, we study
the problem of dynamic market mechanism design for the integration of renewable
generation and flexible loads into the power grid. We take a principal-agent view
point and adopt a Bayesian mechanism design framework [25] where the independent
system operator (principal) designs the market rules in advance and announces them
to the generators; the generators then voluntarily participate in the market assuming
that the independent system operator is committed to implementing the market rules
she has announced.
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In the current electricity market architecture, pooling markets along with forward
bilateral trades between generators and utility companies are the main two forms of
market mechanisms that are used to determine energy trades over the power network.
Therefore, using the general dynamic environment described above, we study the
problem of mechanism design within the context of forward contracts and pooling
markets for the integration of renewable energy and flexible loads in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, respectively.
1.3.1.2 Forward Contracts for Uncertain Electricity Resources
In electricity markets with conventional generators, it has been shown that hav-
ing forward contracts, alongside the pooling-based electricity markets, lowers the
market price, hedges pricing risks, and increases the reliability of the market oper-
ation [3, 24]. Motivated by these results, we study the problem of optimal forward
contract design for energy procurement (resp. direct control of flexible loads [82])
from a diversified electricity producer with renewable generation (resp. set of flexible
loads) in Chapter 2. Due to the seller’s multiple energy sources (resp. demand con-
straints), the seller has multidimensional private information. Moreover, the seller
has incomplete information about his renewable generation (resp. energy consump-
tion) at T = 1; this information becomes complete at T = 2 with the realization of
wind (resp. temperature).
Assuming the wind (resp. temperature) realizations can be monitored, we char-
acterize the optimal forward contract in which the buyer can accept random energy
delivery (resp. partial direct control of the load) from the diversified energy pro-
ducer (resp. flexible loads). We assume that the buyer needs to make a decision
over the amount of flexible and inflexible loads (resp. amount of renewable and
conventional generations) she schedules based on her agreement with the renewable
generator (resp. flexible load). We show that an optimal procurement mechanism is
a contingent contract. The seller chooses a contingent contract at T = 1 based on
his available private information at that time. At T = 2, the specific allocation and
payment are chosen from the selected contract based on the realization of the wind
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speed (resp. temperature).
We illustrate through examples that the contingent contract described above
provides flexibility to a renewable generator in his generation according to the new
information he receives over time, and enables the load serving-entities to utilize
more effectively the set of potential flexible loads that are available to him.
1.3.1.3 Dynamic Market Mechanisms for Wind Energy
We study the problem of market mechanism design for wind energy in Chapter
3. We first consider a dynamic two-step model with one strategic seller with wind
generation and one buyer that captures the essential elements that appear in the
design of a pooling market for renewable energy. The seller has private information
about his generation capability which he learns dynamically over time. At T = 1 the
seller has imperfect information about his generation capability. At T = 2, the seller
learns more accurate information about the realization of wind speed, and thus, has
perfect information about his generation capability.
We consider (static) forward and real-time mechanisms that take place at time
T = 1 and T = 2, respectively. The formulation of these mechanisms is motivated by
current practices that are in place in Europe and the U.S., respectively [20, 62]. We
further propose a dynamic market mechanism that provides a coupling between the
real-time and forward markets over time. We show that the proposed dynamic mech-
anism outperforms the forward and real-time mechanisms; thus, we demonstrate the
advantage of adopting the dynamic mechanism over a sequence of static mechanisms
for wind energy. On one hand, in contrast to the forward mechanism, the dynamic
mechanism incorporates the additional information arriving over time and provides
flexibility for intermittent wind generation. On the other hand, in contrast to the
real-time mechanism, the dynamic market mechanism provides early information
about wind generation which is necessary to maintain the reliability of power grids
and scheduling of adequate reserves. Moreover, by requiring the seller to reveal his
private information sequentially over time instead of simultaneously when he has all
his information, the dynamic mechanism restricts the seller’s market manipulation
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power. We show that the main advantage of the dynamic mechanism over the real-
time mechanism is due to the fact that in the dynamic mechanism it is possible to
(i) price discriminate different types of generators based on the uncertainty level in
their generation, and (ii) expose generators to the risk of penalty charges.
We further consider two variants of the dynamic mechanism. First, we investigate
the dynamic mechanism that guarantees no penalty risk for the seller. We character-
ize the additional incentive payments the designer needs to provide so as to guarantee
no penalty risk for the seller. We show that the performance of the dynamic mech-
anism with no penalty risk is in general inferior to the dynamic mechanism with
penalty risk. Second, we study the dynamic mechanism with wind monitoring. We
show that when the wind condition is monitored, the outcome of the dynamic mech-
anism improves. This happens because the required incentive payments the designer
needs to provide decrease as the seller cannot manipulate the outcome of the mech-
anism by misrepresenting the wind condition. However, we show that the benefit of
wind monitoring vanishes as the number of possible technologies for wind generation
increases.
We discuss how our results generalize to settings with many sellers using a hand-
icap auction mechanism [38]. In a handicap auction, sellers bid for a set of quantity-
payment options in the forward market. Next, in the real time, sellers receive more
information and bid for modifications in their generation. The allocations are deter-
mined based on the seller’s bids in the real-time market and the quantity-payment
options they choose in the forward market. Moreover, the payment that each seller
receives depends on the outcome of the real-time market as well as the quantity-
payment option he chooses at the forward market.
1.3.2 Informational Incentive Mechanisms
In contrast to the situation described in Section 1.3.1, there are instances of CPS
where the designer (principal) does not have perfect control over the decisions made
in the CPS but has superior information about the current state of the CPS that
is of value to the agents who make the decisions. In many of these systems, the
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implementation of monetary incentive mechanisms in not feasible or desirable. For
instance, in a transportation network where every driver makes his routing decision
individually, the effect of toll payments on traffic flow is limited, and it is not pos-
sible to track the routing decision of every driver and charge them accordingly. In
these instances, the designer can utilize her superior information and provide infor-
mational incentives to the agents by a selective disclosure of information that alters
the information structure S so as to influence the agents’ decisions, and maximize
her own objective.
We note that when the agents are non-strategic, the designer’s problem is equiva-
lent to a real-time source coding problem with a noiseless channel [77, 123, 131, 136].
Therefore, the design of informational incentive mechanisms can be viewed as the
analogue of the real-time source coding problem when agents are strategic.
In a strategic setting, each agent utilizes the information he receives from the
designer to his own advantage and does necessarily follow the actions the designer
suggests. Therefore, the designer needs to reveal her information strategically so that
the agents’ best response to the information they receive maximizes her objective.
There are two general approaches to the study of information design problems.
In the first approach, the designer announces a recommendation policy in advance,
and for every realization of her information about the current state of the system,
she recommends a specific action to every agent according to the recommendation
policy announced before [16, 15]. Therefore, the principal must choose an action
recommendation policy so that it is a best response for each agent to follow/obey
the action recommendation. Optimizing over the set of recommendation policies
which the agents obey, the designer chooses the one that maximizes her objective.
In the second approach, the designer directly works with the agents’ beliefs about
the current state of the CPS and attempts to modify them by disclosing selective
information conditioned on the realization of her information [59, 35]. Assuming
that it is possible to determine the agents’ best response for every realization of
their beliefs, the principal then chooses from all possible modifications of the agents’
beliefs so as to maximize her objective.
In this proposal, using the two approaches discussed above, we study the ap-
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plication of informational incentive mechanisms in the design of advanced traveler
information systems in transportation networks (e.g. variable (dynamic) message
signs on roadsides and/or routing recommendation on GPS-enabled devices).
1.3.2.1 Informational Incentives in Congestion Games
In recent years, the development of navigation applications (e.g. Waze, Google
map) and increasing utilization of variable message signs on roadsides have enabled
the drivers to have better information about the congestion level and the condition
of every link in a transportation network, and thus, make informed routing deci-
sions. The provision of real-time data about road conditions to drivers creates new
opportunities to alleviate congestion in transportation networks.
Several studies have examined the effect of information provision to drivers on
the social welfare, and identified instances where provision of information to drivers
can be harmful and reduce the social welfare as well as the drivers’ utility [78, 4,
14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74]. This is because in a transportation network every driver
makes his routing decision individually trying to maximize his own utility and does
not consider the negative externality that he creates by increasing the traffic along
the route that he takes.
In Chapter 4, we study the problem of designing an information disclosure mech-
anism in a transportation network. In contrast to the works of [78, 4, 14, 33, 73,
69, 124, 1, 74] that analyze the effect of specific information disclosure policies, we
investigate the problem of optimal design of information disclosure mechanisms in
transportation networks. We consider a congestion game over a parallel two-link
network, where drivers choose their route/link individually trying to minimize their
travel time. The travel time through every route/link in the network depends on the
route’s condition as well as the number of cars traveling through it. We assume that
the condition of one route (safe route) is known to all drivers while the condition of
the other route (risky route) is random and only known to the designer (principal).
The principal wants to design an information disclosure mechanism so as to mini-
mize the overall traveling time (social welfare). We consider two cases: (i) when the
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principal can only disclose information publicly to all drivers (e.g. variable message
signs), and (ii) when the principal can disclose information privately to each driver
(e.g. navigation applications). We investigate these two cases using the two general
approaches to information design described above in Section 1.3.2.
We show that when the principal employs a public information disclosure mech-
anism her optimal mechanism depends on the second derivative of the social welfare
function with respect to the risky route’s condition. If the social welfare is a convex
(resp. concave) function of the risky route’s condition then it is socially optimal to
disclose no information (resp. perfect information) about the risky routes’ condition
to the drivers. However, if the social welfare is neither convex nor concave, there
may exist a probability distribution over the possible risky route’s condition such
that an optimal mechanism is a partial information disclosure mechanism.
When the principal can employ private information disclosure mechanisms, we
show that the principal can improve the social welfare by coordinating the individual
recommendation she makes to the drivers based on the realization of the risky route’s
condition. When the uncertainty about the risky routes’ condition is high relative
to the ex-ante difference in the routes’ conditions (i.e. the value of information
is high), the principal can achieve the socially efficient routing outcome using an
optimal private information disclosure mechanism. When the uncertainty about
the risky routes’ condition is low relative to the ex-ante difference in the routes’
conditions (i.e. the value of information is low), the principal does not have enough
power to persuade the drivers to change their routing decision so as to achieve the
socially efficient routing outcome; nevertheless, by disclosing private information to
each driver, the principal can improve the social welfare compared to the one under
the “no information disclosure” mechanism.
In Section 4.6, we investigate the problem of dynamic information disclosure
mechanism design in a dynamic setting with time horizon T = 2, where the risky
route’s condition has uncontrolled Markovian dynamics and the drivers learn from
their experience at t = 1. We consider the following three scenarios for what drivers
learn at t = 1: (i) the drivers only learn from the information they receive from the
principal and do not make any additional observation about the risky route’s condi-
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tion and/or the number of cars on each route, (ii) in addition to the information they
receive from the principal at t = 1, the drivers who take the risky route at t = 1 learn
its condition perfectly, and (iii) in addition to the information they receive from the
principal at t = 1, the drivers observe the number of cars on the route they take at
t = 1. Due to privacy constraints and practicality issues, we assume that the infor-
mation the principal discloses to every driver at t = 2 does not depend on his actual
routing decision at t = 1. Using numerical simulations, we conjecture that in sce-
nario (i) the principal can achieve the same performance per time step in a dynamic
setting as in the static setting even though the drivers learn from the information
they receive at t = 1. However, in scenarios (ii) and (iii), where the drivers make
additional observation than in scenario (i), the performance of an optimal dynamic
information mechanism per time step decreases as the correlation between the risky
route’s conditions at t = 1 and t = 2 increases. In particular, for scenario (ii) we
identify instances where the principal’s optimal information mechanism is to commit
to revealing the risky route’s condition at t = 2 so that the drivers do not have an
incentive to experiment by taking the risky route at t = 1. Moreover, for scenario
(iii), we identified instances where the principal’s optimal information mechanism is
to not utilize all her information about the risky route’s condition at t = 1 so as to
have a higher information superiority at t = 2.
1.3.3 Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information
Many CPSs can be modeled as a dynamical system with controlled Markovian
dynamics. Therefore, given a fixed decision tree G and information structure S, we
can analyze CPSs with strategic agents as stochastic dynamic games with asym-
metric information and Markovian dynamics. In dynamic games with asymmetric
information, agents have different observations of the game evolution (i.e. current
state of the CPS), and thus, different information histories. Every agent plays a
strategy which is a function of his information history. In order to anticipate other
agents’ strategies over time, an agent needs to form a belief about other agents’ infor-
mation histories so as to predict other agents’ decisions. Therefore, to characterize
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the outcome of a dynamic game with asymmetric information we need to define an
assessment that consists of a set of strategies for all agents as well as a set of beliefs
for all agents at every information state. In our work, we adopt Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (PBE) as the solution concept to study the outcome of dynamic games
with asymmetric information. A PBE is an assessment that satisfies the sequen-
tial rationality and consistency conditions [43]. Sequential rationality requires that
each agent’s strategy is optimal at each of his information sets given his belief and
other agents’ strategies. Consistency requires that each agent’s belief at each of his
information sets complies with Bayes’ rule given all agents’ strategies.
While the definition of PBE provides a formalization of the connections between
the agents’ strategies and information/beliefs in dynamic games with asymmetric
information, it does not provide a tractable methodology for their analysis. In a dy-
namic game with asymmetric information, an agent’s belief about the current state
of the game at any time t depends on the strategy of all other agents up to time
t; this dependency is captured by the consistency condition, and it is known as sig-
naling. Moreover, at any time t, an agent chooses his strategy from time t onward
according to his belief about the current state of the game at time t; this depen-
dency is captured by the sequential rationality condition. Therefore, there exists a
circular dependency between all agents’ strategies and beliefs over time. As a re-
sult, one needs to determine the agents’ strategies and beliefs simultaneously for the
whole time horizon so as to satisfy the consistency and sequential rationality condi-
tions. Furthermore, as an agent gathers more information over time, the domains of
his strategies grow. Consequently, the determination of an agent’s strategy at any
time has a complexity that grows exponentially over time. As a result, the exist-
ing literature has only studied special instances of dynamic games with asymmetric
information (see [79, 42, 138, 44, 89, 46, 98, 97, 127, 108]).
In Chapter 5 of this dissertation, we aim to develop a general approach to the
study of dynamic games with asymmetric information and propose a tractable ap-
proach to determine a specific set of PBE of these games.
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1.3.3.1 A Common Information Approach to Dynamic Games with Asym-
metric information
Dynamic games with asymmetric information can be considered as the analogue of
decentralized stochastic control problems [53, 100] when agents are strategic and have
different objectives. Alternatively, dynamic games with asymmetric information can
be considered as a generalization of dynamic games with symmetric information [43,
41, 9] when agents possess private information in addition to the common information
they share. The authors of [91, 90] and [81] propose a tractable methodology to
study decentralized stochastic control problems and dynamic games with symmetric
information, respectively. In Chapter 5, we provide an analogue of the results of
[91, 90, 81] for dynamic games with asymmetric information.
The authors of [81] consider Markovian dynamic games with symmetric informa-
tion. They propose the common information based belief about the system state as
the information state for all agents, and characterize a class of subgame perfect equi-
libria (SPE) for dynamic games with symmetric information called Markov Perfect
Equilibrium (MPE). In an MPE, agents play strategies that are only functions of
the common information based belief (information state). Using the notion of MPE,
they propose a sequential decomposition of Markovian dynamic games with symmet-
ric information, and formulate a dynamic program that can be used to determine the
set of MPE of the game. The approach proposed in [81] does not apply to dynamic
games with asymmetric information simply because it does not consider the agents’
private information and beliefs about other agents’ private information over time.
The authors of [91, 90] study dynamic decentralized stochastic control problems
with non-classical information structure. Using the common information among the
agents, they present a centralized stochastic control problem that is equivalent to
the original problem as follows. For every local controller, they consider a fictitious
controller who has access to the local controller’s common information but not his
private information. Every fictitious controller has to determine a sequence of pre-
scriptions that determine the corresponding local controller’s action at every time
for every possible realization of his private information. The problem of determining
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the optimal strategies for the fictitious controllers is a centralized stochastic control
problem since they have symmetric information. Using standard results in centralized
stochastic control literature [67], they characterize a sufficient statistic/information
state for every agent, sequentially decompose the problem over time, and formulate a
dynamic program that can be used to determine the optimal strategy of the original
problem.
The works of [89, 46] have utilized the common information approach proposed
in [91, 90] to study a class of dynamic games with asymmetric informations where
there is no signaling among agents, i.e. agents’ beliefs are strategy independent. In
such situations, the circular coupling between strategies and beliefs, discussed above,
does not exist; this feature is a significant simplification assumed in the solution
methodology for the dynamic games considered in [89, 46]. Such a methodology
does not work for games where there is signaling among agents (i.e. agents’ beliefs
are strategy dependent).
In this chapter, we propose a general approach for the study of dynamic games
with asymmetric information when signaling occurs. We present a set of conditions
sufficient to characterize information states where the agents’ common and private
information are effectively compressed in a mutually consistent manner. We identify
instances of dynamic games with asymmetric information where we can characterize
an information state for every agent that has a time-invariant domain.
When the agents are non-strategic, we show that for every arbitrary but fixed
agents’ strategies, there exists an equivalent set of strategies that utilize only the
above-mentioned information state and results in the same expected flow of utility
over time (Theorem 5.4). This result generalizes the results of [90, 91] for decentral-
ized stochastic control problems in two aspects. First, the set of conditions sufficient
to characterize an information state presented in this dissertation are more general
than those of [90, 91] and includes them as special cases. In contrast to the approach
presented in [90, 91] that requires the agents to use all of their private information (or
use perfectly a predetermined stored memory of it), in our approach the agents’ pri-
vate information can be effectively compressed according to the sufficient conditions
presented in Section 5.6.
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Table 1.1: An overall view of the dissertation
Based on the information state characterized in Section 5.6, we introduce the
notion of Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (CIB-PBE) that
characterizes a set of outcomes for dynamic games. Using the notion of CIB-PBE, we
provide a sequential decomposition of the dynamic games over time and formulate
a dynamic program that enables us to compute the set of CIB-PBEs via backward
induction. The results appearing in Chapter 5 generalize the results of [97, 98, 116]
that consider special instances of dynamic games with asymmetric information when
signaling occurs.
We discuss the connection between the sets of PBEs and CIB-PBEs in dynamic
games with asymmetric information and argue that when the underlying system
is highly dynamic and there exists a significant information asymmetry among the
agents, the notion of CIB-PBE provides a plausible prediction of the outcome in
practice. We provide conditions under which we can guarantee the existence of CIB-
PBEs. Using these conditions, we prove the existence of CIB-PBEs for zero-sum
dynamic games and special instances of non-zero-sum dynamic games.
The information state characterized in Chapter 5 provides a sufficient statistic
for decision making purposes in strategic and non-strategic settings. Therefore, we
propose a universal approach to dynamic decision problems in CPSs with strategic
and non-strategic agents that can be used to study dynamic games among teams.
17
1.4 Contributions of the Thesis
An overall view of the dissertation can be seen in Table 1.1. The main contribu-
tion of this dissertation can be summarized as follows:
• Market mechanisms for renewable energy and flexible loads (Chapter 2)
– We propose a two-time step model that captures the dynamic and uncer-
tain nature of energy generation from renewable resources and allows for
scheduling of flexible/inflexible loads based on the availability of renew-
able generation.
– We investigate the problem of forward contract design for uncertain elec-
tricity resources (e.g. wind generators, flexible loads) between a buyer
and seller with general cost/utility functions and multi-dimensional pri-
vate information. We show that the optimal contract is a contingent
contract that is signed at t = 1 and determines the payment and the en-
ergy quantity for every realization of the uncertain variable (e.g. wind,
temperature) at t = 2.
– We present a modified payment function contingent on the realization of
the uncertainty that achieves any arbitrary risk sharing between the buyer
and seller without changing the energy allocation function. In particular,
we show that it is possible to ensure the stronger notion of ex-post individ-
ual rationality instead of interim individual rationality at no performance
loss.
• Dynamic market mechanisms for wind energy (Chapter 3)
– We demonstrate the advantage of dynamic market mechanisms over static
mechanisms (e.g. day-ahead and real-time markets) for a general de-
signer’s objective. A dynamic market mechanism couples dynamically the
outcomes/payments of different markets over time. Compared to a for-
ward pooling market (e.g. day-ahead markets), a dynamic market incor-
porates the additional information that arrives after the market closes, and
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thus, provides flexibility in generation from renewable resources. Com-
pared to a real-time market, a dynamic market gives less manipulation
power to a seller to misreport his generation cost, guarantees a certain
level of commitment by the seller for energy generation, and reveals in
advance the information necessary to schedule the adequate reserve gen-
erators/flexible loads.
– We show that the advantage of the dynamic market mechanism is mainly
due to (i) the designer’s power to price discriminate sellers with different
generation uncertainty (non-uniform pricing) and (ii) the designer’s ability
to expose sellers to the risk of penalty charges.
– We characterize the benefit of wind monitoring on the performance of the
dynamic market mechanism, and show that the value of wind monitoring
decreases as the number of possible generation technologies increases.
• Informational incentives in congestion games (Chapter 4)
– We investigate the problems of optimal public and private information
disclosure mechanism design in a transportation network so as to improve
the social welfare. We show that perfect disclosure of information about
the routes’ conditions is not an optimal mechanism . Therefore, our results
propose a solution to the concern raised in [78, 4, 14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74]
about the potential negative impact of information provision on the overall
congestion in transportation networks.
– When the principal can employ a private information disclosure mecha-
nism, we show that she can implement the socially efficient routing out-
come by providing coordinated routing recommendation to the drivers if
the value (variance) of her information about the routes’ condition is high
relative to the ex-ante differences in routes’ conditions.
– We investigate the problem of optimal dynamic private information dis-
closure mechanism design in a dynamic two-time step setting where the
routes’ conditions have uncontrolled Markovian dynamics. We identify
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the following three scenarios in which the drivers learn from their expe-
rience at t = 1: (i) they learn from the routing recommendations they
receive at t = 1 (ii) in addition to the routing recommendation they re-
ceive, they observe the condition of the route they take at t = 1 (iii) in
addition to the routing recommendation they receive, they observe the
number of cars (traffic) on the route they take at t = 1. Using numeri-
cal simulation, we conjecture that in scenario (i) the performance of the
optimal dynamic private information disclosure mechanism per time-step
is the same as that of the optimal static private information disclosure
mechanism. However, in scenarios (ii) and (iii) the performance of the
optimal dynamic private information disclosure mechanism decreases as
the correlation among the routes’ conditions at t = 1 and t = 2 increases.
• A common information approach to dynamic games with asymmetric informa-
tion (Chapter 5)
– We present a set of conditions sufficient to characterize an information
state where the agents’ private and common information are effectively
compressed in a mutually consistent manner. We identify instances of
dynamic games with asymmetric information where we can characterize
an information state with a time-invariant domain.
– When agents are non-strategic, we show that for any arbitrary agents’
strategy profile there exists an equivalent set of strategies for the agents
that depend on the above-mentioned information state that results in
the same flow of utility for all agents over time. Therefore, we propose a
general methodology for the study and analysis of dynamic team problems
with asymmetric information and generalize the existing results in [90, 91].
– We introduce a subclass of PBE of dynamic games with asymmetric infor-
mation, called CIB-PBE, that utilizes the above-mentioned information
state for every agent. Using the notion of CIB-PBE, we provide a se-
quential decomposition of the dynamic game over time. Accordingly, we
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formulate a dynamic program that enables us to compute the set of CIB-
PBE of a dynamic game via backward induction.
– We provide conditions under which we can guarantee the existence of
CIB-PBEs in a dynamic game. Using these conditions, we prove the
existence of CIB-PBE for dynamic zero-sum games and specific instances
of dynamic non-zero-sum games.
1.5 Notation
Random variables are denoted by upper case letters, their realization by the
corresponding lower case letter. In general, subscripts are used as time index while
superscripts are used to index agents. For time indices t1 ≤ t2, Xt1:t2 (resp. ft1:t2(·)) is
the short hand notation for the random variables (Xt1 , Xt1+1, ..., Xt2) (resp. functions
(ft1(·), . . . , ft2(·))). When we consider a sequence of random variables (resp. func-
tions) for all time, we drop the subscript and use X to denote X1:T (resp. f(·) to de-
note f1:T (·)). For random variables X1t , . . . ,XNt (resp. functions f 1t (·), . . . ,fNt (·)), we
use Xt :=(X
1
t , . . . ,X
N
t ) (resp. ft(·) :=(f 1t (·), . . . ,fNt (·))) to denote the vector of the set
of random variables (resp. functions) at t, andX−nt := (X
1




t , . . . , X
N
t )
(resp. f−nt (·) := (f 1t (·), . . . , fn−1t (·), fn+1t (·), . . . , fNt (·))) to denote all random vari-
ables (resp. functions) at t except that of the agent indexed by n. P(·) and E(·) denote
the probability and expectation of an event and a random variable, respectively. For
a set X , ∆(X ) denotes the set of all beliefs/distributions on X . For random variables
X, Y with realizations x, y, P(x|y) := P(X = x|Y = y) and E(X|y) := E(X|Y = y).
For a strategy g and a belief (probability distribution) π, we use Pgπ(·) (resp. Egπ(·))
to indicate that the probability (resp. expectation) depends on the choice of g and
π. We use 1{x}(y) to denote the indicator that X = x is in the event {Y = y}.
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Chapter 2
Forward Contracts under Uncertainty for
Electricity Markets
2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Background and Motivation
In recent years, electricity markets have undergone profound structural changes in
both the generation and the demand side. The traditionally monopolistic governm-
ent-regulated markets reformed toward liberalized electricity markets in order to
introduce competition and increase efficiency in generation [134]. Privately-owned
generators and utility companies possess private information about their cost/utility,
behave strategically, and seek to maximize their profits. Moreover, the developing
network of smart grids aims to utilize the available flexibility on the demand side
to increase the efficiency of the grid. To involve the demand side actively into the
operation of the grid, one needs to design appropriate mechanisms that incentivize
the demand to exercise flexibility in its consumption behavior.
Long-term contracts, as an agreement between strategic parties with private in-
formation, is one of the main trading mechanisms used in electricity markets. Gen-
erators and utility companies sign long-term contracts to hedge themselves against
the risk of pooling markets. In fact, it has been suggested that long-term contracts
are necessary along with the existing pooling markets to ensure the stability and
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reliability of electricity markets [24].
Contracts have been considered as one of the main mechanisms to induce a de-
sired behavior on the demand side of smart grids. In comparison to real time pricing
or direct market participation, contracts with incentive payments result in a direct
control of resources, and thus, give reliability and stability guarantees [82]. Fur-
thermore, contracts with incentive payments are simpler to implement and more
appealing to smaller market participants (e.g. households) [125].
In this chapter, we study a general contract design problem for electricity markets
in a principal-agent (buyer-seller(s)) setup. We assume that both the buyer and
the seller sides have multi-dimensional private information and general utility/cost
functions. Furthermore, we explicitly consider a general uncertainty in our problem
formulation which is becoming a critical issue in the operation of electricity markets.
As the share of intermittent generation from renewable generation increases, the
uncertainty in the available generation will increase. Furthermore, the added flexi-
bility on the demand side in smart grids also means a higher uncertainty on demand;
such uncertainty should be properly managed through appropriately designed incen-
tives. In general, both the buyer and the seller may have uncertainty, either in their
cost/utility functions, or the availability of the resources being traded between them.
By explicitly including uncertainty into our problem formulation we capture these
facts and can address the problem of commitment (ex-post voluntary participation),
risk sharing, and forward contracts with random allocation.
The problems formulated in this chapter enable us to capture and analyze in-
teraction between energy consumers and renewable energy generators, as well as
interactions between an aggregator and a network of a demand population partic-
ipating in the demand response program. We provide examples for each of these
scenarios so as to illustrate our results.
2.1.2 Related Literature
There is a growing literature on contract design for electricity with information
asymmetry and strategic behavior. A contract design problem for demand manage-
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ment with one-dimensional private information and linear utility has been studied
in [39]. The work in [21] addresses the problem of contract design for deferrable
demands with constant marginal utility for demand. The work in [28] considers a
mechanism design problem for the forward reserved market assuming that the par-
ticipants have constant marginal cost and no market power. Although the private
information in [21], and [28] is multi-dimensional, the simplifying assumption of con-
stant marginal cost/utility enables the authors to rank different types, and is critical
to the solution approaches they provide. The specific structures of utility/cost func-
tions assumed in [21], [28], and [39] enable the authors to provide solutions that
are inspired by the solution methodology of the one-dimensional screening problem.
Contract design problem for demand response with quadratic cost functions is in-
vestigated in [49] by numerical methods. The work in [114] considers a mechanism
design problem for energy procurement with a general utility/cost function and un-
certainty and applies a Vickery-Clacks-Gloves (VCG) based mechanism. However,
the VCG mechanism is suboptimal for the problem formulated in [114] when the cost
function cannot be parameterized by only a one-dimensional type (see [66], Ch. 14).
From the economics point of view, the problem we formulate in this chapter be-
longs to the class of screening problems. In economics, the one-dimensional screening
problem has been well-studied with both linear and nonlinear utility functions [25].
However, the extension to the multi-dimensional screening problem is not straight-
forward and no general solution is available. The authors in [75] study a general
framework for a deterministic multi-dimensional screening problem with linear util-
ities. They discuss two general approaches, the parametric-utility approach and
the demand-profile approach. The methodology we use to solve the problem for-
mulated in this chapter is similar to the demand-profile approach. We consider a
multi-dimensional screening problem under uncertainty with nonlinear utilities. The
presence of nonlinearities and uncertainty results in additional complications that
are not present in [75] where the utilities are linear and there is uncertainty1.
1When a problem is linear, expectation of any random variable can be replaced by its expected
value and reduce the problem to a deterministic one.
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2.1.3 Contribution
The contribution of this chapter is two-fold. First, we consider an optimal con-
tract design problem for electricity markets with utility/cost functions that are more
general than those considered in the literature ([21],[28],[39],[49]). The nature of
utility/cost functions with multi-dimensional private information is such that the so-
lution methodology presented in [21],[28], and [39] does not extend to our problem.
The generality of our model enables us to capture many instances of problems arising
in electricity markets. Two such instances are discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.6.
Second, we explicitly incorporate a general uncertainty in the realized cost/utility
of the buyer and the seller. The presence of uncertainty along with the nonlinearity
of the utilities result in problems where the methodology used in previous works
([21],[28],[39]) cannot be applied, as in these works the utilities are linear and any
uncertainty can be replaced by its expected value. The inclusion of uncertainty is
crucial in the modeling and analysis of emerging electricity markets because: (1)
the share of renewable generation increases; (2) the existing demand becomes less
shielded from the market outcome and more elastic; and (3) new resources/loads
(e.g. storage, plug-in electric vehicles) enter the market. Due to uncertainty, firm
forward contracts (a priori fixed allocation and fixed payment) do not appear to be
an appropriate form of contract for emerging electricity markets. Moreover, in the
presence of uncertainty, interim voluntary participation (defined in Section 2.3) of
the seller does not necessarily imply ex-post voluntary participation of the seller (de-
fined in Section 2.5). Therefore, additional considerations are needed to ensure the
commitment of the agents to the contract for every realization of the uncertainty.
We show that, in general, the optimal mechanism for the problem formulated in this
chapter is a menu of nonlinear pricing schemes. We prove that by allowing the pay-
ment to depend on the uncertainty, we can achieve ex-post voluntary participation
of the seller, and a desired risk-sharing (associated with the uncertainty) between
the buyer and the seller. To the best of our knowledge, our results present the first
optimal forward contract under uncertainty for electricity markets where the buyer
and the seller have general utility/cost functions parameterized by multi-dimensional
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private information. We illustrate our results by providing two examples from elec-
tricity markets: an optimal demand response contract for ancillary service; and a
bilateral trade between a buyer and a renewable energy generator.
2.1.4 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We introduce the model in
Section 2.2. In Section 2.3, we formulate and analyze an optimal forward contract
with deterministic allocation, and address the problem of risk sharing between the
buyer and the seller. We illustrate the result via an example for a contract design
problem for demand response program in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we formulate
and analyze an optimal forward contract with random allocation that depends on
the uncertainty, and address the problem of the seller’s imperfect commitment (ex-
post voluntary participation). We provide an example of a bilateral trade between
a buyer and a renewable energy generator in Section 2.6. We discuss our results in
Section 2.7. We conclude in Section 4.7. The proofs of the lemmas and corollaries
appearing in this chapter can be found in Appendix A.
2.2 Model
A buyer wants to design a mechanism to procure energy/resource from a seller.2
Let q be the amount of energy/resource the buyer procures, and t be his payment
to the seller. The buyer’s total profit is given by V(q) − t, where V(q) is his utility
by receiving q amount of energy/resource. The function V(·) is the buyer’s private
information and V(0) = 0.
The seller’s provision cost is given by C(q,x, w), convex and increasing in q,
x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)∈χ⊆Rn is the seller’s type, and w denotes the realization of a
random variable W (uncertainty) with a probability distribution FW (w) that is com-
mon knowledge. We assume that C(0,x, w) (zero-provision cost) does not depend on
the realization of random variable w and is equal to x1, i.e. C(0,x, w)=C(0,x)=x1.
2From now on, we refer to the buyer as “he” and to the seller as “she”.
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The seller’s utility is given by her total expected revenue EW {t− C(q,x,W )}. The
seller’s type x is her private information, the set χ is common knowledge, and there
is a prior probability distribution Fx over χ which is common knowledge between
the buyer and the seller.
Let c(q,x) := ∂EW {C(q,x,W )}
∂q
denote the expected marginal cost for the seller’s type
x. We assume that ∃m, 1<m≤ n, such that c(q,x) is increasing in xi for 1≤ i≤m,
and decreasing in xi for m<i≤n.3 Moreover, there exists x∈χ (the seller’s worst
type) such that xi≤xi and xj≥xj for all x∈χ, 1≤ i≤m and m<j≤n.
Definition 2.1. We say the seller’s type x is better (resp. worse) than the seller’s
type x̂ if c(q,x)≤ c(q, x̂) for all q ≥ 0 (resp. c(q,x)≥ c(q, x̂)) with strict inequality
for some q.
Therefore, the seller’s type x is better than the seller’s type x̂ if and only if xi≤ x̂i
for 1≤ i≤m, and xi≥ x̂i for m<i≤n with strict inequality for some i. The following
example illustrates such ordering.
Example 2.1. Consider an energy seller with a wind turbine and a gas genera-
tor. The generation from the wind turbine is free and given by γw3, where γ is the
turbine’s technology and w is the realized weather. The gas generator has a fixed
marginal cost θc. There is a fixed cost c0 which includes the start-up cost for both
plants and the capital cost for the seller. Therefore, the seller’s type has n = 3
dimensions. The generation cost for the seller is given by
C(q, w,x) = c0 + θc max
{
q − γw3, 0
}
. (2.1)
The seller’s type x = (c0, θc, γ) is better than the seller’s type x̂ = (ĉ0, θ̂c, γ̂) if and
only if c0 ≤ ĉ0, θc ≤ θ̂c, and γ ≥ γ̂, with one of the above inequalities being strict.
Note that in the one-dimensional screening problem, the cost of production in-
duces a complete order among the seller’s types, which is crucial to the solution of
3Note that for a general cost function C(q,x,W ) if the corresponding c(q,x) changes sign for
only finite number of times, one can expand the type space χ and reorder its dimensions so that it
satisfies the assumption on the existence of m.
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the optimal mechanism design problem. However, in multi-dimensional screening
problems, the expected cost of production induces, in general, only a partial order
among the seller’s types.
We assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power; thus, he can design the
mechanism/set of rules that determines the agreement for the procurement quantity
q, and the payment t. After the buyer announces the mechanism for procurement and
the seller accepts it, both the buyer and the seller are fully committed to following
the rules of the mechanism.
As a consequence of the assumption on the buyer’s bargaining power and the
fact that the seller’s utility does not directly depend on the buyer’s private infor-
mation (private value), the solution of the problem formulated in this chapter does
not depend on whether the buyer’s utility V(·) is private information or common
knowledge4.
In the rest of this chapter we formulate two contract design problems. In Section
2.3, we assume that the buyer can only accept an a priori fixed energy delivery
and formulate a forward contract design problem with deterministic allocation. In
Section 2.5, we assume that the buyer can tolerate intermittency in the delivered
energy by utilizing his existing storage/reserve resources, and formulate a forward
contract design with random allocation.
2.3 Forward Contracts with Deterministic Allocation
In this section we consider a problem of forward contract design where the allo-
cation q is deterministic and is decided in advance at the time of contract signing.
Bilateral trades with conventional generators and demand response (DR) contracts
for direct load control are forms of such a contract.
4This becomes more clear by looking at the result of Theorem 1.
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2.3.1 Problem Formulation
Let (M, h) be the mechanism/game form (see [80], Ch. 23) for energy procure-
ment designed by the buyer. In this game form, M describes the message/strategy
space for the buyer and the seller, respectively, and h determines the outcome func-
tion; h :M→ R+×R. For every message m ∈M the outcome function h specifies
the amount q of the procured energy/resource and the payment t made to the seller,
i.e. h(m) = (q(m), t(m)).5
The objective is to determine a mechanism (M, h) so as to
maximize
(M,(q(·),t(·)))
Ex,W {V(q(m∗))− t(m∗)} , (2.2)
where m∗ ∈ M is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game induced by the
mechanism (M, h). We want the seller to voluntarily participate in the procurement
process. The voluntary participation (VP) (or individual rationality) for each type
of the seller can be written as
interim VP: EW{t(m∗)−C(q(m∗),x,W )}≥0,∀x∈χ (2.3)
That is, at equilibrium m∗ of the induced game the mechanism the seller must have
an expected (with respect to the uncertainty W ) non-negative payoff. We call the
requirement expressed by (2.3) an interim voluntary participation constraint.
We call the above problem (P1).
2.3.2 Analysis & Results
We prove that the optimal procurement mechanism is a pricing scheme that the
buyer offers to the seller and the seller chooses a quantity according to her type.
In such a pricing scheme we have M = χ, q : χ → R+, and the payment function
t(·) can be defined indirectly as a function of the quantity q(x), i.e. t(q(x)). We
characterize the optimal procurement mechanism by the following theorem, which
5Note that we use q (resp. t) to denote both the quantity value (resp. payment value) and the
quantity outcome function (resp. payment function) of mechanism (M, h).
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reduces the original functional maximization problem (P1) to a set of equivalent
pointwise maximization problems.
Theorem 2.1. Under a certain concavity condition, stated in Lemma 2.3 below, the
optimal mechanism (q(·), t(·)) for the buyer is a nonlinear pricing scheme given by
p(q) = arg max
p̂




p(l)dl + C(0,x), (2.5)
q(x) = arg max
l∈R+
{t (l)− EW {C(l,x,W )}} (2.6)
where V ′(q) := dV(q)
dq
and M = χ.
The assertion of Theorem 2.1 is established via several steps. Below we present
these steps and the key ideas behind each step. The proofs of the lemmas and
corollaries appearing in theses steps can be found in the appendix. In the sequel, we
omit the argument of the functions q(·) and t(·) whenever such an omission causes
no confusion.
Step 1. We set message spaceM = χ and formulate the following problem (P2)
that is equivalent to problem (P1):
maximize
(q(·),t(·))
Ex,W {V(q(x))− t(x)} (2.7)
subject to
IC : x=arg max
x′
EW [t(x′)−C(q(x′),x,W )] , ∀x∈χ (2.8)
interim V P : EW [t(x)−C(q(x),x,W )]≥0,∀x∈χ, (2.9)
where q : χ→ R+ and t : χ→ R.
The equivalence follows from the revelation principle [32]. By invoking the revela-
tion principle, without loss of optimality, we restrict attention to direct mechanisms
(where M = χ) that are incentive compatible and individually rational. Incentive
compatibility (IC) for a direct mechanism requires that truth-telling must be an
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optimal strategy for the seller.
Step 2. We show that for any incentive compatible mechanism (q, t) the seller’s
worst type x gets the minimum utility among all of the seller’s types. We utilize the
partial order among the seller’s different types to rank her utility for her different
types (Lemma 2.1), and reduce the VP constraint (2.13) for all the seller’s types to
the VP constraint only for the seller’s worst type (Corollary 2.1).
Lemma 2.1. For a given incentive compatible mechanism (q, t), a better type of the
seller gets a higher utility. That is, let U(x) := EW {t(x)− C(q(x),x,W )} denote
the expected profit of the seller with type x. Then,
1. ∂U
∂xi
≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m,
2. ∂U
∂xi
≥ 0,m < i ≤ n.
A direct consequence of Lemma 2.1, is that the seller’s worst type x receives the
minimum utility among all the seller’s types.
Corollary 2.1. The voluntary participation constraint is only binding for the worst
type x. That is, the general VP constraint (2.13) can be reduced to
U(x) := EW {t(x)− C(q(x),x,W )} ≥ 0. (2.10)
Step 3. We show, via Lemma 2.2 below, that the optimal mechanism (q, t) is
a pricing scheme. That is the payment function t(x) can be defined indirectly as a
function of q as t(q(x)).
Lemma 2.2. For any pair of functions (q, t) that satisfies the IC constraint, we can
rewrite t(x′) as t (q(x′)).
With some abuse of notation we assume that the payment function t : R → R
refers to the indirectly defined function t(q(x)) (non-linear pricing scheme) and we
denote t(q(x)) by t(q).
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Lemma 2.2 implies that the VP constraint (2.10) can be written as
U(x) := EW {t(q(x))− C(q(x),x,W )} ≥ 0. (2.11)
.
Step 4. We show that under a certain quasi-concavity condition, stated in
Lemma 2.3 below, we can define indirectly the allocation function q(x) as a function
of the payment function t(l) by utilizing the incentive compatibility constraint. We
define the following problem (P3), that is equivalent to problem (P2), in terms of
the marginal price p(l) = dt(l)
dl















The equivalence is established in two steps. First, consider an arbitrary incentive
compatible mechanism (q, t). The optimal quantity q∗(x) for each type x of the seller
is given by
q∗(x) = arg max
l
EW {t (l)− C(l,x,W )} . (2.14)
Incentive compatibility then requires that the seller must tell the truth to achieve
this optimal value, and cannot do better by lying, i.e. q(x) = q∗(x) for all x ∈ χ. For
any function t(·), this last equality can be taken as the definition for the associated
function q(·). Thus, the IC constraint can be eliminated by defining q(·) := q∗(·)
and the problem of designing the optimal direct revelation mechanism (q, t) can be
reduced to an equivalent problem where we determine only the optimal payment
function t(·) subject to the voluntary participation constraint for the worst type.
Next, using Lemma 2.3, stated below, we rewrite the buyer’s expected utility in
terms of the marginal price p(q) := ∂t(q)
∂q
and the minimum payment t(0) (which along
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with p(·) uniquely determines the payment function t(·)).
Lemma 2.3. Assume that the seller’s problem defined by (2.14) is continuous and








P (x∈ χ|q∗(x)≥ l) p(l)dl, (2.15)
where
P (x ∈ χ|q∗(x) ≥ l) = P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l,x)] . (2.16)
Using (2.15) and (2.16), we can rewrite the objective of problem (P2) and obtain
the equivalent problem (P3) given by (2.12) and (2.13)
Equation (2.16) states that the seller is willing to produce the marginal quantity
at l if the resulting expected marginal profit is positive, i.e. the marginal price p(l)
exceeds the marginal expected cost of generation c(l,x). Equation (2.15) expresses
the buyer’s total expected utility in term of an integral of his total marginal utility
V ′(l) − p(l) at quantity l, times the probability that the seller’s production exceeds
l, minus the minimum payment t(0).
Step 5. We prove that the seller’s worst type produces the minimum quantity
among all the seller’s types, i.e. q(x) = minx∈χ q(x). As a result, we show that
6This is a standard assumption in economics literature, e.g. see [75] and [133]. Basically, it can
be seen as a situation where the seller can decide for each marginal unit of production independently.
Thus, in general, there is no guarantee that the seller’s independent decisions about each marginal
unit of production results in a continuous and plausible total production quantity q. Therefore, the
continuity of the result must be checked a posteriori for each type of the seller.
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p(l)dl≥EW [C(q∗(x),x,W)] . (2.18)
We establish the equivalence by providing a ranking for the seller’s optimal deci-
sion q∗(x) based on the partial order among the seller’s types.
Lemma 2.4. For a given mechanism specified by (t(·), q(·)), a better type of the seller
produces more. That is, the optimal quantity q∗(x) that the seller with true type x








≥ 0,m < i ≤ n.
As a consequence of Corollary 2.1 and Lemma 2.4 we can then simplify the VP
constraint (2.13) as follows.
Corollary 2.2. The interim VP constraint is satisfied if t(0) = C(0,x) and the
seller’s worst type payment is equal to her expected production cost, i.e. t(q∗(x)) =
EW{C(q∗(x),x,W )}.
The equivalence of problems (P3) and (P4) follows from Corollary 2.2 and by
replacing the VP constraint (2.13) by (2.18). Note that we also dropped the constant
term t(0) = C(0,x) (from Corollary 2.2) in the objective of problem P4 given by
(2.17).
Problem (P4) is in terms of the marginal price p(l) and requires that the payment
the seller’s worst type receives is equal to her cost of production.
Step 6. We show that the solution of problem (P4) is given by
p(l) = arg max
p̂
{P [x∈ χ|p̂ ≥ c(l,x)](V ′(l)− p̂)}
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To prove the claim of Step 6 we consider a relaxed version of (P4) without the
VP constraint (2.18). The unconstrained problem can be solved pointwise at each
quantity l to determine the optimal p(l) as
p(l)=arg max
p̂
{P [x∈ χ|p̂ ≥ c(l,x)](V ′(l)− p̂)} , (2.19)
which is the same as (2.4). From Corollary 2.2 and the fact that the worst type has
the highest expected marginal cost, we can simplify (2.19), for l ≤ q∗(x), as
p(l) = c(l,x), for l ≤ q∗(x). (2.20)
Note that for l ≤ q∗(x) we have P [x∈ χ|p̂ ≥ c(l,x)] = 1 from Lemma 2.4. Therefore,
the minimum marginal price p(l) that ensures all the seller’s type are willing to
produce more than q∗(x) is equal to the marginal expected cost for the seller’s worst
type c(l,x). Therefore, the solution to the unconstrained version of problem (P4)
satisfies constraint (2.18) of problem (P4), and therefore, (2.19) is also the optimal
solution of problem (P4).
We complete now the proof of Theorem 2.1. Using claim of Step 4 along with





which is the same as (2.5). From (2.14) we determine the optimal energy procurement
function,
q(x) = arg max
l
EW {t (l)− C(l,x,W )}
which is the same as (2.6). The specification of t(·) and q(·) completes the proof of
Theorem 2.1 and the solution to problem (P1).
In essence, Theorem 2.1 states that at each quantity l, the optimal marginal price
p(l) is chosen so as to maximize the expected total marginal utility at l, which is
given by the total marginal utility (V ′(l)− p(l)) times the probability that the seller
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generates at least l.
Remark 2.1. In problem (P1), we assume that there exists a seller’s worst type
which has the highest cost at any quantity among all the seller’s types, and we reduce
the VP constraint for all of the seller’s type to only the VP constraint for this worst
type. As a result, we pin down the optimal payment function by setting t(0) = C(0,x)
to ensure the voluntary participation of the worst type, which consequently implies the
voluntary participation for all of the seller’s types. In absence of the assumption on
the existence of the seller’s worst type, the argument used to reduce the VP constraint
is not valid anymore and we cannot pin down the payment function and specify t(0) a
priori. Assuming that all types of the seller participate in the contract, their decision
on the optimal quantity q∗ only depends on the marginal price p(q), and therefore,
the optimal marginal price p(q), given by (2.19), is still valid without the assumption
on the existence of the worst type. To pin down the payment function t(·), we find











where the optimal decision of type x is given by




p(l̂)dl̂ − EW {C(l,x,W )}
]
. (2.22)
Remark 2.2. In a setup with a positive zero-provision cost for the seller, it might not
be optimal for the buyer to require all the seller’s types to voluntarily participate in
the procurement process, since t(0) depends on the zero-provision cost of the seller’s
worst type C(0,x). In such cases, it might be optimal for the buyer to exclude some
“less efficient” types of the seller from the contract, select an admissible set of the
seller’s types, and then design the optimal contract for this admissible set of the
seller’s types7. Note that this is not the case for setups without a zero-provision cost.
7To find the optimal admissible set, the optimal contract can be computed for different potential
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In such setups, if it is not optimal for some type x to be included in the optimal
contract, it is equivalent to set q(x) = 0 in a contract menu that considers all types
of the seller.
2.3.3 Risk Allocation
In the optimal mechanism/contract menu presented by Theorem 2.1, the buyer
faces no uncertainty, and he is guaranteed to receive quantity q(x), and all the risk
associated with the realization of W is taken by the seller. We wish to modify the
mechanism to reallocate the above-mentioned risk between the buyer and the seller.
To do so, we modify the payment function so that the risk is reallocated between
the buyer and the seller. Consider the following modified payment function with
α∈ [0, 1],
t̂(x, w) = t(q(x)) + α [C(q(x),x, w)
−EW {C(q(x),x,W )}] . (2.23)




= t(q(x)). Therefore, the strategic behavior
of the seller does not change and the seller chooses the same quantity under the
modified payment function t̂(·) as under the original payment function t(q) given by
(2.5). Note that for α = 0 we have the same payment as t(q). For α = 1, the seller
is completely insured against any risk and all the risk is taken by the buyer. The
parameter α determines the allocation of the risk between the buyer and the seller;
the buyer undertakes α and the seller undertakes (1− α) share of the risk.
We illustrate the result of Theorem 2.1 by an example below.
2.4 Example - Demand Response (DR)
We consider a contract design for DR program. There is a load aggregator that
offers contracts with incentive payments to a heterogeneous population of loads who
are willing to yield the direct control of their load to the aggregator given that they
admissible sets. Then, the resulting utilities can be compared to find the optimal admissible set.
37
are offered an appropriate incentive payment. The aggregator participates in an
ancillary service market and sells the aggregated resources to the reserve market at
exogenous marginal price pr.
8 Formally, there are I types of loads with a population
distribution f over different types. Each load of type i has a maximum controllable
load Li. Let qi ≤ Li denote the quantity that each load of type i yields its control to
the aggregator to be dispatched. We assume that each load of type i has a quadratic
















i ). Let ti denotes the incentive payment
to each load of type i for yielding the control of load qi. Then, the total utility of
each load of type i is given by











The aggregator participates in the ancillary service market and provides capacity
q =
∑







We consider I = 5 types of loads described in Table 2.1 along with a normalized
population distribution f with
∑
fi = 1, and set pr = 2 ¢/kWh. Note that no
complete ordering can be defined based on their marginal cost and there exists no
worst type; at lower quantities smaller loads (e.g. type (b)) have a lower marginal
cost while at higher quantities larger loads (e.g. type (e)) have lower cost.
Via Theorem 2.1 we determine the optimal menu of contracts the aggregator
offers to the heterogeneous population of loads (Table 2.2). The optimal menu of
8If pr is not exogenous, the aggregator’s interactions with the reserve market on one hand and
the demand population on the other hand become coupled. In this case these interactions must be
studied simultaneously.
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contracts can be interpreted also as a nonlinear pricing that the aggregator offers to
loads (Fig. 2.1).
The optimal choice and the resulting payoff for each type of load are summarized
in Table 2.3. We note that, unlike one-dimensional contracts, a type with a higher












(a) 0.5 0.1 5 10 0.1
(b) 1 0.1 4 10 0.3
(c) 1.5 0.6 8 5 0.2
(d) 2 0.6 5 8 0.3
(e) 2.5 1.2 6 5 0.1
Table 2.1: Different types of loads
Quantity q(·) (kWh) 0.38 0.64 0.82 1.10 1.40
Payment t(·) (¢) 3847 7569 10498 15450 20991
Table 2.2: Options menu offered by the aggregator
Type Quantity Payment Cost Profit
(a) 0.382 3847 3469 378
(b) 0.643 7569 6897 762
(c) 1.100 15450 15450 0
(d) 0.8185 10498 10052 446
(e) 1.400 20991 19400 1591
Table 2.3: Optimal contract for each and the resulting outcome
2.5 Forward Contracts with Random Allocation
In some instances of the problem considered in this chapter, the buyer has a
reserve resource [130] or wants to supply deferrable loads [21] that gives him the
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Figure 2.1: The optimal pricing scheme for DR program
flexibility to accept a random allocation q(x,W ) that depends on the uncertainty
W , and compensate the randomness in the allocation utilizing the existing flexibility.
In this section, we formulate and analyze a forward contract design problem with
random allocation. We assume that the realization of the random variable W is
common knowledge between the buyer and the seller.
2.5.1 Problem Formulation
Let e(x) denote the forward scheduled quantity (deterministic) by the buyer
and q(x, w) denote the random delivered quantity by the seller with type x. Let
CR(e(x) − q(x, w)) denote the cost incurred by the buyer to compensate the real-
time deviation e(x)− q(x, w) from the forward schedule e(x). Then, for a given set
of contract menus (q(x, w), t(x, w)), the buyer’s optimal schedule e(x) for the seller’s




and the buyer’s expected utility is given by
EW,x{V(e(x))−t(x,W )−CR(e(x)− q(x,W ))} . (2.28)
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The buyer wants to design a mechanism (q(x, w), t(x, w)) so as to maximize his
expected utility given by (2.28), subject to the voluntary participation of the seller.
Formally, the contract design problem with random allocation for the buyer, called





EW{t(x,W )− C(q(x,W ),x,W )} ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X . (2.30)
2.5.2 Analysis & Results
We show, via Theorem 2.2 below, that the optimal forward contract with random
allocation is a menu of pricing schemes, one for each type of the seller.
Theorem 2.2. The optimal forward contract with random allocation for problem
(Q1) is a menu of pricing schemes given by
e(x) = q̃(x) (2.31)
q(x, w) = q̃(x)− qR(x, w), (2.32)


























{C(q̃(x)−l,x, w)+CR(l)} . (2.37)
Proof. Consider the following contract design problem where the seller’s cost function
is defined as
C̃(q̃,x, w) = min
l
{C(l,x, w) + CR(q̃ − l)} ,







The optimal contract design problem for the defined environment above, called





















where q̃ and t̃ denote the quantity and payment function for the defined problem




denote the optimal contract for problem (Q2) obtained via Theorem 2.1. Note
that through the cost function C̃(q̃(x),x, w), defined by (2.36), we absorb the op-
timal schedule choice e(x), given by (2.27), and internalize the compensation cost
CR(e(x)− q(x,W )) for the random deviation e(x)− q(x,W ) in problem (Q1) into
the seller’s cost function. Therefore, the optimal scheduled quantity e(x) for problem
(Q1) is equal to the optimal function q̃(x) for problem (Q2), i.e. e(x) = q̃(x). Con-
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sequently, one can reconstruct the optimal contract {q(x, w), t(x, w)} for problem




for the equivalent problem (Q2) as
q(x, w) = q̃(x)− qR(x, w),





denotes the random reserve quantity required to compensate the random allocation
q(x, w).
Theorem 2.2 has the following interpretation. The buyer offers different pricing
schemes (quantity-payment curves), and each type of the seller chooses one based
on her private information and expectation about W . Then, in real time as W is
realized, based on the realization w, one point from the chosen pricing scheme is
selected and the payment t and the energy delivery q are determined.
2.5.3 Imperfect Commitment and Ex-post Voluntary Participation
The voluntary participation constraint imposed in problem (Q1) is interim. That
is, the expected profit with respect to W must be non-negative for each type of the
seller. Up until now (problem (P1) and (Q1)) we have assumed that once the seller
agrees to sign the contract (such an agreement takes place before the realization
of random variable W ) she is fully committed to following the agreement, even if
the realized profit is negative (due to some realization w)9. Therefore, it would be
desirable to modify the contract in order to ensure a positive payoff for the seller
for every realization of W and full commitment without any outside enforcement.
To ensure that the seller’s realized profit is non-negative for every realization w,
9Since the seller’s reserved utility is zero by not participating (outside option), we can always
think of the seller walking away from the agreement for these negative profit realizations and not
following the mechanism rules.
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we impose an ex-post voluntary participation constraint and replace the interim VP
constraint (2.30) by
Ex-post VP: t(x)− C(q,x, w) ≥ 0,∀w, ∀x∈χ. (2.42)
To satisfy the ex-post voluntary participation constraint, we modify the payment
function of the mechanism given by Theorem 2.2 as follows:
ť(x, w)= EW {t(x,W )}−EW {C(q(x,W ),x,W )}





= EW {t(x,W )}, and therefore, the seller always chooses
the same quantity q under the modified payment function ť as under the original
payment function t given by (2.33). Furthermore, we have ť(x, w)−C(q(x, w),x, w)=
EW {t(x,W )}− EW {C(q(x,W ),x,W )}≥ 0 for all w,x, where the last inequality is
true since {q, t} satisfies the interim VP constraint (2.30). Therefore, under the




satisfies the expost VP constraint (2.42).
2.6 Example - Forward Bilateral Trade
Consider a forward bilateral trade between a buyer and a seller with wind gen-
eration. The buyer has an (almost inelastic) energy demand curve given by Fig.
2.2.
Figure 2.2: The buyer’s demand curve
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Figure 2.3: The wind turbine generation curve g(w,vci,vr,vco,γ)
Figure 2.4: The wind forecast FW
The seller has a wind farm and (possibly) a reserve generator/storage that can be
used to compensate for wind generation intermittency. The seller’s wind generation
is given by g(w, vci, vr, vco, γ) as in Fig. 2.3, where w denotes the wind speed and
(vci, vr, vco, γ) denotes the specification of the wind turbine. The wind speed is ran-
dom and the wind forecast fW is given by Fig. 2.4, which is a Weibull distribution
with shape parameter k = 3 and average wind speed of 5m/s. We assume that the
wind forecast fW as well as the wind realization w are common knowledge between
the buyer and the seller. The wind generation has a marginal operational cost θw.
The seller (possibly) has a reserve generator/storage with capacity r and a marginal
cost θr that can be utilized if needed. The seller has a zero-production cost c0 which
accounts for her capital cost and the start-up cost of her facilities. Therefore, the
seller’s private information is as x = (c0, θw, θr, vci, vr, vco, γ, r).
We assume that the buyer has a reserve generator/deferrable load that can be
utilized to compensate the real-time random energy delivery by the seller. We assume
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that deviation from the scheduled energy has an increasing marginal cost for the
buyer given by b0 + b1q.








type c0 θw θc vci vr vco γ r fi
a 90 0.20 1.2 0.4 13 23 1 60 0.1
b 60 0.25 1.4 0.8 17 25 1.25 30 0.3
c 40 0.10 1.0 0.1 15 20 1.5 10 0.2
d 20 0.15 - 1.0 17 28 1.7 0 0.3
Table 2.4: Different types of the seller
The optimal forward contract menu for the buyer is given by Fig. 2.5. Since the
energy demand considered in this example is almost inelastic, the scheduled quantity
e(x), and therefore, the quantity-demand curves are also close to each others.10 Table
2.5 summarizes the optimal energy schedule e(x), and the expected utility U(x) for
different types of the seller.
type a b c d
e(x) 122.3 118.5 120.4 116.5
U(x) 84.47 35.10 101.82 0
Table 2.5: The outcomes of the optimal contract menus
The energy q(x, w) delivered to the buyer, the payment t(x, w) made to the seller,
and the seller’s utility u(x, w) in terms of wind w are given by Figures 2.6, 2.7, and
2.8, respectively.
For low realizations of wind speed, the delivered energy is low and the seller
may even incur some penalty for very low energy delivery (Fig. 2.5). For higher
realization of wind speed, the energy delivery increases, and therefore, the payment
10For a completely inelastic energy demand, we have e(x) fixed and independent of the seller’s
type x. Therefore, all the quantity-demand curves coincide and are equal to the quantity-cost curve
for the worst type.
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Figure 2.5: The optimal forward contract menus
and the realized utility increase. However, for very high realization of wind speed that
surpasses the cut-off speed vco (see Figure 2.3), the energy delivery, and consequently
the payment and the realized utility, drop.
Figure 2.6: Energy deliver q(x, w) in terms of wind w
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Figure 2.7: Payment t(x, w) in terms of wind w
Figure 2.8: The realized seller’s utility u(x, w) in terms of wind w
2.7 Discussion
For the problem on energy/service procurement formulated in this chapter the
optimal mechanism is a menu of contracts/nonlinear pricing schemes. The nonlin-
earity is due to three factors. First, the buyer’s utility function V(q) is not linear
in the quantity q. Second, for each type of the seller, the cost function is a nonlin-
ear function of the quantity . Third, the seller has private information about her
technology and cost (seller’s type).
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The buyer has to pay information rent (monetary incentive) to the seller to in-
centivize her to reveal her true type. Therefore, the payment the buyer makes to the
seller includes the cost of provision the seller incurs plus the information rent, which
varies with the seller’s type; the better the seller’s type, the higher is the information
rent.
The optimal forward contracts discovered in this chapter can be implemented as
follows: the buyer offers the seller a menu of contracts (nonlinear pricing schemes);
the seller chooses one of these contracts based on her type.
The optimal forward contracts induce some incentives for investment in infras-
tructure and technology development. From Lemma 2.1, the seller with the higher
type has a higher utility. Therefore, there is an incentive for the seller to improve
her technology and decrease her cost of generation.
It is well-known that in the presence of private information and strategic behavior,
in general, there exists no mechanism/contract that is (1) individually rational, (2)
incentive compatible, and (3) efficient (Pareto-optimal) [105]. In the optimal forward
contract given by Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 the allocation for the seller’s different types
is not ex-post efficient (Pareto-optimal) except for the seller’s worst type who gets
zero utility.
In this chapter, we formulated the contract design problem in a principal-agent
setup. Therefore, the result can be applied to the contract design problem for a setup
with one buyer (principal) and a heterogeneous population of sellers (agents), if the
buyer has a linear utility function, as in the example of Section 2.4, or if the share of
each individual agent is small and their effect on the market is negligible. However,
if one considers a setup with nonlinear utility for the buyer or market power for
each individual agent, the associated problem for such setup with multiple agents
becomes equivalent to the design of optimal multi-unit auctions in economics. It is
known that there exist no closed form solution to the general problem of optimal




We investigated the problem of optimal forward contract design under uncertainty
and multi-dimensional private information. The consideration of multi-dimensional
private information and general utility/cost functions enables us to capture many
applications in electricity markets as well as other disciplines. We assumed that
the buyer and/or the seller has uncertainty in their utility/cost function which is
realized after the time of contract signing. We considered froward contracts with
random allocation that depends on the real-time realization of the uncertainty. We
characterized the optimal forward contract under uncertainty as a menu of contracts.
We addressed the problem of commitment (ex-post voluntary participation), and risk
sharing in the presence of uncertainty. We demonstrated our results by two examples;
an optimal contract design for a demand response program, and an optimal forward
bilateral trade between a buyer and a seller with wind energy generation.
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Chapter 3
Dynamic Market Mechanisms for Wind Energy
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Background and Motivation
Wind generation is intermittent and uncertain. An energy producer with wind
energy (seller) has neither complete control over his generation nor does he have an
exact prediction of his generation in advance. The information about wind realization
arrives dynamically over time and an accurate prediction is only available within a
few (5-15) minutes of the generation time [56]. The stochastic and dynamic nature of
wind energy makes the integration of wind generation into grids a challenging task.
The common practice for the integration of wind energy is to incorporate it into
the existing two-settlement market architecture for conventional generators along
with extra-market treatments such as feed-in tariffs, investment tax credit, and pro-
duction tax credit. The two-settlement market architecture consists of forward mar-
kets (e.g. day-ahead market) and real-time markets, where the outcome of forward
markets is fed to real-time markets.
For energy markets with low share of wind energy, like the U.S., it is possible to
include wind energy in real-time markets, and treat it as negative load [19]; we call
this approach real-time mechanism. One advantage of incorporating wind energy
into real-time markets is that the allocation for wind generation is decided when
all the information about wind generation is available. Moreover, a seller does not
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face any penalty risk as he commits to a certain level of generation only if he can
produce it. However, in energy markets with high share of wind energy, due to
reliability concerns, inclusion of wind energy in real-time markets as negative load is
not possible.
For high shares of wind energy, the system operator needs to have information
about wind generation in advance, and to incorporate wind energy as an active
generation into its forward planning for power flow. Thus, wind energy is included
in forward markets [62]; we call this approach forward mechanism.
In forward markets, knowledge about wind generation in real time is imperfect.
Nevertheless, a seller needs to commit to certain levels of generation in advance even
without knowing the exact amount he will be able to produce in real time. Therefore,
the energy allocation decision in forward markets is determined only based on the
incomplete information available at the time of forward markets, and all the new
information that arrives after forward markets are closed is not incorporated into
the energy allocation decision. In some countries, like the U.K., a seller is exposed to
penalty risk if his real-time generation is different from his commitment in forward
markets. We note that this is not an issue for a conventional generator as he has
perfect knowledge of his real-time generation in advance.
The limitations of the real-time and forward market mechanisms discussed above
motivate our work to study alternative market mechanisms for the integration of
wind energy into grids. The U.S. department of energy encourages the development
of “rules for market evolution that enable system flexibility rationale”, i.e. market
mechanisms that give a seller flexibility in generation, and provide opportunities
for the demand side to actively respond to changes in market over time [30]. It is
desired that such mechanisms provide truthful (probabilistic) information about the
seller’s generation in real-time, and assign commitment to the seller in advance [126].
To achieve the above features, we need to study market mechanisms in a dynamic
setting that accounts for the dynamic and intermittent nature of wind generation as
well as the strategic behavior of the seller. The forward and real-time mechanisms
discussed above are static mechanisms in the strategic sense. That is, for each market
mechanism, the sellers and buyers make simultaneous decisions only once, and their
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one-shot decisions determine the energy allocations and payments at that market;
the outcome of the market is then assumed to be fixed and is fed as an exogenous
parameter to the next market in time.
In this chapter, we consider a simple two-step model that captures the dynamic
and intermittent nature of wind generation. We propose a dynamic mechanism that
provides a coupling between the forward and real-time mechanisms, and, unlike the
(static) real-time and forward mechanisms, allows for flexible generation of wind
energy, incorporates all the information that arrives over time, and provides forward
commitment of the seller.
To demonstrate the main ideas, we first consider a strategic setting with one buyer
and one seller with wind generation. The buyer and the seller trade energy through
a mechanism determined by a mechanism designer. The seller’s cost depends on his
private technology and the wind condition which he learns dynamically over time.
Since the seller is strategic and profit maximizer, he must be incentivized to reveal
his private information about his cost function. We formally define such incentive
payment, and utilize it in the formulation and solution of the mechanism design
problems that we consider in this chapter. We determine such incentive payments
for different market mechanisms. We then characterize the set of feasible outcomes
under each market mechanism. We show that the dynamic mechanism outperforms
the real-time and forward mechanisms for a general objective of the designer.
After we establish our results for a setting with one seller, we consider a setting
with many sellers. We discuss how the problem of market design with many sellers is
similar to that with one seller, and argue that our results generalize to this setting.
Specifically, we formulate and study three different mechanism design problems.
Two of these problems capture the real-time and forward mechanisms. For the third
problem, we propose a new dynamic market mechanism that dynamically couples the
outcome of the real-time and forward markets. In the dynamic market mechanism,
the seller is required to sequentially reveal his private information to the designer as
it becomes available, and accordingly refines his commitment for energy generation
over time.
We show that the set of constraints that the designer faces due to the seller’s
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strategic behavior and private information is less restrictive under the dynamic
mechanism than under the forward and real-time mechanisms. Consequently, we
show that the proposed dynamic market mechanism outperforms the real-time and
forward mechanisms. We further consider two variants of the dynamic mechanism;
one guarantees no penalty risk to the seller, and in the other the designer monitors
the wind speed. By analyzing the outcome of these variants of the dynamic mech-
anism, we characterize the effect of penalty risk exposure and wind monitoring on
the performance of the dynamic mechanism.
3.1.2 Related work
Most of the literature on market design for wind energy assumes a static in-
formation structure and has mainly taken the forward mechanism approach. The
works of [20, 139] study the problem of optimal bidding in a forward market with
an exogenous price and penalty rate. The works of [72, 92] investigate the problem
of mechanism design for wind aggregation among many wind producers that jointly
participate in a forward market. The work in [115] studies the problem of auction
design for a forward market that determines the penalty rate endogenously.
The concept of (flexible) contracts with risk in electricity market has been pro-
posed in [113, 21, 139, 122]. The authors of [139] propose and investigate risky
contracts for wind aggregation where there is no private information. The work in
[113] studies the problem of efficient pricing of interruptible energy services. The
authors of [21] look at the problem of optimal pricing for deadline-differentiated
deferrable loads. The authors of [122] study the problem of forward risky contracts
when the seller’s private information is multi-dimensional and the wind is monitored.
The various mechanism design problems formulated in this chapter belong to
the screening literature in economics. We formulate static and dynamic mechanism
design problems. Our approach to the static mechanism design problems is similar to
the one in [25]. Our approach to the dynamic mechanism design problems is inspired
by the ones in [31, 38, 63]. We provide a unified approach for all the mechanism design
problems that enables us to demonstrate the advantage of dynamic mechanisms over
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static mechanisms for the wind energy market.
3.1.3 Contribution
We propose a dynamic model that enables us to provide a comparison among var-
ious market mechanisms for wind energy. We propose and analyze a dynamic market
mechanism that couples the outcomes of the real-time and forward mechanisms. We
show that the proposed dynamic mechanism outperforms the real-time and forward
mechanisms for a general objective of the market designer. The proposed dynamic
mechanism reveals to the system designer the information required for planning in
advance, incorporates the new information that arrives over time, and provides flex-
ibility for the intermittent wind energy generation. We further study the effect of
providing penalty insurance to the seller and monitoring the wind condition. We
show that the performance of the dynamic mechanism with no penalty risk is in
general inferior to the dynamic mechanism with penalty risk. Moreover, with wind
monitoring, the outcome of the dynamic mechanism improves, as the seller cannot
manipulate the outcome of the mechanism by misrepresenting his wind condition.
3.1.4 Organization
We present our model in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we discuss the market
mechanism design problems as well as the seller’s strategic behavior and private in-
formation. In Section 3.4, we propose the dynamic market mechanism, and formulate
three mechanism design problems accordingly. We analyze the formulated mecha-
nism design problems and compare them in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6, we provide
some additional remarks and consider variants of the proposed dynamic mechanism.
We illustrate our results with an example in Section 3.7. We discuss how our results
generalize to settings with many sellers in Section 3.8, and conclude in Section 3.9.
All the technical proofs can be found in Appendix B.
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3.2 Model
Consider a buyer and a diversified seller with wind energy generation who trade
energy through a mechanism determined by a designer. We refer to the seller as “he”
and the designer and the buyer as “she”. The buyer gets utility V(q̂) from receiving
energy q̂; V(q̂) is increasing and strictly concave in q̂. The seller has production
cost C(q̂; θ) parametrized by his type θ ∈ {θ, θ}.1 The seller’s type depends on his
technology τ (i.e. technology of his wind turbines and the operational status of
them, the size of his wind farm and its location) and the wind speed ω. We assume
that at T = 1 (e.g. day ahead), ex-ante the seller knows privately his technology τ
for wind generation, which takes values from one of M possible technologies T :=
{τ1,τ2, · · · ,τM}, τ1 < τ2 < ... < τM , with probability p1, p2, · · · , pM ,
∑M
i=1 pi = 1,
respectively. At T = 2 (e.g. real-time), the seller receives additional information
ω ∈ [ω, ω] about the wind condition and can refine his private information about
his cost function at T = 2 as θ = Θ(τ, ω). The probability distribution of wind ω is
independent of the technology τ and is denoted by G(ω). We assume that C(q̂; θ)




c(q̂; θ) := ∂C(q̂;θ)
∂q̂
, cθ(q̂; θ) :=
∂c(q̂;θ)
∂θ




Assumption 3.1. The production cost C(q̂;θ) is increasing and convex in q̂. The
marginal cost c(q̂; θ) is increasing in θ, i.e. Cθ(q̂, θ)≥0 and cθ(q̂, θ)≥ 0. The seller’s
type Θ(τ, ω) is decreasing in τ , i.e. Θ(τi, ω)≤Θ(τj, ω) for i > j, ∀ω, and strictly
decreasing in ω, i.e. Θω(τ, ω)<0.
Let Fi(θ) denote the resulting conditional probability distribution of θ given τi.
Then, Assumption 3.1 states that a seller with technology τi expects to have a lower
production cost than the one with technology τj for i > j, i.e. Fτj(θ) first order
stochastically dominates Fτi(θ).
We also make the following technical assumption.
1We assume that C(q̂; θ) captures the seller’s operational cost, capital cost, and an exogenous
opportunity cost associated with wind generation participation in his outside option. Moreover,
we assume that the seller has a diversified energy portfolio, so he does not face a strict capacity
constraint for generation as he can produce energy from other resources that are more expensive.
Therefore, C(q̂; θ) is non-zero but decreasing in the realization of wind speed.
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Assumption 3.2. The distribution Fτ (θ) has non-shifting support, i.e. fτ is strictly




for τ ∈ T .
Assumption 3.2 implies that the range of achievable values of θ is the same for
all technologies τi, i=1, ...,M . However, the same realization of the wind ω results in
different values of θ for different technologies. Thus, the probability distribution of
θ, given by Fτi(θ), is different for different technologies (cf. Assumption 3.1).
3.3 Mechanism Design and Strategic Behavior
Consider an arbitrary mechanism that determines the agreement between the
buyer and the seller. Let t(τ,ω) denote the payment the buyer ends up paying to the
seller with technology τ and wind speed ω, and q(τ,ω) denote the amount of energy
the seller delivers according to the mechanism. The social welfare S, the seller’s
revenue R, and the buyer’s utility U can be written as,
S := Eτ,ω{V(q(τ, ω))−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))} , (3.1)
R := Eτ,ω{t(τ, ω)−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))} , (3.2)
U := Eτ,ω{V(q(τ, ω))− t(τ, ω)}= S−R. (3.3)
The social welfare S only depends on q and is independent of t. Thus, by the first
order optimality condition, an allocation qe∗ is socially efficient (maximizing S) if
and only if at qe∗ the marginal utility v(q̂) := ∂V(q̂)
∂q̂
is equal to the marginal cost
c(q̂; θ), i.e., for all τ, ω,
v(qe∗(τ, ω)) = c(qe∗(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)). (3.4)
If the seller is not strategic or does not have any private information, the mechanism
designer can set q(τ,ω) equal to qe∗(τ,ω), to maximize the social welfare S. Then, the
designer can set payment t(τ,ω) so as to achieve any arbitrary surplus distribution
between the buyer and the seller.
However, the strategic seller does not simply reveal his production cost function,
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which is his private information. Therefore, the socially efficient allocation (3.4) is
not sinply implementable by the mechanism designer. The seller has incentives to
manipulate the outcome (misrepresent his cost function, by misreporting τ and ω)
in order to gain a higher revenue. Thus, the mechanism’s output would differ from
the efficient allocation qe∗.
Due to the seller’s strategic behavior, any mechanism must (i) incentivize the
seller to truthfully reveal his private information, and (ii) leave a non-negative rev-
enue to the seller so that he voluntarily participates in the mechanism.
Following the literature on regulation and market design [68], we assume that the
mechanism designer has the following general objective,
W := U + αR, (3.5)
where α ∈ [0, 1]. When α = 1, the designer wants to maximize the social welfare S.
When α= 0, the designer seeks to maximize the utility of the buyer (demand side).
For α ∈ (0,1), the designer’s objective is to maximize a weighted sum of the buyer’s
utility U and the seller’s revenue R. We assume that the designer knows the buyer’s
utility function V(q̂).2
We invoke the revelation principle for multistage games [87], and, without loss of
generality, restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms that are incentive com-
patible. In these mechanisms, the designer determines a mechanism for the payment
and the allocation {t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ∈T ,ω∈[ω,ω]} based on the seller’s technology τ and
the wind speed ω, and asks the seller to report his private information about τ and ω
over time. The designer determines {t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ∈T ,ω∈ [ω,ω]} so as to ensure the
truthful report of the seller; this is called incentive compatibility (IC). A mechanism
{t(τ,ω),q(τ,ω),τ ∈T ,ω ∈ [ω,ω]} is incentive compatible if it is always optimal for the
seller to report truthfully his private information. The seller voluntarily participates
in the mechanism if he earns a positive (expected) revenue from the agreement; this
2In practice, even when the designer’s objective is to maximize the social welfare, we have α < 1
due to cost/loss associated with financial transaction between the buyer and the seller (see [68] for
more discussion). We note that the case where α > 1 is of no interest, as it implies that simply the
money flow from the buyer to the seller increases the designer’s objective.
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is known as individual rationality (IR).
Define Rτ,ω := t(τ,ω)−C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω)) as the seller’s revenue with technology τ
and wind ω, and Rτ :=Eτ{Rτ,ω} as the seller’s expected revenue with technology τ .
Then, R=Eτ{Rτ}=Eτ,ω{Rτ,ω}. In the next section, we show that the IC and IR
constraints can be written in terms of Rτ,ω, and Rτ . We show that any mechanism
design problem can be formulated as a constrained functional optimization problem,
where we determine the optimal allocation and the seller’s revenue that maximize
W subject to the IC and IR constraints.
3.4 Market Mechanisms
We consider different structures and timings of mechanisms, and formulate the
resulting mechanism design problems accordingly. We consider a forward mechanism
that takes place at T = 1. We also consider a real-time mechanism that takes
place at T = 2. Moreover, we propose a dynamic mechanism that takes place at
T = 1 and T = 2. Therefore, we formulate three mechanism design problems for the
model of Section 3.2: (A) real-time mechanism, (B) forward mechanism, (C) dynamic
mechanism. By comparing the solutions to these mechanism design problems, we
demonstrate the advantage of the dynamic mechanism over the static forward and
real-time mechanisms.
We show that when the objective of the designer is to maximize W , given by
(3.5), each of the mechanism design problems mentioned above can be formulated
as a functional optimization problem with different sets of constraints. In Section
3.5, we determine the restrictions that each of these sets of constraints implies on
the outcome of the mechanism design problems. Thus, we demonstrate how each of
the three market structures impact the market outcome.
3.4.1 Forward Mechanism
In the forward mechanism, the designer specifies the mechanism that determines
the agreement between the buyer and the seller at T =1; the information about wind
speed ω that becomes available at T = 2 is ignored. This mechanism is similar to
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the current day-ahead integration in Europe, and the proposed firm contracts in the
literature.
Since information ω is not available at T = 1, the allocation function q(τ,ω) and
the payment function t(τ,ω) are independent of ω. Therefore, we drop the dependence
on ω and denote the allocation and payment functions for the forward mechanism
by q(τ) and t(τ), respectively. The optimal forward mechanism is then given by the





IC : Rτ ≥ t(τ̂)−Eω{C(q(τ̂);Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ, τ̂ , (3.6)
IR: Rτ ≥ 0 ∀τ. (3.7)
We note that (3.7) only ensures a positive expected revenue for the seller with tech-
nology τ , and, therefore, exposes him to the risk of penalty (i.e. Rτ,ω < 0) for low
realizations of ω.3
3.4.2 Real-Time Mechanism
In the real-time mechanism, the designer specifies the mechanism that determines
the agreement between the buyer and the seller at T =2, after the information about
wind speed ω is available to the seller. We assume that the wind speed ω is not
monitored by the designer. This mechanism is similar to the current real-time market
integration in the U.S. The allocation and payment functions {q(τ,ω),t(τ,ω)} depend
on (τ, ω), and the seller reports/reveals his technology τ and his private knowledge
about ω simultaneously at T =2. The optimal real-time mechanism is then given by
3For simplicity, we do not model forward mechanisms with explicit penalty rate for shortfalls
here. In Section 3.6, we discuss how our results continue to hold when we consider forward market
mechanisms with explicit penalty for shortfalls.
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IC :Rτ,ω≥t(τ̂, ω̂)−C(q(τ̂, ω̂);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ,ω,τ̂,ω̂, (3.8)
IR: Rτ,ω ≥ 0 ∀τ, ω. (3.9)
Equation (3.8) ensures that the seller’s revenue by reporting the true value of (τ,ω) is
higher than the one with any misreport (τ̂, ω̂). Equation (3.9) guarantees a positive
revenue for the seller for all wind realizations, thus, ensuring no penalty risk for him.
3.4.3 Dynamic Mechanism
In the dynamic mechanism, the designer specifies the mechanism that determines
the agreement between the buyer and the seller at T =1. However, unlike the forward
mechanism, the dynamic mechanism determines an agreement that is contingent on
the information about the wind speed ω that becomes available at T =2. Moreover,
unlike the real-time mechanism, the seller reports τ and ω sequentially; at T = 1,
he reports τ , then at T = 2, he reports ω. We assume that the wind speed ω is not
monitored by the designer. Therefore, the optimal dynamic mechanism is given by






IC2:Rτ,ω≥ t(τ, ω̂)−C(q(τ,ω̂);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ, ω, ω̂, (3.11)
IR:Rτ≥0 ∀τ. (3.12)
The above dynamic mechanism design problem involves two IC constraints (3.10)
and (3.11). By (3.10), the designer ensures the seller’s true report of τ , even when
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he can potentially coordinate his misreport τ̂ at T =1 with an arbitrary (mis)report
strategy σ(ω) of ω at T =2. The designer ensures the seller’s truthful report of ω at
T =2 by (3.11), assuming that the seller already reported the true τ at time T =1.
3.5 Comparison of Market Mechanisms
In all three mechanism design problems formulated in Section 3.4, the designer
wants to maximize W = U + αR = S + (α − 1)R. However, in each problem the
designer faces a different set of constraints due to the seller’s strategic behavior and
private information about his cost function, as well as the specific mechanism struc-
ture and rules. In this section, we analyze these sets of constraints so as to compare
the performance of the three mechanism design problems presented in Section 3.4.
We proceed as follows. We consider the set of constraints that the designer needs
to satisfy for each market mechanism: constraints (3.6)and (3.7) for the forward
mechanism, constraints (3.8) and (3.9) for the real-time mechanism, and constraints
(3.10)-(3.12) for the dynamic mechanism. We investigate the implications of each
of these sets of constraints under the corresponding market structure. We provide
a reduced form of these constraints in Theorems 3.1 and 3.2. Using the results of
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, we show that the set of constraints in the dynamic mechanism
is less restrictive than the set of constraints in the forward and real-time mechanisms.
Therefore, we show that the outcome of the dynamic market mechanism outperforms
those of the forward and real-time mechanisms (Theorem 3.3).
We start our analysis by determining the condition that Rτ,ω must satisfy so as to
ensure the seller’s truthful report about ω in the real-time and dynamic mechanisms.
Theorem 3.1. The real-time and dynamic mechanisms are incentive compatible for
ω (constraints (3.8) and (3.11), respectively), if the allocation function q(τ, ω) is
increasing in ω, and the seller’s revenue Rτ,ω satisfies
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (3.13)
where Cθ(q; θ) :=
∂C(q;θ)
∂θ
and Θω(τ, ω) :=
∂Θ(τ,ω)
∂ω
. The inequality (3.13) is strict if
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q(τ, ω) > 0.
Theorem 3.1 states that, under the assumption that the seller reports truthfully
his technology τ , his revenue Rτ,ω must be increasing in ω, as in (3.13), so that he
is incentivized to report ω truthfully.
We next provide conditions on Rτ = Eω{Rτ,ω} so as to ensure that the seller with
technology τi reports truthfully in the forward, real-time, and dynamic mechanisms
(constraints (3.6), (3.8), and (3.10) resp.). Moreover, we determine the conditions
thatRτ must satisfy so as to ensure the seller’s voluntary participation in the forward,
real-time, and dynamic mechanisms (constraints (3.7), (3.9), and (3.12) resp.).









where σ∗(τj;τi,ω) is uniquely defined by Θ(τj,ω)=Θ(τi, σ
∗(τj;τi,ω))
4. That is, σ∗(τj;τi,ω)
denotes the wind speed that the seller with technology τj requires so as to have a
generation cost identical to that of the seller with technology τi and wind speed ω.
Below, we elaborate on the role of RT and RW .
Consider a seller with technology τi and wind speed ω. The seller can misreport
his technology (say, by declaring τj), or his wind speed (say, by declaring ω̂), or both
(by declaring τj,ω̂). In Theorem 3.2, below, we prove the following result. Under
the assumption that the seller reports truthfully his wind speed ω, the payment
that incentivizes him to report truthfully τi instead of misreporting τj is given by
RT(τj,τi;q). The seller may also misreport his wind speed ω (say, by declaring ω̂) after
misreporting his technology τi as τj. In this case,RW(τj,τi;q) represents the additional
expected payment that incentivizes the seller not to misreport his technology τi as
4This is true because of Assumption 3.2.
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τj even when he can misreport his true wind speed. Consequently, RT(τj,τi;q) +
RW(τj,τi;q) represents the incentive payment that the designer must provide to the





[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))Θω(τi, ω)dω,
which results from integrating (3.13), followed by an expectation with respect to ω.
We show below that RP (τ1; q) determines the minimum incentive payment that the
seller with technology τ1 (the worse technology) must receive in order to voluntarily
participate in the real-time mechanism. The precise statement of these results is as
follows.
Theorem 3.2. In the mechanism design problems formulated in Section 3.4, the
incentive compatibility and individual rationality constraints can be reduced to the
following conditions.
a) For the forward mechanism,
q(τ,ω) is independent of ω, (3.14)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi, τi−1; q)≥0 ∀i∈{2, ..,M}, (3.15)
Rτ1 = 0. (3.16)
b) For the real-time mechanism,




= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (3.18)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi, τi−1; q)+RW(τi, τi−1; q)≥0
∀i∈{2,...,M}, (3.19)
Rτ1 = RP(τ1; q). (3.20)
c) For the dynamic mechanism,
q(τ,ω) is increasing in ω, (3.21)
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (3.22)
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj, τi; q)+RW(τj, τi; q)≥0,
∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (3.23)
Rτ1 = 0. (3.24)
Moreover, RT(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 (strict if q(τj,ω) 6= 0 for some ω) and RW(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 (strict
if q(τ,ω) is dependent on ω).
We now comment on the results of Theorem 3.2. The results of parts (a-c) reduce
the set of constraints (3.6,3.7) for the forward mechanism, constraints (3.8,3.9) for
the real-time mechanism, and constraints (3.10-3.12) for the dynamic mechanism to
those given by (3.14-3.16), (3.17-3.20), and (3.21-3.24), respectively.
Part (a) of Theorem 3.2 follows from the fact that the forward mechanism takes
place at T =1 when information about ω in not available. Therefore, the allocation
function is independent of ω, and, thus, RW(τi,τj;q) = 0 by its definition. Therefore,
the designer only needs to provide the payment RT(τi,τj;q) so as to incentivize the
seller to report truthfully his technology τi instead of misreporting τj. Part (a)
of Theorem 3.2 states further that when the seller’s technology is τi, the payment
RT(τi−1,τi;q) is enough to incentivize the seller not to misreport τi as τi−1 or as any
other technology τj.
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In part (b) of Theorem 3.2, constraint (3.17) states that the allocation function
q(τ,ω) must be only a function of Θ(τ,ω), as the seller reports both of τ and ω simulta-
neously at T =2. Therefore, the designer cannot differentiate between different pairs
of (τ,ω) that correspond to the same cost function C(q;Θ(τ,ω)). Moreover, (3.17)
requires the allocation function to be increasing in ω, which, along with constraint
(3.18), ensures the seller’s truth telling about ω (Theorem 3.1). Constraint (3.19)
states that when the seller’s technology is τi, the paymentRT(τi−1,τi;q)+RW(τi−1,τi;q)
is enough to incentivize the seller not to misreport τi as τi−1 or as any other technol-
ogy τj. We note that, unlike the forward mechanism where the seller with technology
τ1 receives no incentive payment, in the real-time mechanism the seller with tech-
nology τ1 receives a positive expected incentive payment RP(τ1;q), given by (3.20),
that ensures truth telling about ω.
In part (c) of Theorem 3.2, constraints (3.21) and (3.22) ensure the seller’s truth
telling about ω by Theorem 3.1. Equation (3.23) determines the incentive payment
that the designer needs to provide to the seller with technology τi, so that he does
not misreport his technology as τj, and does not misreport his wind speed ω along
with τj. We note that, unlike the real-time market, the seller with technology τ1
does not receive a positive expected incentive payment (see (3.24)).
From the designer’s point of view, the dynamic mechanism has the following
advantages over the forward and real-time mechanisms: (i) In contrast to the forward
mechanism, the dynamic mechanism incorporates the information about the wind
speed ω that becomes available at T = 2 into the allocation and payment functions.
As a result, the set of allocation and payment functions available to the designer in the
dynamic mechanism is richer than the ones available in the forward mechanism. (ii)
In the real-time mechanism, the seller reports τ and ω simultaneously. Therefore, he
can perfectly coordinate his reports about τ and ω. In the dynamic mechanism, the
seller reports τ and ω sequentially over time, thus, he cannot perfectly coordinate
his reports about τ and ω. As a result, in the dynamic mechanism, the designer
can distinguish among different pairs (τ,ω) that result in the same cost function
C(q;Θ(τ,ω)); this is not the case in the real-time mechanism (see (3.17) and (3.21)).
Furthermore, in the dynamic mechanism the designer faces a less restrictive set of
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constraints on the seller’s revenue R than the ones in the real-time mechanism (see
(3.20) and (3.24)).
Using the result of Theorem 3.2, we can determine the adequate incentive pay-
ment to the seller that is associated with an allocation function q(τ,ω) for the forward,
real-time, and dynamic mechanisms. Consequently, we can omit the payment func-
tion t(τ,ω) and optimize over the allocation function q(τ,ω) to determine the optimal
forward, real-time, and dynamic mechanisms.5 Under a set of regularity conditions,
the resulting functional optimization problems, which are in terms of the allocation
function q(τ,ω), can be solved point-wise separately for every pair (τ,ω) as a value
optimization problem. The closed form solutions of the optimal forward, real-time,
and dynamic mechanisms can be found in Appendix B.
Using the result of Theorem 3.2, we can compare the sets of constraints that
the designer faces under the forward, real-time, and forward mechanisms. We prove
below that for any arbitrary designer’s objective of the form (3.5), the outcome is
superior under the optimal dynamic mechanism than under the optimal forward or
optimal real-time mechanisms.
Theorem 3.3. The designer’s objective under the optimal dynamic mechanism is
higher than her objectives under the optimal forward and the real-time mechanisms,
i.e. Wdynamic >Wforward and Wdynamic >Wreal−time.
The result of Theorem 3.3 demonstrates the advantage of the dynamic mechanism
over the forward and real-time mechanisms. We note that Theorem 3.3 does not pro-
vide a comparison between the forward and real-time mechanisms. That is because
the designer faces different sets of constraints in the forward and the real-time mech-
anisms. On one hand, the forward mechanism ignores ω in its allocation function,
while the real-time mechanism incorporates ω. On the other hand, the incentive
payments are higher in the real-time mechanism than in the forward mechanism (see
5For dynamic mechanisms, the set of constraints (3.23) are in the form of inequality constraints,
and it is not possible to determine a priori which of these inequality constraints are binding at the
optimal solution (see [12] for more discussion). Therefore, we need to make assumptions about
which subset of these inequality constraints are binding, and omit the payment function using the
assumed binding conditions. We then need to verify that the set of assumed binding constraints
are in fact binding at the computed optimal dynamic mechanism.
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(3.20) and (3.16)) since the seller can perfectly coordinate his simultaneous reports
about τ and ω in the real-time mechanism. The impact of these constraints on the
performance of the forward and the real-time mechanisms depend on the specific
parameters of the model, and thus, there is no generic ordering of the designer’s
objective under the forward and real-time mechanisms.
3.6 Additional Remarks
In this section, we examine the following variations of the problems formulated
in Section 3.4, and analyzed in Section 3.5. First, we consider a forward mechanism
with explicit penalty rate for shortfalls, and compare it with the dynamic mechanism
proposed in Section 3.4. Second, we consider a dynamic mechanism that guarantees
no loss for the seller for every realization of wind speed ω. We show that the perfor-
mance of this mechanism is superior to that of the real-time mechanism and inferior
to that of the dynamic mechanism proposed in Section 3.4. Third, we consider a
dynamic mechanism with monitoring, where the designer monitors the wind speed
ω. We show that the dynamic mechanism with monitoring outperforms the dy-
namic mechanism proposed in Section 3.4, where the designer does not monitor the
wind speed ω. Moreover, in the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, the designer
can guarantee no loss for the seller without compromising the performance of the
mechanism.
3.6.1 Forward Mechanism with Penalty Rate
The forward mechanism formulated in Section 3.4 ignores the wind speed ω,
and determines the allocation q(τ) and payment function t(τ) only as a function of τ .
Here, we consider a variation of the forward mechanism where the seller is not bound
to produce exactly q(τ) at T = 2. However, if the seller’s generation at T = 2 falls
short of his commitment q(τ), he faces a penalty charge rate λ(τ) by the designer
for each unit of generation that he falls short of producing. The penalty rate λ(τ) is
agreed at T = 1 based on the seller’s report about his technology. We refer to this
variation of the forward mechanism as forward mechanism with penalty rate. The
68
work of [115] studies the design of such a mechanism for wind procurement, and the
works of [20, 139] consider settings where λ is exogenously fixed and does not depend
on τ .
We note that the forward mechanism with penalty rate does not fully ignore ω
at T = 2, as it allows the seller to change his generation at T = 2 based on the
realized wind condition ω. However, we argue below that such incorporation of ω
into the forward mechanism with penalty rate is not efficient. Therefore, the dynamic
mechanism outperforms the forward mechanism with penalty rate.
A forward mechanism with penalty rate that is incentive compatible and individu-
ally rational can be characterized by allocation and payment functions {q(τ),t(τ),τ ∈
T }, along with associated penalty rates {λ(τ),τ ∈ T }. Let e(τ,ω), e(τ,ω) ≤ q(τ),
denote the amount of energy that the seller with technology τ and wind speed ω
actually produces at T = 2 (given the described forward mechanism with penalty
rate). The seller with technology τ and wind ω chooses e(τ,ω) so as to maximize his
revenue as,
e(τ, ω) :=arg max
0≤ê≤q(τ)
{t(τ)−C(ê; Θ(τ, ω))− λ(τ)(q(τ)−ê)} .
Using e(τ,ω), we can define a dynamic mechanism {q̃(τ,ω), t̃(τ,ω),τ ∈T ,ω∈ [ω,ω]} that
is equivalent to the forward mechanism with penalty rate described above. Define,
q̃(τ, ω) := e(τ, ω), (3.25)
t̃(τ, ω) := t(τ)− λ(τ)(q(τ)−e(τ, ω)). (3.26)
The dynamic mechanism {q̃(τ,ω), t̃(τ,ω),τ ∈ T ,ω ∈ [ω,ω]} defined above is incentive
compatible and individually rational since it induces the same allocation and payment
function for the seller with technology τ and wind ω as the forward mechanism with
penalty rate.
In the equivalent dynamic mechanism {q̃(τ,ω), t̃(τ,ω),τ ∈T ,ω∈ [ω,ω]} constructed
above, the payment function t̃(τ,ω) is linear in q̃(τ,ω) (see (3.26)). However, in the
optimal dynamic mechanism, the payment t(τ,ω) is in general, nonlinear in q(τ,ω)
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(see the example in Section 3.7). Therefore, even though the forward mechanism with
penalty rate allows the seller to modify his generation according to the realized wind
speed ω, such incorporation of ω is not as efficient as in the dynamic mechanism.
3.6.2 Dynamic Mechanism with no Penalty
The dynamic mechanism formulated in Section 3.4 promises a positive expected
revenue to the seller for every technology τ (see the IR constraint (3.12)). However,
once the seller signs the agreement at T =1, he is committed to following the terms
of the agreement. Similar to the forward mechanism, it is possible that in the dy-
namic mechanism, the realized revenue of the seller becomes negative for very low
realizations of wind speed, i.e. Rτ,ω < 0 for small values of ω (note that the IR
constraint (3.12) only guarantees Rτ =E{Rτ,ω} ≥ 0).
In this section, we consider a variation of the dynamic mechanism that guarantees
no loss for the seller for every realization of ω, i.e. Rτ,ω ≥ 0. We refer to this mech-
anism as the dynamic mechanism with no penalty. The optimal dynamic mechanism






IC2:Rτ,ω≥ t(τ, ω̂)−C(q(τ,ω̂);Θ(τ,ω)) ∀τ, ω, ω̂, (3.28)
IR:Rτ,ω≥0 ∀τ, ω. (3.29)
The above optimization problem is similar to the optimization problem formulated
for the optimal dynamic mechanism in Section 3.4. The only difference is that we
replace the ex-ante IR constraint Rτ ≥ 0, given by (3.12), with the ex-post IR
constraint Rτ,ω ≥ 0, given by (3.29).
It is clear that the IR constraint Rτ,ω ≥ 0 is more restrictive than the ex-ante IR
constraint Rτ ≥ 0. Therefore, the performance of the optimal dynamic mechanism
with no penalty is inferior to that of the optimal dynamic mechanism. Nevertheless,
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we show below that the optimal dynamic mechanism with no penalty outperforms
the optimal real-time mechanism.
Theorem 3.4. (i) The set of IC and IR constraints for dynamic mechanism with
no penalty, given by (3.27-3.29), can be reduced to the following conditions,
q(τ,ω) is increasing in ω, (3.30)
∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω) ≥ 0, (3.31)
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj, τi; q)+RW(τj, τi; q)≥0,
∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (3.32)
Rτ1 ≥ RP(τ1; q). (3.33)
(ii) The designer’s objective, given by (3.5), under the optimal dynamic mechanism
with no penalty is higher than her objective under the optimal real-time mechanism
and lower than her objective under the optimal dynamic mechanism, i.e. Wdynamic>
Wdynamic no penalty>Wreal-time.
Part (i) of Theorem 3.4 states the analogue result of part (c) of Theorem 3.2 for
dynamic mechanisms with no penalty. We note that the set of constraints (3.31)
and (3.32) for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty is the same as the set of
constraints (3.22) and (3.23) for dynamic mechanisms in part (c) of Theorem 3.2.
This is because the IC constraints (3.27) and (3.28) for dynamic mechanisms with no
penalty are the same as the IC constraints (3.10) and (3.11) for dynamic mechanisms.
However, constraint (3.33) for the dynamic mechanism with no penalty is different
from constraint (3.24) for the dynamic mechanism. In the dynamic mechanism with
no penalty we impose the ex-post IR constraint (3.29) instead of the less restrictive
interim IR constraint (3.12) imposed for the dynamic mechanism. As a result, the
designer cannot reduce the incentive payment she pays to the seller by exposing him
to penalty risk for low realizations of wind speed ω. The ex-post constraint requires
that Rτ1,ω ≥ 0, where τ1 and ω denote the worst technology and lowest wind speed
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realization for the seller, respectively. Using constraint (3.31), which is implied by
the IC constraint about ω at T = 2, the expected revenue Eω{Rτ1,ω} is strictly positive
for the seller with technology τ1, and must be greater than or equal to RP(τ1;q) (see
(3.33)).
Part (ii) of Theorem 3.4 follows directly from the result of part (i). First, the
set of constraints (3.31-3.33) for the dynamic mechanism with no penalty is more
restrictive than the set of constraints (3.22-3.24) for the dynamic mechanism (of
Section 3.4). Therefore, the performance of the optimal dynamic mechanism with
no penalty is inferior to that of the optimal dynamic mechanism.
Second, comparing the set of constraints (3.31)-(3.33) for the dynamic mechanism
with no penalty with the set of constraints (3.18)-(3.20) for the real-time mechanism
(in particular (3.19) and (3.32)), it is clear that the designer’s objective under the
optimal dynamic mechanism with no penalty is higher than her objective under the
optimal real-time mechanism. This is because under the real-time mechanism, the
designer cannot distinguish between different pairs of (τ, ω) corresponding to the
same Θ(τ,ω) (see (3.17)), whereas, in the dynamic mechanism with no penalty, dis-
tinction among all pairs of (τ,ω) is possible as the seller reports τ and ω sequentially.
We note that Theorem 3.4 does not provide a comparison between the forward
mechanism and the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty. This is because, on one
hand, the forward mechanism ignores ω in its allocation function. On the other hand,
in the dynamic mechanism with no penalty we impose the no penalty risk constraint,
i.e. ex-post IR (3.29). The impact of these two constraints on the performance of
the forward mechanism and the dynamic mechanism with no penalty depends on the
specific parameters of the model, and thus, there is no generic ordering among them
in terms of the designer’s objective.
3.6.3 Dynamic Mechanism with Wind Monitoring
In the model of Section 3.2, we use ω to denote the wind speed information that
becomes available only to the seller at T = 2. In this section, we consider a scenario
where the designer can also monitor the realization of wind speed ω.
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In the following, we formulate the dynamic mechanism design problem under this
assumption. We refer to this mechanism as the dynamic mechanism with monitoring.
Assuming that the designer monitors ω, the seller is only required to reveal his private
technology τ at T =1. Therefore, the optimal dynamic mechanism with monitoring





IC :Rτ≥Eω{t(τ̂ , ω)−C(q(τ̂ ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))} ∀τ,τ̂, (3.34)
IR:Rτ≥0 ∀τ. (3.35)
The above optimization problem is similar to the optimization problem for the opti-
mal dynamic mechanism in Section 3.4. However, there is no IC constraint for ω in
the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, as the designer monitors ω.
Below, we show that wind monitoring provides two advantages to the designer.
First, it improves the outcome of the dynamic mechanism. Second, it enables the
designer to render the dynamic mechanism with monitoring free of any penalty risk
for the seller simply by modifying the payment function for different realizations of
ω.
Theorem 3.5. (i) The set of IC and IR constraints for the dynamic mechanism with
monitoring, given by (3.34,3.35) can be reduced to the following conditions,
Rτi−Rτj =RT(τj, τi; q)≥0, ∀i,j∈{1,...,M},i>j, (3.36)
Rτ1 = 0. (3.37)
(ii) The designer’s objective under the optimal dynamic mechanism with monitor-
ing is higher than her objective under the optimal dynamic mechanism, the optimal
dynamic mechanism with no penalty risk, and the optimal real-time and forward
mechanisms. i.e. Wdynamic with monitoring >Wdynamic >Wdynamic no penalty >Wreal-time,
and Wdynamic with monitoring>Wdynamic>W forward.
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Wind monitoring No wind monitoring
Penalty risk RT (q) RT (q) +RW (q)
No penalty risk RT (q) RT (q) +RW (q) +RP (q)
Table 3.1: Incentive payment to the seller
(iii) In the dynamic mechanism with wind monitoring, the designer can guarantee
no penalty risk for the seller, without changing the mechanism outcome in terms of
her objective W, the buyer’s utility U , and the seller’s revenue R.
We summarize the results of Theorems 3.2-3.5 on incentive payments to the seller












and RP(q):=RP(τ1;q). Then, RT (q) denotes the incentive payment that the designer
must pay to the seller so that he reveals truthfully his private technology τ . If the
designer wants to incorporate ω in energy allocation and does not monitor ω, then
she needs to pay the additional incentive payment RW (q) so that the seller reveals
ω truthfully. Without monitoring ω, if the designer wants to guarantee no penalty
risk for the seller, then she must pay an additional incentive payment RP (q) to the
seller.
3.7 Example
We consider an environment where the designer’s objective is W = U+0.5R (i.e.
α = 0.5). That is, the designer assigns more weight on the welfare of the demand
than on the seller’s revenue. The buyer has utility function V(q̂) = q̂− 1
2
q̂2. The
seller has linear cost function C(q̂;θ) = θq̂. The seller has two possible technologies;
technology τ1 (inferior technology) with marginal cost Θ(τ1,ω)=1−ω, and technology
τ2 (superior technology) with marginal cost Θ(τ2,ω)=(1−ω)2. We assume that the
designer believes that both technologies are equally likely and each has probability
0.5. The wind speed ω is uniformly distributed in [0, 1].
Using the results of Theorems 3.2-3.5, we compute the optimal forward, real-time,
and dynamic mechanisms as well as the optimal dynamic mechanisms with no penalty
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Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(a) Allocation q(τ1, ω)




















Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(b) Allocation q(τ2, ω)














Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(c) Payment t(τ1, ω)














Dyanmic with no penalty
Real-time
(d) Payment t(τ2, ω)
Figure 3.1: Example - optimal mechanisms
and with monitoring. (see Appendix B for the closed form solution of the general
case). Figure 3.1 depicts the allocation and payment functions for each of the optimal
mechanisms. The outcome of these different mechanisms is summarized in Table 3.2.
Consistent with the results of Theorems 3.3-3.5, we find thatWdynamic with monitoring >
Wdynamic > Wdynamic no penalty > Wreal-time, and Wdynamic with monitoring > Wdynamic >
U forward. We note that, as discussed in Section 3.6.B, there exists no general ordering
between the dynamic mechanism with no penalty and the forward mechanism.
As we argued earlier, the seller’s strategic behavior affects the efficiency of a
mechanism and distorts its outcome from the efficient allocation (see Fig. 3.1). We
note that for τ2, the allocation functions in the dynamic mechanism and dynamic
mechanism with monitoring are the same as the efficient allocation. Moreover, for
τ1, the distortion of the allocation function from the efficient allocation is less under
the dynamic mechanism than under the real-time and forward mechanisms. These
observations further illustrate the advantage of the dynamic mechanism over the
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Real-time






















Dyanmic with no Penalty
Real-time
Figure 3.2: Example - the seller’s revenue
forward and real-time mechanisms.
Next, we consider the seller’s revenue R. We note that the seller’s revenue is the
highest under the optimal real-time mechanism. This is because (i) the seller is not
subject to any penalty risk under the real-time mechanism (as opposed to the forward
and dynamic mechanisms); (ii) the seller reports τ and ω simultaneously, therefore,
he has more power in manipulating his reports (about τ and ω) to the designer
than in the dynamic mechanism, where he reports τ and ω sequentially. We also
note that the seller’s revenue under the optimal dynamic mechanism is higher than
that of the forward mechanism because the forward mechanism ignores wind speed
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Figure 3.3: Example - different payment vs. quantity options in the dynamic mech-
anism
ω whereas wind speed ω is incorporated in the dynamic mechanism, and, therefore,
the seller receives additional incentive (payment) to report ω truthfully. Next, we
note that the seller’s revenue under the optimal dynamic mechanism is lower than
of the optimal dynamic mechanism with no penalty, and higher than of the optimal
dynamic mechanism with monitoring. This is because the payment to the seller is
lower in the optimal dynamic mechanism with monitoring and higher in the optimal
dynamic mechanism with no penalty (see Table 3.1).
As pointed out above, the dynamic and forward mechanisms expose the seller to
penalty risk (negative revenue) for low realizations of the wind speed ω. However, in
the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, the dynamic mechanism with no penalty,
and the real-time mechanism, the seller always receives a non-negative revenue for
all realizations of ω. Figure 3.2 shows the seller’s revenue for all the mechanisms and
all realizations of ω.
Next, we consider the buyer’s utility U . The buyer’s utility under the dynamic
mechanism is higher than that of the forward and real-time mechanisms. This is be-
cause the dynamic mechanism’s efficiency is higher than that of the optimal forward
and real-time mechanisms, and this is also reflected in the buyer’s utility. Moreover,









Efficient allocation — — 0.2167
Forward 0.1372 0.0347 0.1545
Real-time 0.0693 0.1210 0.1298
Dynamic 0.1729 0.0417 0.1938
Dynamic with no penalty 0.1077 0.0842 0.1498
Dynamic with monitoring 0.1813 0.0333 0.1979
Table 3.2: Example - the buyer’s utility U , the information rentR, and the designer’s
objective W
under the optimal dynamic mechanism is less than the incentive payments under the
optimal forward and real-time mechanisms. The buyer’s utility under the optimal
dynamic mechanism is higher than that of the optimal dynamic mechanism with no
penalty, and lower than that of the optimal dynamic mechanism with monitoring.
This is because the payment made by the buyer to the seller is lower in the optimal
dynamic mechanism with monitoring and higher in the optimal dynamic mechanism
with no penalty (see Table 3.1).
We note that in the forward and real-time mechanisms, which are static mech-
anisms, the payment the seller receives for producing a certain amount of energy q̂
is independent of his type. However, this is not the case in the dynamic mechanism
(see Fig. 3.3). In the dynamic mechanism the payment and allocation depend on
the seller’s reports at T = 1 and T = 2. Therefore, depending on the seller’s reports
at T = 1 and T = 2, the designer can provide different payments to the seller for
producing the same amount of energy. In Fig. 3.3, one can see that the seller with
the superior technology τ2 receives a higher payment than the seller with the infe-
rior technology τ1 for high quantities of energy produced. On the contrary, for low
quantities of energy produced the seller with inferior technology τ1 receives a higher
payment than the seller with superior technology τ2. The difference in payments to
different types of seller for the same quantity of energy produced, allows the designer
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to differentiate among different types of seller, thus, to increase the efficiency of the
mechanism.
3.8 Extension to Many Sellers
To demonstrate the main ideas, namely the advantage of the dynamic mechanism
over the forward and real-time mechanisms, we considered a setting with only one
seller in the model of Section 3.2. However, in a general electricity market there
exist many sellers competing with one another. In this section, we discuss how our
results on the advantage of the dynamic mechanism over the forward and real-time
mechanisms also hold for environments with many sellers. We provide only the sketch
of the proof following steps similar to those presented for the model with one seller.
Consider a model similar to that of Section 3.2, with N sellers. Seller n, n ∈
{1, ...,N}, has generation cost C(q̂n; Θ(τn, ωn)), where q̂n denotes the amount of en-
ergy he produces, and τn and ωn denotes seller n’s technology and wind speed, respec-
tively. We assume that τn takes values in {τn1 , ..., τnM} with probability (pn1 ..., pnM).
The probability distribution of ωn ∈ [ω, ω] is independent of τn. The wind speeds
ω1, ..., ωN may be correlated as the sellers can be located in geographically close
locations. We assume that joint distribution of (ω1, ...,ωN) (resp. (τ 1, ...,τN)), is com-
monly known to all sellers as well as the designer. Furthermore, Assumptions 3.1
and 3.2 of Section 3.2, hold for every seller n, n∈{1, ...,N}.
Similar to the approach presented in Section 3.3, we invoke the revelation prin-
ciple and restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms that are incentive com-
patible and individually rational. Let τ−n (resp. ω−n) denote the set of all sellers’
technologies (resp. wind speeds) except seller n’s technology τn (resp. wind speed
ωn). In the model with many sellers, seller n’s allocation and payment are functions
of seller n’s reports about τn and ωn as well as all the other sellers’ reports about
τ−n and ω−n. Let qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n), and tn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n) denote the allocation and
payment functions for seller n, respectively.
We assume that the designer does not reveal the reports of seller n to other sellers
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as seller n’s conditional expected cost and payment, respectively, when he has tech-
nology τn and wind ωn, and he reports τ̂n and ω̂n. We note that, the expectations
above are written using the fact that at equilibrium, seller i believes that other sellers
report their private information truthfully.































denote the buyer’s expected utility and the designer’s objective, respectively.
We discuss how the results of Theorems 3.1-3.3 (on the advantage of the dynamic
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mechanism over the forward and real-time mechanisms) continue to hold in the model
with many sellers described above.
The key idea is the following. We write each mechanism design problem with
many sellers in a form similar to the corresponding mechanism design problem with
one seller (formulated in Section 3.4). We write these mechanism design problems
using the conditional expected cost and payment functions, defined by (3.38) and
(3.39), respectively, instead of the cost and payment functions that appear in the
problems with a single seller. We show that in each mechanism design problem and
for each seller, the designer faces a set of constraints that are similar to those that
arise in the case with a single seller. Therefore, the arguments used in the proofs of
Theorems 3.1-3.3 can be directly extended to environments with many sellers.
We proceed with the formulation of the mechanism design problems with many
sellers, and discuss how the results of Theorems 3.1-3.3 continue to hold in the model
with many sellers.
Forward mechanism: In the forward mechanism, the allocation function qn(τ̂n,
ω̂n,τ−n,ω̂−n) and payment function tn(τ̂n,ω̂n,τ−n,ω̂−n) for seller n are independent
of the reported wind speeds ω̂n and ω̂−n. Therefore, we drop the dependence
on (ω̂n, ω̂−n), and denote the conditional expected cost and payment functions by
C̄n(τ̂n; τn, ωn) and t̄n(τ̂n), respectively. The optimal forward mechanism with many





ICn: Rnτn≥ t̄n(τ̂n)−Eω{C̄n(τ̂ ;τ,ωn)} ∀τn, τ̂n, n (3.40)
IRn: Rnτn ≥ 0 ∀τn, n. (3.41)
We note that in the above optimization problem, the designer faces a set of con-
straints, given by (3.40) and (3.41), for every seller n. These constraints are similar
to those given by (3.6) and (3.7) for the forward mechanism with a single seller.
Therefore, we can show that seller’s expected revenue Rnτn for every seller i must
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satisfy a set of constraints similar to those given by (3.15) and (3.16) in part (a) of
Theorem 3.2 in terms of conditional expected cost C̄n(τ̂n;τn,ωn).
Real-time mechanism: The real-time mechanism design problem with many






∀τn,ωn, τ̂n,ω̂n, n, (3.42)
IRn: Rnτn,ωn ≥ 0 ∀τn, ωn, n. (3.43)
Note that the set of constraints (3.42) and (3.43), for every seller n, is similar to
the set of constraints (3.8) and (3.9) in the real-time mechanism with a single seller.
Therefore, we can show that expected revenue Rnτn,ωn must satisfy a set of constraints
similar to those given by Theorem 3.1. Consequently, we can show that the set of
constraints that the designer faces for every seller n can be reduced to a set of con-
straints that are similar to those given by (3.18)-(3.20) in part (b) of Theorem 3.2 in
terms of expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn and Rnτn , and the conditional expected cost
C̄n(τ̂n,ω̂n;τn,ωn). We can also show that q(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n) must only be a function of
Θn(τn,ωn) and Θm(τm,ωm), m 6=n, since all sellers report simultaneously about their
own technologies and wind speeds (see (3.17)). Using an argument similar to the
one in Theorem 3.2 for seller n, we can also show that Eτ−n,ω−n{qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)}
must be increasing in ωn.
Dynamic mechanism: The optimal dynamic mechanism with many sellers is
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ICn2 :Rnτn,ωn≥ t̄n(τn,ω̂n)−C̄n(τn,ω̂n;τn,ωn) ∀τn,ωn,ω̂n,n, (3.45)
IRn :Rnτn≥0 ∀τ, n. (3.46)
As we mentioned above, we assume that the designer does not reveal other sellers’
reports about τ−n at T = 1. Therefore, seller n’s IC constraint about ω at T = 2 is
given by (3.45), where seller n assumes that other sellers report truthfully τ−n and
ω−n. We note that the set of constraints (3.44)-(3.46), for every seller n, is similar
to the set of constraints (3.10)-(3.12) in the dynamic mechanism with a single seller.
Therefore, we can show that the expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn must satisfy a set
of constraints similar to those given by Theorem 3.1. Furthermore, we can show
that the expected seller’s revenue Rnτn,ωn and Rnτn for every seller n must satisfy a
set of constraints that are similar to the ones given by (3.22)-(3.24) in part (c) of
Theorem 3.2. Using an argument similar to Theorem 3.2 for seller n, we can also
show that Eτ−n,ω−n{qn(τn,ωn,τ−n,ω−n)} must be increasing in ωn as in (3.21) in part
(c) of Theorem 3.2.
The above arguments show that all the mechanism design problems with many
sellers considered in this section, have sets of constraints for each seller that are
similar to those that arise in the corresponding problems with a single seller. Thus,
we can show, by arguments similar to those given in the proof of Theorem 3.3, that
the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanism with many sellers is less restrictive
than the set of constraints for the forward and real-time mechanisms with many
sellers. Therefore, we can establish that the dynamic mechanism with many sellers
outperforms the forward and real-time mechanism with many sellers.
Remark 3.1. The optimal forward and real-time mechanism with many sellers are
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standard static multi-unit auctions (see [66]). However, the optimal dynamic mech-
anism with many sellers is a form of handicap auction, first introduced in [38].
In a standard auction, seller n bids his generation cost function simultaneously
and the auctioneer determines the outcomes based on all sellers’ bids.
In a handicap auction, at T = 1, seller n bids his current information about his
generation cost (i.e. τn), so as to pick a menu of payment-quantity curve, from
which he can select his generation at T = 2. Then, at T = 2, seller n observes the
realized wind speed ωn, and competes with other sellers for generation based on the
payment-quantity curve he won at T = 1. Sellers with better technologies anticipate
to have higher generations in real-time. Therefore, in a handicap auction, at T =1,
they bid for payment-quantity curves that give them high marginal prices for high
generation quantities (which are more likely for them), but low marginal prices for
low generation quantities (which are less likely for them). On the other hand, sellers
with worse technologies bid for payment-quantity curves that give them high marginal
prices for low generation quantities (which are more likely for them), but low marginal
prices for high generation quantities (which are less likely for them); see Fig. 3.3 in
the example of Section 3.7.
3.9 Conclusion
We considered a dynamic model for market design for wind energy, and studied
the problem of market mechanism design for wind energy. We proposed dynamic
market mechanisms that couple the outcome of the real-time and forward mecha-
nisms. We showed that the dynamic market mechanisms proposed in this chapter
outperform the real-time and forward mechanisms with respect to the integration of
wind energy into the grid. Dynamic mechanisms dynamically incorporate the new
information that arrives over time, and require the wind generator to sequentially
reveal his private information to the market designer, and to refine his generation
commitment accordingly. We investigated the effects of wind monitoring and penalty
risk exposure on the market outcome. Generalization of the these results to mecha-
nisms with multiple wind generators is our main direction for future work.
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Chapter 4
Informational Incentives in Congestion Games
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Background and Motivation
In a transportation network, the condition of every link varies over time due
to changes in weather conditions, accidents, traffic jams, etc. Traditionally, drivers
receive public information about these changes at every route through various in-
frastructures, e.g. regional traffic updates via radio broadcasts, and/or variable
(dynamic) message signs on road sides displaying specific information about the on-
ward routes [11, 29, 36]. In recent years, the advent of GPS-enabled routing devices
and navigation applications (e.g. Waze and Google maps) has enabled drivers to
receive private, real-time data about the transportation network’s condition for their
own intended origin-destination [10]. The development of these technologies cre-
ates new opportunities to reduce congestion in the network, and improve its overall
performance (as measured by various metrics including social welfare).
Several studies have investigated the effects of information provision to drivers
on the social welfare of the transportation network [4, 14, 33, 73, 124, 1, 74, 69].
These studies have shown that the effect of information provision on social welfare
is ambiguous, and in general, is not necessarily socially beneficial. For exogenously
fixed information provision structures, these works have identified instances where
the provision of information can in fact increase congestion in parts of the network,
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leading to a decrease in social welfare. In addition to the above-mentioned theo-
retical and experimental works, there are empirical evidences that identify negative
impacts of information provision on the network’s congestion [52, 94, 103, 45, 26].
Therefore, it is important to investigate how to design appropriate information pro-
vision mechanisms, in a manner that is socially beneficial and leads to a reduction
in the overall congestion in the transportation network.
In this chapter, we study the problem of designing a socially optimal informa-
tion disclosure mechanism. We consider a congestion game [83, 104] in a parallel
two-link network. We consider an information provider (principal) who wants to dis-
close information about the condition of the network to a fixed population of drivers
(agents). We assume that the condition of one route/link, called safe route, is con-
stant and known to everyone, while the condition of the other route, called risky
route, is random and only known to the principal. The principal wants to design an
information disclosure mechanism so as to maximize the social welfare.
We study the problem of designing an optimal information provision mechanism
in two cases: (1) when the principal can only provide information that is publicly
available to all drivers, and (2) when the principal can provide private information
to each driver individually.
We first consider a static setting where the drivers do not learn from their past
experiences. We determine a condition under which the principal can achieve the
maximum social welfare using an optimal information provision mechanism. That
is, the principal can utilize her superior information about the network to provide
informational incentives so as to align the drivers’ objectives with the overall social
welfare. Next, we consider a dynamic two-stage setting where the drivers learn from
their experience at t = 1, and the risky routes’ condition evolves according to an
uncontrolled Markov chain. We consider three scenarios for the drivers’ learning at
t = 1: (i) the drivers only learn from the information they receive directly from the
principal at t = 1, (ii) in addition to the information they receive directly from the
principal at t = 1, the drivers who take the risky route learn perfectly its condition at
t = 1, and (iii) in addition to the information he receives directly from the principal
at t = 1, each driver perfectly observes the number of cars/drivers on the route
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he takes at t = 1. Using numerical simulations, we show that in scenario (i) the
principal can achieve the same outcome as in the static setting in which there is no
learning. However, in scenarios (ii) and (iii) the performance of an optimal dynamic
information provision mechanism decreases due to the drivers’ learning only. In
particular, we identify instances in scenario (ii) where it is optimal for principal to
reveal perfectly risky route’s condition at t = 2 so that the drivers do not have an
incentive to experiment and learn the risky route’s condition at t = 1. Moreover,
in scenario (iii) we identify instances where it is optimal for the designer to not
implement different routing outcome, i.e. reveal her information about risky route’s
condition, so as to increase her information superiority at t = 2.
4.1.2 Related literature
The problems investigated in [78, 4, 14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74] are the most closely
related to our problem. The authors of [4, 14] consider a bottleneck model [128] with
stochastic capacities, where each route is modeled as a queue with a first-come, first-
served policy, with the service rate determined by the route’s condition. In [4], the
authors consider a scenario where each driver decides the time and the route/queue
he wants to join, considering the behavior of the other drivers. Through numerical
simulations, they show that when drivers receive a low quality/highly noisy signal
about the routes’ conditions, social welfare decreases. In [14], the authors consider
a scenario where each driver does not take into account the other drivers’ response
to the information provided by the principal. They show that social welfare may
decrease when the drivers receive accurate information about the routes, due to the
drivers’ overreaction and/or higher congestion concentration in parts of the network.
The authors of [33, 73] consider a parallel two-link network that is similar to
our model. In [33], the authors assume that only one of the routes has a random
condition with two possible values. They show that social welfare may decrease
when the drivers receive public information about the routes’ conditions irrespective
of whether they are risk-neutral or risk-averse. The authors of [73] assume that the
condition of both routes are random. They show that social welfare can decrease
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when the drivers receive public perfect information about the realizations of the
routes’ conditions.
The authors of [124, 74, 1] consider a model where a subset of drivers (informed
drivers) has access to more accurate information about the condition of every route
than the remaining drivers. In [124], the authors assume that the drivers that do
not receive the more accurate information prefer to use high-capacity routes (i.e.
highways) rather than low-capacity routes. By numerical simulation, they show that
as the number of informed drivers increases, the congestion in low-capacity routes
(i.e. urban areas) increases. The authors of [74] consider a model similar to ours,
in which the condition of one of the routes is random. They show that when the
number of informed drivers is low, the expected utilities of both groups of drivers
are higher compared to the case where all drivers are uninformed. However, as the
number of informed drivers increases, the social welfare decreases, even compared
to the case where all drivers are uninformed. The authors of [1] study a model
where the informed drivers become aware of the existence of additional routes in a
network. They show that the provision of information can create a Braess’ Paradox
phenomenon, and thus, can reduce not only the social welfare, but also the utility of
the informed drivers.
In contrast to [78, 4, 14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74], which analyze the performance of
fixed information provision mechanisms, in this chapter we investigate the problem
of designing an optimal information provision mechanism; the information provision
mechanisms analyzed in [78, 4, 14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74] are within the set of feasible
mechanisms the principal can choose from when maximizing the social welfare.
Our work is also related to the literature on improving efficiency in resource
allocation problems with externalities (i.e. congestion games). It is known that
the equilibrium outcome in congestion games is not socially optimal [106]. Several
approaches have been proposed in the literature to address this inefficiency. One
approach is to utilize monetary mechanisms in order to align the agents’ objectives
with the social welfare (see [99] and references therein). A second approach, which is
applicable when the principal has control over a fraction of agents, is for the principal
to choose routes for this fraction so as to influence the behavior of selfish agents. This
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can lead to improvement in the social welfare (see [65, 112] and references therein).
We propose an alternative approach to improving the efficiency in congestion game by
utilizing informational incentives when the principal has an informational advantage
over the agents. Specifically, our approach can prove promising in transportation
networks where the application of tolls (pricing) is limited and agents are typically
selfish.
Within the economics literature, the problems studied in this chapter belong
to the class of information design problems (see [17] and references therein). Our
approach to the public information mechanism design problem (Section 4.4) is similar
to the ones in [35, 59]. Our approach to the private information mechanism design
problems (Section 4.5 and 4.6) is similar to the ones in [15, 16]. The work in [64] is
closely related to our work. The authors of [64] consider a model with two possible
actions where the payoff of one of the actions is not known, even to the principal.
The principal (e.g. the Waze application) faces a group of short-lived agents that
arrive sequentially over time. She wants to design an information mechanism that
provides information about the agents’ past experience to the incoming agents over
time. Our work is different from [64] as (i) in contrast to the single-agent decision
problem considered in [64], our model assumes that the principal faces a population
of agents that create negative externalities on one other at each time step, and (ii)
in the dynamic setting, agents are long-lived and learn from their past (private)
experience, while in [64], the agents are short-lived.
The dynamic two-stage problems studied in this chapter are also related to litera-
ture on strategic experimentation in economics [22, 61, 60]. The authors of [47] study
a monetary mechanism design in a principal-agent relationship. Our problem is dif-
ferent from that of [47] since we study an information disclosure mechanism design
instead of a monetary mechanism design. The authors of [48, 18] study the problem
of information disclosure mechanism design in an innovation contest. Our problem is
different from those of [48, 18] since in contrast to their models where agents do not
observe each others’ actions and payoffs unless the principal discloses information
and an agent’s payoff is independent of other agents’ action, in our model agents’
actions create negative externality and influence agents’ payoffs, and each agent may
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have an indirect observation about other agents’ actions and payoffs at t = 1.
The information design problems that we consider in this chapter are also related
to the problem of designing real-time communication systems [77, 123, 131, 136].
However, in contrast to these studies, where the receivers are cooperative and have
the same objective as the transmitter, in our problem the drivers are strategic and
have objectives that are different from that of the principal. The authors of [2]
consider a problem of real-time communication with a strategic transmitter and
receiver, Gaussian source, and quadratic estimation cost. They follow an approach
that is similar to that of [59] and our approach for the design of public information
disclosure mechanism in Section 4.4. However, our problem is different from that
of [2] since in our model there exist many agents, and each agent’s utility depends
on his action and the routes’ conditions as well as other agents’ actions. Moreover,
in this chapter, we study the problem of private information disclosure mechanism
design that is not present in the work of [2].
4.1.3 Contribution
We determine optimal public and private information provision mechanisms that
maximize the social welfare in a transportation network. Our results propose a so-
lution to the concern raised in [78, 4, 14, 33, 73, 69, 124, 1, 74] about the potential
negative impact of information provision on congestion in transportation networks.
We show that the principal can utilize his superior information about the condition
of the network, and provide informational incentives to the drivers so as to improve
the social welfare. When the principal can disclose information to every driver pri-
vately, we show that the principal can benefit from providing coordinated routing
recommendations to the drivers. We identify a condition under which the principal
can achieve the efficient routing outcome in a static setting. Moreover, we consider a
dynamic setting with two-time steps under three scenarios, each capturing a possible
piece of information that the drivers can learn from it in dynamic setting. Using nu-
merical simulations, we discuss the effect of each piece of information on the solution
to the optimal dynamic information mechanism and its qualitative properties.
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4.1.4 Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we present our
model in a static setting. In Section 4.3, we consider two naive information mech-
anisms and compare their outcomes with the socially efficient outcome. We study
the problem of designing an optimal public information mechanism in Section 4.4.
In Section 4.5, we study the problem of designing an optimal private information
mechanism. We consider the design of optimal dynamic information mechanisms
in a two-step setting in Section 4.6, and investigate the effect of different types of
drivers’ observations on the performance and qualitative properties of an optimal
dynamic mechanism through numerical simulations. We conclude in Section 4.7. All
proofs appear in Appendix C.
4.2 Model
Consider a two-link network managed by a principal who wants to maximize
social welfare (Figure 4.1). There is a unit mass of agents traveling from the origin
O to the destination D. There are two routes/links that agents can take. The top
route, denoted route s (i.e. safe route) has condition a > 0 that is known to all
agents and the principal. The bottom route, denoted route r (i.e. risky route), has a
condition θ ∈ Θ := {θ1, . . . , θM}, θ1 < θ2 < . . . < θM , that is not known to the agents
and is only known to the principal. It is common knowledge among the agents and
the principal that θ takes values in {θ1, . . . , θM} with probability {pθ1 , pθ2 , ..., pθM},
respectively. Let xs and xr (where xs+xr = 1), denote the mass of agents that choose
route s and r, respectively. The utility of each agent depends on the condition of the
route that he chooses to travel as well as on the congestion (negative externality)
that he observes along his route. Given xs and xr, let Cs(xs) and Cr(xr) denote the
congestion cost at route s and route r, respectively. The functions Cs(·) and Cr(·)
are strictly increasing, with Cs(0) = 0 and Cr(0) = 0. For the ease of exposition, we
assume that Cs(xs) = xs and Cr(xr) = xr. Throughout this chapter, we discuss how
our results extend to general congestion functions.
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We assume that the utility of an agent taking route s (resp. r) is given by
a − Cs(xs) = a − xs (resp. θ − Cr(xr) = θ − xr); that is, the effect of a route’s
condition on an agent’s utility is separable from the effect of the congestion cost.
Therefore, the expected social welfare W is given by
W := E {xs(a− Cs(xs)) + xr(θ − Cr(xr))} . (4.1)
We make the following assumption about the possible values of θ.
Assumption 4.1. The risky route’s types θ are such that θM − Cr(1) ≤ a and
a− Cs(1) ≤ θ1.
Assumption 4.1 ensures that for every realization θ of route r’s condition, there
will be a positive mass of agents taking either route.
The principal wants to design an information disclosure mechanism that provides
information about the condition θ of route r to the agents, so as to maximize the
expected social welfare W . We consider two classes of information disclosure mech-
anisms by the principal: (i) public information disclosure mechanisms, where the
principal sends a public signal about θ which is observed by all agents (Section 4.4),
(ii) private information disclosure mechanisms, where the principal sends a private
signal about θ to each agent, and this signal is only observed by that agent (Section
4.5).
Before proceeding with the study of optimal public and private information disclo-
sure mechanisms which maximize social welfare, we present two naive information
disclosure mechanisms in Section 4.3. By exploring the agents’ routing decisions
under these two naive information disclosure mechanisms, along with the socially
efficient routing decisions, we will elaborate on the main insights underlying some of
the results appearing in the rest of the chapter.
4.3 Naive Mechanisms
We study two naive information disclosure mechanisms that the principal can







Figure 4.1: The two-link network
formation disclosure and full information disclosure mechanisms. We then present
the socially optimal outcome and compare it to the outcomes of the naive mecha-
nisms. Let µ := E{θ} =
∑
θ∈Θ pθθ denote the expected condition of route r. Define
∆ := a − µ and ∆θ := a − θ as the expected and realized difference between the




denote the variance of route r’s
condition. In the sequel, we characterize the traffic outcome under different infor-
mation that the agents may receive as a function of µ, ∆, and ∆θ.
4.3.1 No Information Disclosure
Consider an information disclosure mechanism where the principal discloses no
information about θ to the agents. In this case, the expected utility from route r,
given by µ − xr, must be equal to the utility a − xs from route s; this is because
otherwise, some agents would switch from the route with lower utility to the one














That is, the difference between the traffic on routes s and r depends on the expected
difference between the routes’ conditions, given by ∆.
Consequently, the expected social welfare W no info under the no information dis-
1Note that by Assumption 4.1, both routes are non-empty for any realization of the condition
of the risky route.
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closure mechanism is given by






denotes the expected utility of an agent taking either of the routes.
4.3.2 Full Information Disclosure
Consider an information disclosure mechanism where the principal reveals per-
fectly the condition θ of route r to all agents. In this case, agents choose their route
knowing θ. By an argument similar to the one given above for the no information
disclosure mechanism, the utility from taking either of the routes must be equal.














In this case, the traffic difference between routes s and r depends on the realized
difference ∆θ between the routes’ conditions, as opposed to the expected difference
∆ that determines the outcome under the no information disclosure mechanism.
Using (4.5) and (4.6), we can obtain the expected social welfare W full info under
the full information disclosure mechanism as
W full info = E{a+ θ − 2
2
} = a+ µ− 1
2
. (4.7)
Remark 4.1. We note that the expected social welfare W full info under the full in-
formation disclosure mechanism and W no info under the no information disclosure
mechanism are the same in the model of Section 4.2 with linear congestion costs.
This is because under the full information disclosure mechanism the social welfare is
linear in θ. As we discuss in Remark 4.2 below, for congestion functions Cs(xs) and
Cr(xr) that are nonlinear in xs and xr, respectively, the social welfares under the full
information and no information disclosure mechanisms are not identical in general.
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4.3.3 Socially Efficient Outcome
When each agent chooses his route, under either the no information or full in-
formation disclosure mechanisms, he does not take into account the congestion (i.e.
negative externality) that his decision creates on the other agents. Therefore, the
social welfare under the no information and full information disclosure mechanisms
are different from the one under the socially efficient outcome. The socially efficient

























We observe that the difference in the traffic of routes s and r is doubled under
the full information mechanism (see (4.8) and (4.9)), where agents make routing
decisions selfishly, compared to the socially efficient routing. This is an instance of
the tragedy of commons, where each agent maximizes his own utility and does not
take into account the congestion cost he imposes on the other agents on his route.
Therefore, it may not be optimal for the principal to perfectly reveal his information
about θ to the agents, as in the full information disclosure mechanism.
We now compare the optimal social welfare W eff with the social welfare W no info
under the no information disclosure mechanism. Under the no information disclosure
mechanism, agents do not know θ and make their routing decisions only based on
their ex-ante belief about θ (see (4.2) and (4.3)). Therefore, the social welfare under
the no information disclosure mechanism, given by (4.4) is lower than the efficient
social welfare because (i) the agents make their routing decisions selfishly, and (ii)
the agents make their routing decisions without any knowledge about the realization






in (4.10) capture the social welfare loss due to factors (i)
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and (ii) above, respectively.
In order to reduce the social welfare loss due to the agents’ lack of information
about θ, the principal may want to disclose information about the realization of θ
to the agents. As discussed earlier, disclosing the realization of θ perfectly does not
improve social welfare (see (4.4) and (4.7)). Therefore, the principal must utilize her
superior information about route r’s condition to strategically disclose information
to the agents and influence their routing decision so as to improve the expected social
welfare. This can be interpreted as providing informational incentives to the agents
that align their objectives with that of the principal.
In the sequel, we explore various information disclosure mechanisms that the prin-
cipal can employ to improve the expected social welfare. In Section 4.4, we explore
public information disclosure mechanisms, where the principal reveals information
about the realization of θ which is publicly observed by all agents. In Section 4.5,
we explore private information disclosure mechanisms, where the principal reveals
information to each agent individually through a private communication channel.
4.4 Public Information Disclosure
In this section, we consider mechanisms through which the principal reveals public
information about the realization of θ to all agents. For instance, the principal can
post traffic information on public road signs, or broadcast traffic updates through
radio stations. Let M denote the set of all messages through which the principal
can reveal information about the realization of θ. For instance,M can be the set of
possible commute times on route r, or the number of congestion-causing accidents
that have happened on route r. Given a message space M, a public information
disclosure mechanism can be fully described by ψ : Θ→ ∆(M). For every realization
of θ, ψ determines a probability distribution over the set of messages M that the
principal sends. We note that the no information and full information disclosure
mechanisms presented in Section 4.3 can be described as special instances of public
information disclosure mechanisms by setting M = ∅, and M = Θ along with
ψ(θ) = θ, respectively.
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Given a public information disclosure mechanism (M, ψ), the agents update their
belief about route r’s condition θ after receiving a public message m ∈M as,




Using an argument similar to the one given in Section 4.3.1, for every message














where ∆m := a− E{θ|m}.
The principal’s objective is to design a message space M along with a public





subject to (4.12) and (4.13).
Even though the principal can influence the agents’ routing decisions for differ-
ent realizations of θ by employing various public information disclosure mechanisms
(M, ψ), we prove below that the expected social welfare W is independent of (M, ψ)
for the model of Section 4.2.
Theorem 4.1. For every public information disclosure mechanisms (M, ψ), the
expected social welfare W is given by a+µ−1
2
.
The result of Theorem 4.1 states that the principal cannot benefit from employing
a public information disclosure mechanism. We would like to note that for the model
of Section 4.2 (i) the congestion functions Cs(xs) and Cr(xr) are linear in xs and xr,
and (ii) the effect of route r’s condition θ on the utility of an agent taking route r is
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linearly separable from the congestion cost Cr(xr). Because of features (i) and (ii),
conditioned on the realization of message m, the expected social welfare is a linear
function of ∆m; this leads to the result of Theorem 4.1. In a model where either
feature (i) or (ii) is absent, the result of Theorem 4.1 does not hold.
Remark 4.2. Consider a model where the congestion costs Cs(xs) and Cr(xr) are
nonlinear functions of xs and xr, respectively. Define a function G : [a − θM , a −
θ1] → [0, 1] as G(δ) := {x : Cr(1 − x) − Cs(x) = δ}. Note that since Cs(xs)
and Cr(xr) are strictly increasing in xs and xr, respectively, function G(δ) is well-




. Under a public
information disclosure mechanism (M, ψ), conditioned on the realization of message
m, the traffics at routes s and r are given by
xs,public(m) = G(∆m), (4.14)
xr,public(m) = 1−G(∆m). (4.15)
We can verify that if the function Cs(G(δ)) is convex (resp. concave) in δ, the
optimal public information disclosure mechanism is the no information (resp. full
information) mechanism.2 In particular, if Cs(xs) and Cr(xr) are convex and con-
cave (resp. concave and convex) in xs and xr, respectively, the function Cs(G(δ)) is
convex (resp. concave) in δ; thus, the optimal public information disclosure mech-
anism is the no information (resp. full information) mechanism. However, if the
function Cs(G(δ)) is neither convex nor concave in δ, there may exist instances of a
set Θ of possible values for θ, along with a probability distribution over Θ, such that
the optimal public information disclosure mechanisms is a public partial information
disclosure mechanism.
4.5 Private Information Disclosure
In this section, we study various private information disclosure mechanisms that
the principal can use to reveal information about the realization of θ to the agents
2The result directly follows from an application of Jensen’s inequality since W = E{(a−G(·)}.
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so as to improve the expected social welfare. For instance, the principal can provide
individualized and private information to every agent through GPS-enabled devices
such as routing suggestions in smart phone applications. Under a private informa-
tion disclosure mechanism, the principal sends a private signal that is based on the
realization of θ to every agent. Similar to a public information disclosure mechanism,
the principal needs to determine (i) a set of messages (i.e. language) that he wants
to use, and (ii) a mapping that determines for every realization of θ the probability
according to which every signal is sent.
One class of private information disclosure mechanisms is the set of mechanisms
where the principal sends to every agent a private and individualized routing recom-
mendation (i.e. which route to take) based on the realization of θ. We refer to this
subset of private information disclosure mechanisms as recommendation policies. We
note that since the agents are strategic, they do not necessarily follow the principal’s
recommendation unless it is a best response for them. Using the revelation princi-
ple argument for information design problems (see [15]), we can restrict attention,
without loss of generality, to the set of recommendation policies where it is a best
response for every agent to follow the recommendation he receives.
To avoid measure theoretic difficulties, we first assume that the principal sends
N > 0 different recommendations to N groups of agents that have equal masses of
1
N
. We then consider the asymptotic case where N →∞.
Let σN : Θ → ∆({s, r}N) denote the recommendation policy that the principal
employs for a given N . With some abuse of notation, let σN(mN |θ) denote the
probability that the principal sends routing recommendation mN := (mN1 , ...,m
N
N) ∈
{s, r}N to the N groups of agents, given that the state realization is θ ∈ Θ. Given
a recommendation policy σN , each agent must be willing to take the recommended
route given his information about route r’s condition θ. This is captured by the
following obedience condition for each agent belonging to group n, for 1 ≤ n ≤ N ,
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The above obedience constraints are the analogue of the incentive compatibility
constraints in mechanism design problems, and can be interpreted similarly as fol-
lows. The left hand side of condition (4.16) (resp. (4.17)) expresses the expected
utility of an agent in group n, 1 ≤ n ≤ N , if he follows the recommendation to take
route s (resp. r) given his ex-post belief about θ after he receives the recommen-
dation, assuming that the other agents are following their recommendations. The
right hand side of condition (4.16) (resp. (4.17)) expresses the expected utility of an
agent in group n, if he deviates from his recommendation and takes route r (resp.
s) instead of s (resp. r) given his ex-post belief about θ. The obedience constraint
(4.16) therefore requires that it is a best response for every agent to follow the rec-
ommendation, given his ex-post belief about θ, assuming that other agents follow
their routing recommendations. We note that unlike standard mechanism design
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problems, there is no individual rationality constraint, since an agent can simply
ignore the recommendation and choose any route he wishes.




, . . . , N
N
} denote the mass of agents that take route s when the
state is θ under σN . Note that the set of obedience constraints (4.16) and (4.17) are
linear in σN(·|·) and identical for all N groups of agents. Therefore, by symmetry, we
can restrict attention to the set of recommendation policies for the principal where
she selects N · xs,N(θ) groups randomly, recommends to them to take route s, and
recommends to the agents in the remaining groups to take route r.
Therefore, for N → ∞ the set of recommendation policies for the principal can
be characterized by y(θ) ∈ [0, 1], where y(θ) denotes the mass of agents receiving the
recommendation to take route s, i.e. xs(θ) = y(θ) and xr(θ) = 1− y(θ). When the
state is θ, the principal recommends route s (resp. r) to every agent with probability
y(θ) (resp. 1− y(θ)) independent of her recommendation to other agents.
Under the information policy σ, let Uσ(s, θ) := a− y(θ) and Uσ(r, θ) := θ− (1−
y(θ)) denote an agent’s utility from taking routes s and r, respectively, when route
r’s condition is θ. The set of obedience constraints (4.16) and (4.17) for each agent









pθ(1− y(θ))Uσ(r, θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ
pθ(1− y(θ))Uσ(s, θ). (4.19)
Therefore, the problem that the principal faces is to determine a recommendation
policy that maximizes the expected social welfare subject to the obedience constraints
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subject to (4.18) and (4.19).
4.5.1 Implementable Outcomes
To determine an optimal recommendation policy, we first specify the set of feasible
routing outcomes/recommendation policies that satisfy the obedience constraints
(4.18) and (4.19).
Lemma 4.1. A routing outcome {xs(θ), xr(θ), xs(θ) + xr(θ) = 1, θ ∈ Θ} is imple-



























We note that the outcomes under the no information and full information dis-
closure policies, given by (4.2)-(4.3) and (4.5)-(4.6), respectively, satisfy conditions
(4.20) and (4.21) with equality. That is, they are the corner points of the set of
implementable outcomes. The set of implementable outcomes is depicted in Figure
4.2 for an example with |Θ| = 2.
4.5.2 Incentivizing the Socially Efficient Routing
Using the result of Lemma 4.1, we can determine the necessary and sufficient
condition to implement the efficient allocation {xs,eff(θ), xr,eff(θ), θ ∈ Θ} through the
recommendation policy below.
3We note that we can restrict attention, without loss of optimality, to policies where y(θ) is
deterministic. This is because the set of obedience constraints only depends on the expected value
of y(θ). Moreover, the principal’s objective is a concave function of y(θ) (see (4.1)). Thus, by the
Jensen’s inequality, an optimal recommendation policy is a recommendation policy where y(θ) is
deterministic for every θ ∈ Θ.
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Figure 4.2: The set of implementable outcomes for a = 2, Θ = {L,H}, L = 1.5,
H = 2.5, pL = 0.6, and pH = 0.4.
Theorem 4.2. The efficient routing policy xeff is implementable through an infor-
mation disclosure policy if and only if
σ2 ≥ 2|∆| −∆2. (4.22)
We note that |∆| = |a−µ|
m
≤ 1 by Assumption 4.1; thus, 2|∆| − ∆2 ≥ 0. For
ex-ante symmetric routes (i.e. µ = a), we have ∆ = 0, and the efficient outcome
is always implementable for any distribution of θ. However, if the two routes are
ex-ante asymmetric (i.e. µ 6= a), to incentivize the efficient policy, the variance of θ
must be greater than the threshold (4.22), which depends on the expected difference
between the routes. We further elaborate on this issue below.
As we discussed above, we can view the routing recommendation by the principal
to the agents as an informational incentive that she provides so as to influence the
routing decision of each agent. When the routes are symmetric, i.e. ∆ = 0, under the
no information disclosure policy, each agent (at equilibrium) is indifferent between
taking either of the routes; see (4.2) and (4.3). Therefore, the principal can persuade
(i.e. recommend to) an agent to take a specific route even when she does not have
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significant information superiority over him (i.e. σ2 is small). However, when the
routes are asymmetric, i.e. ∆ 6= 0, under the no information disclosure policy, each
agent has a strict preference over route s (resp. r) if ∆ > 0 (resp. ∆ < 0). Thus, the
principal needs a strictly positive incentive to persuade an agent to take the route
that is not aligned with his original preference. This implies that the information the
principal holds must be valuable enough to enable her to offer adequate informational
incentives to persuade an agent to follow her recommendation. Condition (4.22)
captures the value of the principal’s information about θ in terms of σ2.
Figure 4.3 depicts the maximum expected social welfare the principal can achieve
for different combinations of σ2 and ∆ by utilizing a recommendation policy in an
example with |Θ| = 2. We note that for pairs (σ,∆) that satisfy condition (4.22) of
Theorem 4.2, the principal can implement the socially efficient outcomes. However,




































Figure 4.3: The best implementable outcomes with respect to the socially efficient
outcome for a = 2, Θ = {L,H}, and pL = pH = 0.5.
Remark 4.3. A result similar to that of Theorem 4.2 can be obtained for general
congestion functions Cr(xr) and Cs(xs), where the condition that is the analogue of
(4.22) depends on higher order moments of θ.
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4.6 Dynamic Setting
In this section, we study a dynamic setting with time horizon T = 2, i.e t ∈
{1, 2}, where route r’s condition θt, t = 1, 2, has uncontrolled Markovian dynam-
ics with transition probability P ∈ R|Θ|×|Θ|. We assume that P[pθ1 , . . . , pθM ]T =
[pθ1 , . . . , pθM ]
T , that is, the marginal probability distribution of θ2 is the same that
of θ1.
We consider a situation where the same group of agents commute from the origin
to the destination every day. Therefore, agents at t = 2 may have learnt new
information from their observations at t = 1. We study the problem of designing
an optimal dynamic private information disclosure policy by the principal. The
investigation of this two-step dynamic mechanism provides some insight into how
the results for a static setting change in a dynamic setting where agents can learn
from their past experience. We note that by the result of Theorem 4.1, the study
of dynamic public information disclosure mechanisms in a dynamic setting does not
introduce any issue in addition to those present in the study of static mechanisms
within the context of the model of Section 4.2.
We consider three scenarios depending on the agents’ observations at t = 1 as
follows: (i) agents do not make any environmental observations (i.e., neither the
condition of the risky route nor the traffic (i.e. mass of agents/cars) on routes s
and r, (ii) agents who take route r observe only its condition θ1, and (iii) each agent
observes only the traffic on the route he takes at t = 1. In a real world situation,
the agents can have noisy observations of θ1 as well as a noisy observation of the
number of cars traveling the route. Therefore, the study of the three scenarios
described above will allow us to understand the effect of each type of learning (piece
of information) on the solution of the dynamic problem and uncover its qualitative
properties.
In all of these scenarios, we assume that the principal’s routing recommendation
policy at t = 2 does not depend on the agent’s decisions at t = 1. We make this
assumption for the following reasons. (1) If the principal wants to incorporate the
agents’ past decisions into her routing recommendation policy, she needs to moni-
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tor every agent’s location over time; this may not be feasible due to technological
limitations and/or privacy concerns. (2) If the principal can incorporate the agents’
past decisions into her routing recommendation policy, then her optimal strategy
would be to not disclose any further information to every agent that does not follow
her routing recommendation (i.e. punish him). On one hand, such a punishment
scheme may not be desirable in practical settings. On the other hand, if such a pun-
ishment scheme is permitted, then the principal can incentivize any desired routing
behavior in a dynamic setting with long enough horizon if the agents are sufficiently
patient and θt does not have deterministic dynamics (i.e. the principal has informa-
tion superiority over the agents for all times). Therefore, in the sequel we restrict
attention to the class of dynamic recommendation policies where the principal does
not observe/incorporate the agents’ decisions at t = 1 when designing her policy.
As a result, the set of recommendation policies for the principal can be charac-
terized by σ := {y1(θ1), ys2(θ2, θ1), yr2(θ2, θ1), ∀θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ}. The principal’s routing
policy at t = 1 is given by y1(θ) (resp. 1− y1(θ)), which denotes the probability that
route s (resp. r) is recommended when route r’s condition is θ1. For t = 2, y
s
2(θ2, θ1)
(resp. yr2(θ2, θ1)) denotes the probability that route s is recommended to agents who
took route s (resp. r) at t = 1, when route r’s condition at t = 1 and t = 2 are θ1 and
θ2, respectively. Similarly, 1− ys2(θ2, θ1) (resp. 1− yr2(θ2, θ1)) denotes the probability
that route r is recommended to agents who took route s (resp. r) at t = 1, when
route r’s condition at t = 1 and t = 2 are θ1 and θ2, respectively.
4.6.1 Case (i): No Environmental Observations
Consider a situation where the agents do not make any observations about the
road condition θ1 and/or the number of agents at the route they took at t = 1.
Therefore, the agents infer information about θ1 only based on the recommendation
that they receive at t = 1.
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Let
Uσ2 (s, θ2, θ1) := a− y1(θ1)ys2(θ2, θ1)− (1− y1(θ1))yr2(θ2, θ1),
Uσ2 (r, θ2, θ1) := θ2 − y1(θ1)(1− ys2(θ2, θ1))− (1− y1(θ1))(1− yr2(θ2, θ1)),
denote the utility of routes s and r at t = 2 given that all agents follow their
recommendations. Moreover, define,
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, s} = ys2(θ2, θ1)y1(θ1)P(θ2, θ1)pθ1 ,
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, r} = yr2(θ2, θ1)(1− y1(θ1))P(θ2, θ1)pθ1 ,
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, s} = (1− ys2(θ2, θ1))y1(θ1)P(θ2, θ1)pθ1 ,
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, r} = (1− yr2(θ2, θ1))(1− y1(θ1))P(θ2, θ1)pθ1 .
Then the set of obedience constraints for t = 2 are as follows:
(a) Recommendation s at t = 2 and s at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, s}U2(s, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, s}U2(r, θ2, θ1). (4.23)
(b) Recommendation s at t = 2 and r at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, r}U2(s, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, r}U2(r, θ2, θ1) (4.24)
(c) Recommendation r at t = 2 and s at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, s}U2(r, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, s}U2(s, θ2, θ1) (4.25)
(d) Recommendation r at t = 2 and r at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, r}U2(s, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, r}U2(r, θ2, θ1) (4.26)
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We note that since the agents’ observations at t = 1 include only the routing
recommendation they receive at that time, the agents act myopically at t = 1, as
they cannot learn additional information by themselves. Thus, the set of obedience
constraints at t = 1 are the same as those of the static problem; these constraints









1 (r, θ1), (4.27)∑
θ1∈Θ
pθ(1− y1(θ1))Uσ1 (r, θ1) ≥
∑
θ!∈Θ
pθ(1− y1(θ1))Uσ1 (s, θ1), (4.28)
where Uσ1 (s, θ1) = a− y1(θ1) and Uσ1 (r, θ1) = θ1 − (1− y1(θ1)).














2(θ2, θ1) + (1− y(θ1))yr(θ2, θ1)
]




y(θ1)(1− ys2(θ2, θ1)) + (1− y(θ1))(1− yr2(θ2, θ1))
]
Uσ2 (r, θ2, θ1)
]
Therefore, the optimal routing recommendation policy by the principal when the





subject to (4.23)− (4.28).
In this chapter, we do not provide a closed solution to the above maximization
problem for a general transition matrix P. Nevertheless, we consider two special
cases below: (a) when θ2 is identically distributed and independent of θ1 (i.e. no cor-
relation), and (b) when θ2 is identical to θ1 (i.e. perfect correlation). We argue below
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that that for special cases (a) and (b) the performance of an optimal dynamic rec-
ommendation policy per time step is equal to that of optimal static recommendation
policy.
For case (a), it is easy to verify that the repetition of the optimal static recom-
mendation policy is an optimal dynamic recommendation policy. For case (b), at
t = 1, the optimal static routing policy is implementable since the obedience con-
straints at t = 1 are identical to those in the static problem, At t = 2, consider the
recommendation policy ys(θ2) = 1 and y
r(θ2) = 0. That is, at t = 2, the principal
recommends to every agent to take the same route he took at t = 1. If an agent
is willing to follow his recommendation at t = 1, then he is also willing to take the
exact route for the next day, since he does not learn any new information after t = 1,
and route r’s condition remains the same. Therefore, ys(θ2) = 1 and y
r(θ2) = 0 is
implementable at t = 2. It is easy to verify that the performance of the dynamic
recommendation policy described above is identical to that of the optimal static
recommendation policy.
Given a general transition matrix P, every agent forms an updated belief about
θ1 after receiving his recommendation at t = 1. As the correlation between θ1 and
θ2 increases, the information that the agent learns at t = 1 becomes more valuable
to him, and consequently, the principal’s information superiority decreases. The
argument given above for case (b) states that even when θ1 = θ2, the principal can
achieve the same expected social welfare at t = 2 as in the static setting. Therefore,
we conjecture that the (partial) results we proved above for the special cases (a) and
(b), hold in general for any correlation between 0 and 1.
Conjecture 1. For every transition matrix P, the performance of an optimal dy-
namic recommendation policy per time step is equal to that of an optimal static
recommendation policy.
We examine the above conjecture through a numerical simulation below. Consider
a setting where Θ = {L,H} with pL = pH = 0.5. Assume that the transition matrix
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(a) The social welfare





















Optimal Dynmaic - T=1 and θ
1
=L,H
Optimal Dynamic T=2 and θ
2
=L,H
Full Info. - θ=L,H
No Info
Efficient - θ=L,H
(b) The number of agents at routes at t = 1, 2
for different route r’s condition




























(c) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = L



























(d) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = H
Figure 4.4: Case (i) - the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different values
of persistence ε, for θ ∈ {L,H}, L = 1.5, H = 2.5, pL = pH = 0.5 (∆ = 0, σ2 = 0.25)
P is given by
P :=
 pL + ε2 pL − ε2




where ε ∈ [0, 1] denotes the persistence (i.e. correlation) of route r’s condition from
t = 1 to t = 2. Figures 4.4-4.6 depict the optimal dynamic recommendation policies
vs. different values of ε for three pairs of σ2 and ∆. As seen in Fig. 4.4a-4.6a, in
all three examples the performance of the dynamic recommendation policy per time
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step is the same as in the optimal static recommendation policy for different values
of ε. Moreover, the total number of cars at each route at t = 1, 2 are identical under
the optimal dynamic recommendation policy; see Figures 4.4b-4.6b.
























(a) The social welfare


















Optimal Dynmaic - T=1 and θ
1
=L,H
Optimal Dynamic T=2 and θ
2
=L,H
Full Info. - θ=L,H
No Info
Efficient - θ=L,H
(b) The number of agents at routes at t = 1, 2
for different route r’s condition































(c) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = L




























(d) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = H
Figure 4.5: Case (i) - the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε, for θ ∈ {L,H}, L = 1.6, H = 2.6, pL = pH = 0.5 (∆ = 0.1,
σ2 = 0.25)
In the first two examples (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5), the pair (σ2,∆) satisfies
condition (4.22) of Theorem 4.2; thus, the performance of the optimal dynamic and
static recommendation policies are the same as the efficient social welfare. However,
in the third example (see Figure 4.6), where the pair (σ2,∆) does not satisfy condition
(4.22), the performance of the optimal dynamic and static recommendation policies
are inferior to that of the social welfare maximizing policy.
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(a) The social welfare


















Optimal Dynmaic - T=1 and θ
1
=L,H
Optimal Dynamic T=2 and θ
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No Info
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(b) The number of agents at routes at t = 1, 2
for different route r’s condition




























(c) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = L





























(d) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = H
Figure 4.6: Case (i) - the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε, for θ ∈ {L,H}, L = 1.7, H = 2.7, pL = pH = 0.5 (∆ = 0.2,
σ2 = 0.25)
In Section 4.5.2, we argued that σ2 represents a measure of the principal’s power
in terms of the informational incentives she can provide to the agents. Moreover,
we argued that ∆ indicates the agents’ ex-ante preference towards one of the routes.
Accordingly, we interpreted the condition of Theorem 4.2 as requiring that the prin-
cipal’s informational power to be greater than the agents’ ex-ante preference towards
one of the routes. A similar interpretation can be given here by comparing the rec-
ommendation outcomes for different pairs of (σ2,∆). As seen in Figures 4.4c and
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4.4d, when the agents do not have an ex-ante preference towards either of the routes
(i.e. ∆ = 0), the optimal recommendation policy prescribes the same routing sug-
gestion for all groups of agents at t = 2 irrespective of what they have learnt at t = 1.
As the agents develop an ex-ante preference towards one of the routes (see Figure
4.5 where ∆ = 0.1), the optimal recommendation policy prescribes the same routing
suggestion for low values of ε; but as ε increases, the optimal recommendation policy
prescribes different routing suggestions depending on what every agent has learnt at
t = 1. When agents have a high ex-ante preference towards one of the routes (see
Figure 4.5 where ∆ = 0.2), the optimal recommendation policy prescribes different
routing suggestions for every value of ε 6= 0 depending on what every agent has learnt
at t = 1.
4.6.2 Case (ii): Observing θ
Consider a situation where agents who take route r at t = 1 observe θ1 perfectly.
Therefore, at t = 2 agents have heterogeneous/asymmetric information about θ2
depending on which route they took at t = 1.
As a result, the set of obedience constraints at t = 2 is as follows:
(a) Recommendation s at t = 2 and s at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, s}U2(s, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, s, s}U2(r, θ2, θ1). (4.32)
(b) Recommendation s at t = 2 and r at t = 1: for every θ1 ∈ Θ∑
θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, s, r}U2(s, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, s, r}U2(r, θ2, θ1) (4.33)
(c) Recommendation r at t = 2 and s at t = 1:∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, s}U2(r, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ1,θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, s}U2(s, θ2, θ1) (4.34)
113
(d) Recommendation r at t = 2 and r at t = 1: for every θ1 ∈ Θ∑
θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, r}U2(r, θ2, θ1) ≥
∑
θ2∈Θ
Pσ{θ2, θ1, r, r}U2(s, θ2, θ1) (4.35)
We note that the obedience constraints (4.32) and (4.34) are the same as (4.23)
and (4.25). This is because if an agent takes route s at t = 1, his only new information
at t = 2 is the routing recommendation that he receives at t = 1, and the situation at
t = 2 is similar to the scenario with no environmental observations in Section 4.6.1.
However, if an agent takes route r at t = 1, he observes θ1 perfectly. Therefore, for
every possible value of θ1 at t = 1, there exists a corresponding obedience constraint
at t = 2 expressed (4.33) and (4.35).
Since agents can learn/observe θ1 at t = 1 by taking route r, the agents’ incentives
to follow the principal’s routing recommendation are different from those in a static
setting. An agent may want to deviate from the recommendation to take route s
and instead take route r so as to observe θ1; he can then utilize this observation to
his benefit, as he now has better information about route r’s condition at t = 2. In
other words, an agent can coordinate his routing decision at t = 2 with his routing
decision at t = 1. Therefore, the set of obedience constraints at t = 1 must consider
all possible future plans that an agent can utilize at t = 2 after his deviation at t = 1;
this set of obedience constraints can be described as follows:
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2 (λ(s, θ1), θ2, θ1)
+(1− yt2(θ2, θ1))Uσ2 (λ(r, θ1), θ2, θ1)
)]
, (4.36)
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2 (λ(s), θ2, θ1)
+(1− yr2(θ2, θ1))Uσ2 (λ(r), θ2, θ1)
)]
. (4.37)
In the obedience constraints above, an agent’s plan at t = 2 after his deviation at
t = 1 is denoted by λ. If an agent deviates from a recommendation to take route s
at t = 1 and takes route r instead, his plan λ at t = 2 depends on his observation of
θ1 as well as his routing recommendation at t = 2 (see (4.36)). If an agent deviates
from a recommendation to take route r at t = 1 and instead takes route s, his plan λ
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at t = 2 depends only his routing recommendation at t = 2 since he does not observe
θ1 at t = 1 (see (4.37)).
Consequently, the optimal routing recommendation policy by the principal, when





subject to (4.32)− (4.37).
The above optimization problem has 6+2|Θ|+22|Θ| number of constraints, which
grows exponentially in |Θ|, making it difficult to provide a closed form solution to
the above problem in general. Therefore, we investigate the properties of an optimal
dynamic recommendation policy, when agents can observe θ1, through numerical
simulations below.
Consider a setting similar to the one in Section 4.6.1, where Θ = {L,H} with
pL = pH = 0.5 and the transition matrix P is given by (4.38). Figures 4.7-4.8 depict
the optimal dynamic recommendation policies vs. different values of ε for two pairs
of σ2 and ∆. As seen in Figures 4.7a-4.8a, in both examples the performance of the
dynamic recommendation policy is decreasing in ε.
In the first example (see Figure 4.7)), the pair (σ2,∆) satisfies condition (4.22) of
Theorem 4.2. Therefore, for low values of ε, where the information the agents learn
at t = 1 does not reduce the principal’s information superiority to the point where
condition (4.22) is not satisfied at t = 2, the principal can implement the efficient
routing policy (see Figure 4.7a)). However, as ε increases, the principal cannot
implement the efficient routing at t = 1, 2. As a result, the optimal recommendation
policy is different from the efficient routing policy for higher values of ε (see Figure
4.7b)). Moreover, for higher values of ε the optimal recommendation policy at t = 2
depends on the route an agent took at t = 1 (see Figures 4.7c and 4.7d). We note
that for ε = 1, yr(L,L) = 1 and yr(H,H) = 0. This is because, when ε = 1, an agent
who takes route r at t = 1 perfectly knows θ2 since θ2 = θ1. Therefore, an agent who
takes route r (i.e. observes θ1) at t = 1 always chooses the route with the better
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condition at t = 2.
In the second example (see Figure 4.8), the pair (σ2,∆) does not satisfy con-
dition (4.22) of Theorem 4.2. Therefore, the performance of the optimal dynamic
recommendation policy is strictly decreasing in ε for all values of ε (see Figure 4.8a).
Moreover, the optimal recommendation policy at t = 1, 2 is always different from
the efficient routing policy (see Figure 4.8b). As seen in Figures 4.8c and 4.8d, for
all ε 6= 0, the optimal recommendation policy at t = 2 depends on which route an
agent took at t = 1. We note that when ε = 1, the optimal routing recommendation
policy at t = 2 results in the same traffic on the routes as the one under the full
information disclosure mechanisms (see Figure 4.8b). That is, for very high values
of ε, where the agents have considerable incentive to experiment at t = 1 by taking
route r, the principal promises to perfectly disclose his information at t = 2 so that
the agents are willing to follow her recommendation at t = 1. As a consequence, in
contrast to Figures 4.7c and 4.7d, in Figures 4.8c and 4.8d we have yr(L,L) 6= 1 and
yr(H,H) 6= 0 for ε = 1. This is because under the optimal recommendation policy
the utility from taking either route is the same when ε = 1, and thus, an agent is
indifferent between them even though he knows θ2 perfectly.
4.6.3 Case (iii): Observing the Traffic
Consider a situation where each agent observes the traffic on the route he has
taken at t = 1, , given by y1(θ1) or 1 − y1(θ1). Since we assume that there exists a
unit mass of agents, which is common knowledge among all agents, each agent can
determine the traffic at t = 1 on both routes, and thus, all agents have identical
information at t = 2. Consequently, the set of obedience constraints for t = 1, 2 are
similar to that of the static problem and are given by (4.18) and (4.19). Therefore,
when the agents observe the traffic at t = 1, the problem of designing an optimal
dynamic recommendation policy does not introduce any conceptual issue in addi-
tion to those present in the study of an optimal static recommendation policy. In
the following, we argue that as the correlation between θ1 and θ2 increases the per-
formance of the dynamic optimal recommendation policy decreases. Moreover, we
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(b) The number of agents at routes at t = 1, 2
for different route r’s condition
































(c) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = L































(d) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = H
Figure 4.7: Case (ii) - the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε, for θ ∈ {L,H}, L = 1.2, H = 2.8, pL = pH = 0.5 (∆ = 0,
σ2 = 0.64)
show that when the correlation between θ1 and θ2 is high the designer’s optimal
recommendation policy at t = 1 is a partial information disclosure mechanism.4
4For the sake of discussion we restrict attention to deterministic policies at t = 1. We can
show that this restriction is without loss of optimality. For t = 2, fix the recommendation policy
at t = 1. Then by an argument similar to the one given in the static setting in Section 4.5, we
can restrict without loss of optimality, to deterministic recommendation policies. For t = 1, fix the
recommendation policy at t = 2, which is a deterministic recommendation policy. Then the problem
of designing the optimal recommendation policy for t = 1 can be written as a linear program in
terms of the probabilities of different routing policies for every realization of θ1 (see [16] and [129]).
It is known that in a linear program, the optimal solutions are the corner points. Therefore, under
the optimal recommendation policy the probability of each routing policy is either 0 or 1. Therefore,
we can restrict attention to the set of deterministic policies without loss of optimality.
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(c) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = L





























(d) The recommendation outcome at t = 2
for θ1 = H
Figure 4.8: Case (iii) - the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε, for θ ∈ {L,H}, L = 1.7, H = 2.7, pL = pH = 0.5 (∆ = 0.2,
σ2 = 0.25)
We consider two classes of recommendation policies for the designer: (a) dynamic
separating recommendation policies in which for every θ̂1 6= θ̃1, θ̂, θ̃ ∈ Θ, we have
y1(θ̂1) 6= y1(θ̃1), and (b) dynamic pooling recommendation policies in which there
exists θ̂1 6= θ̃1, θ̂, θ̃ ∈ Θ, we have y1(θ̂1) = y1(θ̃1).
First, consider a case where the principal employs a separating recommendation
policy. As argued above, the agents can infer perfectly θ1 at t = 1. Therefore, as ε
increases the principal’s information superiority is reduced at t = 2, and thus, the
performance of the dynamic recommendation policy decreases at t = 2. Therefore,
the overall performance of a dynamic separating recommendation policy is decreasing
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in ε. In particular, when θ1 = θ2 (i.e. perfect correlation), the agents learn θ2
perfectly and the performance of the recommendation policy at t = 2 is the same as
that of the full information disclosure mechanism.
Next, consider a case where the principal employs a dynamic pooling recommen-
dation policy. When the correlation between θ1 and θ2 is high, the principal may
prefer to use a dynamic pooling recommendation policy so as to not reveal θ1 per-
fectly at t = 1, and consequently, increase his information superiority at t = 2 as
compared to the outcome under a dynamic separating recommendation policy. Given
a dynamic pooling recommendation policy, let {Θ1,Θ2, . . .Θm} denote a partition of
Θ such that for every θ̂1, θ̃1 ∈ Θ, we have y1(θ̂1) = y2(θ̃1) if and only if θ̂1, θ̃1 ∈ Θi for
some 1 ≤ i ≤M . That is, if Θi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is a singleton, the principal implements
a distinct routing outcome at t = 1 and the drivers perfectly learn the realization of
θ1 at t = 1; if Θ
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is not a singleton, the principal implements the same
routing outcome for all realization in Θi and the drivers only learn that θ1 ∈ Θi at
t = 1. Similar to the outcome under a dynamic separating recommendation policy,
under a dynamic pooling recommendation policy the principal’s information supe-
riority decreases at t = 2 as the correlation between θ1 and θ2 increases since the
drivers learn the partition to which θ1 belongs. Therefore, the overall performance of
the principal’s optimal dynamic recommendation policy decreases as the correlation
between θ1 and θ2 increases irrespective of the exact form of the optimal dynamic
recommendation policy.
It is clear that the performance of an optimal dynamic pooling recommendation
policy at t = 1 is inferior to that of an optimal dynamic separating recommendation
policy. However,the performance of an optimal dynamic pooling recommendation
policy at t = 2 is higher than that of an optimal dynamic separating recommenda-
tion policy since the principal has a higher information superiority under an opti-
mal dynamic pooling recommendation policy rather than the one under an optimal
dynamic separating recommendation policy. Using a numerical simulation, we show
below that, when the correlation between θ1 and θ2 is high, there are instances where
the principal’s optimal recommendation policy is a dynamic pooling recommendation
policy.
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Consider a setting where Θ = {L,M,H} with pL = pM = pH = 13 . Assume that
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where ε ∈ [0, 1] denotes the persistence (i.e. correlation) of route r’s condition over
time. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 depict the optimal dynamic recommendation policy for
two pairs of σ2 and ∆. In the first example (see Figure 4.9), the parameters σ2 and ∆
satisfy the condition (4.22) of Theorem 4.2, while in the second example (see Figure
4.10) they do not satisfy it. As seen in Figures 4.9a and 4.9a, the performance of an
optimal dynamic pooling recommendation policy and an optimal dynamic separating
recommendation policy are decreasing in persistence ε. Figures 4.9b and 4.9b depict
the optimal dynamic recommendation policies for high values of ε. As we discussed
above, when the correlation between θ1 and θ2 is high, the principal prefers to employ
a dynamic pooling recommendation policy.

























Optimal Dynamic Separating Policy
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={M,H}, Θ2={L}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={M}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={H}
(a) The social welfare under the optimal dy-
namic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε



















Optimal Dynamic Separating Policy
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={M,H}, Θ2={L}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={M}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={H}
(b) The optimal recommendation policy for
high values of ε
Figure 4.9: Case (iii) - The optimal dynamic recommendation policy for {L,M,H} =
{1.3, 2.1, 2.6} (∆ = 0, σ2 = 0.2867)
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Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={M,H}, Θ2={L}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={M}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={H}
(a) The social welfare under the optimal dy-
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Optimal Dynamic Separating Policy
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={M,H}, Θ2={L}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={M}
Optimal Pooling Policy,  Θ1={L,M}, Θ2={H}
(b) The optimal recommendation policy for
high values of ε
Figure 4.10: Case(iii) - The optimal dynamic recommendation policy for different
values of persistence ε, for {L,M,H} = {1.7, 2.3, 2.6} (∆ = 0.2, σ2 = 0.0867)
4.7 Conclusion
We investigated the problem of information disclosure mechanisms design in
transportation networks. We showed that the principal can improve the social welfare
by strategically disclosing information to the drivers, and coordinating the routing
recommendations she provides to them. We characterized a condition under which
the principal can implement the efficient routing outcome by utilizing her superior
information to provide informational incentives to the drivers. We also investigated a
two-time step dynamic setting where the drivers learn from their experience at t = 1.
We characterized different pieces of information from which the drivers can learn,
and examined the effect of each of them using numerical simulations. For future
research, we will investigate the dynamic setting more extensively and consider the
extension of our results for nonlinear congestion cost functions.
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Chapter 5
Stochastic Dynamic Games with Asymmetric
Information: A Common Information Approach
5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Background and Motivation
Stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information have been used to model
many situations arising in engineering, economic, and socio-technological network
applications. In these applications many decision makers/agents interact with each
other as well as with a dynamic system. They make private imperfect observations
over time, and influence the evolution of the dynamic system through their actions.
In this chapter we study a general class of dynamic games where the underlying
system has Markovian dynamics. Given the agents’ actions at every time, the system
state at the next time is a stochastic function of the current system state. The
instantaneous utility of each agent depends on the agents’ joint actions as well as
the system state. At every time, each agent makes a private noisy observation that
depends on the current system state and the agents’ past actions. Therefore, at
every time agents have asymmetric and imperfect information about the history of
the game. Moreover, at every time the information that an agent possesses about
the history of the game depends on the other agents’ past actions and strategies; this
phenomenon is known as signaling in the control theory literature. Therefore, the
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agents’ decisions and information are coupled and interdependent over time in these
games because (i) an agent’s utility depends on the other agents’ actions, (ii) the
evolution of the system state depends on the agents’ actions, (iii) the agents have
imperfect and asymmetric information about the history of the game, and (iv) at
every time an agent’s information depends on the agents’ (including his own) past
actions and strategies.
There are two main challenges in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric
information. First, because of the coupling and interdependence among the agents’
decisions and information over time, we need to determine the agents’ strategies
simultaneously for all times. Second, as the agents acquire more information over
time, the domains of their strategies grow.
In this chapter, we propose a general approach for the study of the class of games
described above and address the challenges stated above. We provide a set of con-
ditions sufficient to characterize an information state for every agent, where private
and common information are compressed over time in a mutually consistent man-
ner among the agents. Based on this information state, we propose the notion of
Common Information Based Pefect Bayesian Equilibrium (CIB-PBE) that charac-
terizes a set of outcomes for dynamic games. We provide a sequential decomposition
of the game over time based on the notion of CIB-PBE, and formulate a dynamic
program that enables us to compute the set of CIB-PBEs via backward induction.
We characterize specific instances of dynamic games where we can determine a set
of information states for the agents that have time-invariant domain. We determine
conditions that guarantee the existence of CIB-PBEs. We show that the proposed
approach to dynamic games can also be used to study dynamic teams with asym-
metric information, thus, we provide a framework for the study of a broad class of
dynamic multi-agent decision problems with asymmetric information.
To present clearly the key ideas and results appearing in this chapter we attempt
to connect and compare them with existing key ideas and results in stochastic control,
dynamic teams, and dynamic games with symmetric information. In the following
we briefly discuss some of these existing results. We then provide a quick overview
of our approach and results and compare them with related literature.
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The centralized stochastic control problem presents the simplest form of a deci-
sion making problem with only one agent where the main two challenges described
above are present. Partially Observed Markov Decision Process (POMDP) provides
a general model to describe a centralized control problem. In a POMDP, an agent
acquires imperfect observations about the system state over time; thus, he has a
growing domain for his strategies over time. Moreover, the information that the
agent acquires at any time is affected by his previous actions since his past actions
influence the evolution of the dynamic system. To address these two challenges the
notion of information state is introduced [67]. An information state in POMDP
can be defined as the agent’s belief about the current system state conditioned on
his information history. The definition of information state provides an approach
to compress the agent’s information in a way that is sufficient for decision making
purposes. Assuming that the agent has perfect recall, it is shown that his conditional
belief about the system state (i.e. information state) is independent of his strategies
over time; this result is known as policy-independence belief property [67, Lemma
6.5.10]. As a result, the problem of finding an optimal policy for the agent can be
sequentially decomposed over time so that the complexity of the agent’s decision
problem does not grow over time.
Our main objective in this chapter is to present an approach to compress the
agents’ information and to provide a decomposition of dynamic games with asym-
metric information similar to the one described for POMDPs above. Therefore,
we highlight the three main properties that underly the definition of an informa-
tion state in POMDPs as follows (see [76, 137]): (1) the information state can be
updated recursively, that is, at any time t the information state at time t can be
written as a function of the information state at t− 1 and the new information that
becomes available at t, (2) the agent’s belief about the information state at the next
time conditioned on the current information state and action is independent of his
information history, and (3) at any time t and for any arbitrary action the agent’s
expected instantaneous utility conditioned on the information state is independent
of his information history. In this chapter, we provide a generalization of these prop-
erties to decision problems with many strategic agents, and accordingly, present a
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general approach to study dynamic games with asymmetric information. Before, we
present our approach and results, we discuss the existing results that generalize the
approach and results for POMDPs to dynamic games with symmetric information
and dynamic teams below.1
The authors of [81] study dynamic games with symmetric information and pro-
pose an approach to compress the agents’ information over time, and sequentially
decompose the game over time. In a strategic setting, each agent has its own ob-
jective, thus, he chooses his strategy individually and privately so as to maximize
his own utility. The authors in [81] show that when agents have symmetric infor-
mation, the belief about the system state conditioned on the agents’ information
satisfies properties (1)-(3) described above; thus, it can be defined as an information
state for all agents. Similar to the policy-independence belief property in central-
ized stochastic control, they show that this information state is independent of the
agents’ private strategy choices. They consider a class of strategies for the agents,
called Markov strategies, that utilizes this information state, and show that this class
of strategies are closed under the agents’ best response mapping. Consequently, they
introduce the notion of Markov Perfect Equilibrium that characterizes a subset of
Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE) for dynamic games with symmetric information.
The notion of MPE characterizes a class of equilibria where the agents’ strategies
have time-invariant domain, and they can be computed sequentially via backward
induction.
The results of [67, 81] show that when agents have symmetric information in
dynamic teams and games, the conditional belief about the system state defines
an information state that can be used to compress the agents’ information and to
sequentially decompose the problem over time. However, this approach is not directly
applicable when the agents have asymmetric information over time. When the agents
have asymmetric information, they need to form beliefs about the other agents’
information, beliefs about the agents’ belief about the agents’ information, and so on.
1We note that dynamic teams with symmetric information do not introduce additional difficulties
compared to POMDPs. This is because in these problems all the agents share the objective and have
identical information at all times. Therefore, they can be treated as centralized control problems
with many actions (one for each agent).
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On one hand, these hierarchies of beliefs depend on the agents’ strategies over time.
On the other hand, the agents’ optimal strategies depend on the agents’ beliefs over
time. Thus, there is an interdependence between the agents’ strategies and beliefs
overtime. As a result, the results for dynamic games and teams with symmetric
information do not directly apply to dynamic games and teams with asymmetric
information.
The authors of [90, 91] study dynamic team problems with non-classical informa-
tion structure 2, where at every time agents possess common and private information.
They propose an approach to construct a dynamic team problem with symmetric in-
formation that is equivalent to the original problem as follows. For every agent,
they consider a fictitious agent who has access to the agent’s common information
but not his private information. At every time t, each fictitious agent chooses a
function/prescription that determines the corresponding agent’s action at t for every
possible realization of the agent’s private information. They show that the dynamic
team problem among the fictitious agents is equivalent to the original dynamic team
problem. However, the problem with the fictitious agents is a dynamic team problem
with symmetric information. Therefore, it can be solved using the existing results
for centralized stochastic control problems. In the problem with the fictitious agents,
the information state is given by the Common Information Based (CIB) belief about
the agents’ private information and the system state. Thus, in the original problem
the information state for each agent is given by the described-above CIB-belief and
his own private information. Using this information state, the authors of [90, 91]
provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic teams with asymmetric information,
and provide an approach to compress the agents’ common information over time.
We would like to point out that the proposed information state in [90, 91] requires
the agents to keep track of their private information (or his private memory that is a
predetermined function of his private information if they do not have perfect recall)
over time, and does not provide an approach on how to effectively compress it.
The approach proposed in [90, 91] for dynamic teams does not apply for dynamic
2A dynamic team has a non-classical information structure when each agent’s information de-
pends on other agents’ strategies (see [135])
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games with asymmetric information. This is because in games, an agent’s strategy
is his private information. Therefore, in the equivalent dynamic games among the
fictitious agents, the decisions of each fictitious agent, which prescribes an action
for every realization of the associated agent’s private information, is his own private
information; that is, the resulting game among fictitious agents is a dynamic game
with asymmetric information (hidden actions).
In this chapter, we propose a general approach for the study of dynamic games
with asymmetric information. We present a set of conditions sufficient to characterize
information states where the agents common and private information are compressed
in a mutually consistent manner. Based on these information states, we define a
class of equilibria called Common Information Baesd Perfect Bayesian Equilibria
(CIB-PBE) that generalize the notion of MPE to dynamic games with asymmetric
information. We provide a sequential decomposition of the game that enables us to
compute the set of CIB-PBEs by backward induction. Moreover, we show that our
results also apply to dynamic teams with asymmetric information, thus, generalize
the results of [90, 91] by providing an approach to effectively compress the agents’
private information in a mutually consistent manner. As a result, our results provide
an universal approach for the study of dynamic decision problems with many agents
in strategic and cooperative settings.
5.1.2 Related Literature
Dynamic games with asymmetric information have been investigated extensively
in literature in the context of repeated games; see [138, 42, 5, 79] and the references
therein. The key feature of these games is the absence of a dynamic system. More-
over, the works on repeated games study primarily their asymptotic properties when
the horizon is infinite and agents are sufficiently patient (i.e. the discount factor
is close one). In repeated games, agents play a stage (static) game repeatedly over
time. As a result, in the absence of strategic interactions with other agents, the
decision making problem that each agent faces is very simple. The main objective of
this strand of literature is to explore situations where agents can form self-enforcing
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punishment/reward mechanisms so as to create additional equilibria that improve
upon the payoffs that agents can get by simply playing an equilibrium of the stage
game over time. Recent works (see [55, 37, 111]) adopt approaches similar to those
used in repeated games to study infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric
information when there is an underlying dynamic Markovian system. Under certain
conditions on the system dynamics and the agents’ information structure, the au-
thors of [55, 37, 111] characterize a set of asymptotic equilibria when the agents are
sufficiently patient.
The problem that we study in this chapter is different from the ones in [138, 42,
5, 79, 55, 37, 111] in two aspects. First, we consider a class of stochastic dynamic
games where the underlying dynamic system has a general Markovian dynamics and
information structure, and we do not restrict our attention to asymptotic behaviors
when the horizon is infinite and/or the agents are sufficiently patient. Second, we
study situations where the decision problem that each agent faces, in the absence of
strategic interactions with other agents, is a POMDP, which is a complex problem
to solve by itself. Therefore, reaching (and computing) a set of equilibrium strate-
gies, which take into account the strategic interactions among the agents, is a very
challenging task. As a result, it is not very plausible for the agents to seek reaching
equilibria that are generated by the formation of self-enforcing punishment/reward
mechanisms similar to those used in infinitely repeated games (see Section 5.7 for
more discussion). We believe that our results provide new insight into the behav-
ior of strategic agents in complex and dynamic environments, and complement the
existing results in the repeated games literature with simple and (mostly) static
environments.
The works in [101, 27, 44, 70] consider dynamic zero-sum games with asymmetric
information. The authors of [27, 101] study zero-sum games with Markovian dynam-
ics and lack of information on one side (i.e. one informed player and one uninformed
player). The authors of [44, 70] study zero-sum games with Markovian dynamics
with lack of information on both sides. The problem that we study in this chapter
is different from the ones in [101, 27, 44, 70] in three aspects. First, we study a gen-
eral class of dynamic games that include dynamic zero-sum games with asymmetric
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information as a special case. Second, we consider a general Markovian dynamics
for the underlying system whereas the authors of [27, 101, 44, 70] consider a specific
Markovian dynamics where each agent observes perfectly a local state that evolves
independently of the other local states conditioned on the agents’ observable actions.
Third, we consider a general information structure for each agent that allows us to
capture scenarios with unobservable actions and imperfect observations that are not
captured in [27, 101, 44, 70].
The problems investigated in [89, 46, 97, 98, 127, 108] are the most closely related
to our problem. The authors of [89, 46] study a class of dynamic games where the
agents’ common information based belief is independent of their strategies; that is,
there is no signaling among them. This property allows them to apply ideas from the
common information approach developed in [90, 91], and define an equivalent dy-
namic game with symmetric information among the fictitious agents. Consequently,
they characterize a class of equilibria for dynamic games called Common Information
Based Markov Perfect Equilibrium. Our results are different from those in [89, 46] in
two aspects. First, we consider a general class of dynamic games where the agents’
CIB beliefs are strategy-dependent, thus, signaling is present. Second, the proposed
approach in [89, 46] requires the agents to keep track of all of their private informa-
tion over time. We propose an approach to effectively compress the agents’ private
information, and consequently, reduce the number of variables on which the agents
need to form CIB belief.
The authors of [97, 98, 127, 108] study a class of dynamic games with asymmetric
information where signaling occurs. When the horizon in finite, the authors of [97, 98]
introduce the notion of Common Information Based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium,
and provide a sequential decomposition of the game over time. The authors of
[127, 108] extend the results of [97, 98] to finite horizon Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian
(LQG) dynamic games and infinite horizon dynamic games, respectively. The class
of dynamic games studied in [97, 98, 127, 108] satisfies the following assumptions:
(i) agents’ actions are observable (ii) each agent has a perfect observation of his own
local states/type (iii) conditioned on the agents’ actions, the evolution of the local
states are independent.
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In this chapter we relax assumptions (i)-(iii) of [97, 98, 127, 108], and study a
general class of dynamic games with asymmetric information, hidden actions, im-
perfect observations, and controlled and coupled dynamics. As a result, each agent
needs to form a belief about the other agents’ past actions and private (imperfect)
observations. Moreover, in contrast to [97, 98, 127, 108], an agent’s, say agent i’s,
belief about the system state and the other agents’ private information is his own pri-
vate information and is different from the CIB belief. In this chapter, we extend the
methodology developed in [97, 98] for dynamic games, and generalize the notion of
CIB-PBE. Furthermore, we propose an approach to effectively compress the agents’
private information and obtain the results of [97, 98, 127, 108] as special cases.
5.1.3 Contribution
We develop a general methodology for the study and analysis of dynamic games
with asymmetric information, where the information structure is non-classical. We
propose an approach to characterize a set of information states that effectively com-
press the agents’ private and common information in a mutually consistent manner.
As a result, we characterize a subclass of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria for dynamic
games with asymmetric information, called CIB-PBE, and provide a sequential de-
composition of these dynamic games over time. This decomposition provides a back-
ward induction algorithm to determine the set of CIB-PBEs. We characterize special
instances of dynamic games where we can identify a set of information states with
time-invariant domain. We provide conditions that guarantee the existence of CIB-
PBEs in dynamic games with asymmetric information. We show that the method-
ology developed in this chapter generalizes the existing results for dynamic teams
with non-classical information structure. The information state characterized in this
chapter provides a sufficient statistic for decision making purposes in strategic and
non-strategic settings. Therefore, we provide a universal approach to decision mak-
ing problems with strategic and non-strategic agents; our approach can be applied
to study dynamic games among teams of agents.
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5.1.4 Organization
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 5.2, we describe our
model and formulate the dynamic game problem. In Section 5.3, we discuss the
main issues that arise in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric information.
We provide the formal definition of Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in Section 5.4. In
Section 5.5, we propose an approach to compressing the agents’ common and private
information and define an information state for each agent. Accordingly, we propose
the notion of CIB assessment and CIB-PBE for dynamic games. In Section 5.6, we
present our main results and provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games.
We compare the notion of CIB-PBE with other equilibrium concepts appropriate
for dynamic games with asymmetric information, and extend our results to dynamic
teams in Section 5.7. In Section 5.8, we discuss the role of assumptions we make in
the model of Section 5.2, and provide the extension of our results by relaxing them
under certain conditions. In Section 5.9, we determine conditions that guarantee the
existence of CIB-PBE. We conclude in Section 5.10. The proofs of all the theorems
and lemmas appear in Appendix D.
5.2 Model
1) System dynamics: There are N strategic agents who live in a dynamic Marko-
vian world over horizon T := {1, 2, ..., T}, T < ∞. Let Xt ∈ Xt denote the state
of the world at t ∈ T . At time t, each agent, indexed by i ∈ N := {1, 2, ..., N},
chooses an action ait ∈ Ait, where Ait denotes the set of available actions to him at t.
Given the collective action profile At := (A
1
t , ..., A
N
t ), the state of the world evolves
according to the following stochastic dynamic equation,
Xt+1 = ft(Xt, At,W
x
t ), (5.1)
where W x1:T−1 is a sequence of independent random variables. The initial state X1 is
a random variable that has a probability distribution η ∈ ∆(X1) with full support.
At every time t ∈ T , before taking an action, agent i receives a noisy private
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observation Y it ∈ Y it of the current state of the world Xt and the action profile At−1,
given by





where W i1:T , i ∈ N , are sequences of independent random variables. Moreover, at
every t ∈ T , all agents receive a common observation Zt ∈ Zt of the current state of






where W c1:T , is a sequence of independent random variables. We note that the agents’





1:T , and W
i
1:T , i ∈ N are mutually independent.
2) Information structure: Let Ht ∈ Ht denote the aggregate information of
all agents at time t. Assuming that agents have perfect recall, we have Ht =
{Z1:t, Y 1:N1:t , A1:N1:t−1}, i.e. Ht denotes the set of all agents’ past observations and ac-












At time t ∈ T , the aggregate information Ht is not fully known to all agents, and
each agent may have asymmetric information about Ht. Let Ct := {Z1:t} ∈ Ct denote
the agents’ common information about Ht and P
i
t := {Y i1:t, Ai1:t−1}\Ct ∈ P it denote
agent i’s private information about Ht, where P it and Ct denote the set of all possible
realizations of agent i’ private and common information at time t, respectively. In
Section 5.2.1, we consider and discuss several instances of information structures that
can be captured as special cases of our general model.
3) Strategies and Utilities: Let H it := {Ct, P it } ∈ Hit denote the information
available to agent i at t, where Hit denote the set of all possible realizations of agent
i’s information at t. Agent i’s behavioral strategy git, t ∈ T , is defined as a sequence
of mappings git : Hit → ∆(Ait), t ∈ T , that determine agent i’s action Ait for every
realization hit ∈ Hit of the history at t ∈ T .
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Agent i’s instantaneous utility at t depends on the state of the world Xt and the
collective action profile At, and is given by u
i
t(Xt, At). Agent i chooses his behavioral
strategy gi1:T so as to maximize his total (expected) utility over horizon T , given by,




To avoid measure-theoretic technical difficulties and for clarity and convenience
of exposition, we assume that all the random variables take values in finite sets.
Assumption 5.1. (Finite game) The sets Xt, Zt, Y it , Ait, i ∈ N , t ∈ T , are finite.
Moreover, we assume that given any sequence of actions a1:t−1 up to time t− 1,
every realization xt ∈ Xt for system state at t has a strictly positive probability of
realization.
Assumption 5.2. (Strictly positive transition matrix) For all t ∈ T , xt ∈ Xt and
a1:t−1 ∈ A1:t−1, we have P{xt|a1:t−1} > 0.
Furthermore, we assume that for any sequence of actions {a1:T}, all realizations
of private observations {y1:N1:T } have a positive probability. That is, no agent can infer
perfectly another agent’s action based only on his private observations.
Assumption 5.3. (Imperfect private monitoring) For all t ∈ T , y1:t ∈ Y1:t, and
a1:t−1 ∈ A1:t−1, we have P{y1:t|a1:t−1} > 0.
We discuss the role of Assumptions 5.1-5.3 in Section 5.8, where we determine
conditions under which we can relax these assumptions, and obtain results similar
to those of Sections 5.5, and 5.6.
5.2.1 Special Cases
We discuss several instances of dynamic games with asymmetric information that
can be described as special cases of general model described above.
1) Nested information structure: Consider a two-player game with one informed
player and one uninformed player. At every time t ∈ T , the informed player makes a
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private perfect observation of the state Xt, i.e. Y
1
t = Xt. The uninformed player does
not have any observation of the state Xt. Both the informed and uninformed players
observe each others’ actions, i.e. Zt = {At−1}. Therefore, we have P 1t = {X1:t},
P 2t = ∅, and Ct = {A11:t−1, A21:t−1} for all t ∈ T . The above nested information
structure corresponds to dynamic games with asymmetric information considered in
[101, 102, 71], where in [102, 71] the underlying state Xt is static.
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions: Consider an N -player game






t , ..., X
N
t ) has N components. The agents’ actions
At are observable by all agents, i.e. At−1 ⊂ Zt for all t ∈ T . At every time t ∈ T ,
agent i makes a perfect observation of its local state X it as well as a global state
X0t . Moreover, at time t all agents make a common imperfect observation of state








t ), i ∈ N . Conditioned on the agents’ collective
action At, each X
i







all i ∈ N and t ∈ T , where W x,it , i ∈ N , t ∈ T are mutually independent. Therefore,
we have P it = {X i1:t} and Ct = {X01:t, Z1:N1:t , A1:t−1}. The above environment includes
the dynamic game with asymmetric information considered in [98, 97].
3) Delayed sharing information structure: Consider a N -player game with observ-
able actions where agents observe each others’ observations with d-step delay. That
is, P it = {Y it−d+1:t} and Ct = {Y1:t−d, A1:t−1}. We note that in the model we assume
that the agents’ common observation Zt at t is only a function of Xt and and At−1.
Therefore, to describe the game with delayed sharing information structure within the
context of our model we need to augment our state space to include the agents’ last
d observations as part of the augmented state. Define X̃t := {Xt,M1t ,M2t , ...,Mdt }
as the augmented system state where M it := {At−i, Yt−i} ∈ At−i × Yt−i, i ∈ N ; that
is, M it serves as a temporal memory for the agents’ observation Yt−i at t− i. Then,
we have X̃t+1 = {Xt+1,M1t+1,M2t+1, ...,Mdt+1} = {ft(Xt, At,W xt ), (Yt),M1t , ...,Md−1t }
and Zt = {Mdt } = {Yt−d}.
The above environment captures a connection between the symmetric information
structure and asymmetric information structure. The information asymmetry among
the agents increases as d increases.
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4) Perfectly controlled dynamics with hidden actions: Consider a N -player game




t , ..., X
N
t ) has N components. Agent i, i ∈ N , perfectly




t. Agent i’s actions A
i
t, t ∈ T , is not observable by all
other agents −i. Every agent i, i ∈ N , makes a noisy private observation Y ti (Xt,W it )
of the system state at t ∈ T . Therefore, we have P it := {A1:t, Y i1:t}, Ct = ∅.
5.3 Equilibrium Solution Concept
In this section we discuss the notion of an equilibrium solution concept for dy-
namic games with asymmetric information. We argue that an equilibrium solution
concept must consist of a pair of a strategy profile and a belief system (to be defined
below). We provide a comparison between approaches to dynamic games with asym-
metric information and dynamic teams with non-classical (asymmetric) information
structure, and discuss the importance of off-equilibrium path beliefs in dynamic
games.3
In a dynamic game, as described in Section 5.2, agents have private information
about the evolution of the game, and they do not observe the complete history of
the game given by {Ht, Xt}, t ∈ T . Therefore, at every time t ∈ T , each agent, say
agent i ∈ N , needs to form (i) an appraisal about the current state of the system
Xt and the other agents’ information H
−i
t (appraisal about the history), and (ii)
an appraisal about how other agents will play in the future so as to evaluate the
performance of his strategy choices (appraisal about the future). Given the other
agents’ strategies g−i, agent i can utilize his own information H it at t ∈ T , along with
(i) other agents’ past strategies g−i1:t−1 and (ii) other agents’ future strategies g
−i
t:T to
form these appraisals about the history and future of the game, respectively.4
3We refer the interested reader to the papers by Battigalli [13], Myerson and Remy [88], and
Watson [132]
4In dynamic teams, agents share the same objective, and thus, coordinate their strategies so
as to maximize their shared objective. This implies that in dynamic teams the agents’ strategies
g1:N1:T are common knowledge among them. Therefore, agent i ∈ N can form appraisals about the
system’s history and its future by using his private information Hit along with commonly known
strategies g−i. As a result, the outcome of dynamic team problems can be fully characterized by
the agents’ strategy profile g.
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In dynamic games, each agent has his own objective and chooses his strategy gi so
as to maximize his objective. Thus, in contrast to dynamic teams, in dynamic games
strategy gi is agent i’s private information and not known to other agents. Therefore,
in dynamic games, each agent needs to form a prediction about the other agents’
strategies. We denote this prediction by g∗1:N1:T to distinguish it from the strategy
profile g1:N1:T that is actually being played by the agents. Following Nash’s idea, we
assume that agents share a common prediction g∗ about the actual strategy g. We
would like to emphasize that the prediction g∗ does not necessarily coincide with
the actual strategy g. As we point out later, one requirement of an equilibrium of a
game is that for every agent i ∈ N , the prediction g∗i must be an optimal strategy
for him given the other agents prediction strategy g∗−i.
Since an agent’s actual strategy, say agent i, is his own private information, it is
possible that agent i’s actual strategy gi is different from the prediction g∗i. Below
we discuss the implication of an agent’s deviation from the prediction strategy profile
g∗. For that matter, we first consider an agent who may want to deviate from g∗,
and then we consider an agent who faces such a deviation and his response.
In dynamic games, when agent i ∈ N chooses his strategy gi, he needs to know
how other agents will play for any choice of gi which can be different from the
prediction g∗i. Therefore, the prediction g∗ has to be defined at all the information
sets of every agent, those that have positive probability under g∗ as well as those
that have zero probability under g∗. Using the prediction g∗, any agent, say agent i,
can form an appraisal about the future of the game for any strategy choice gi, and
evaluate the performance of gi.5
By the same rationale, when agent i chooses gi he needs to determine his strategy
for all of his information sets, even those that have zero probability under g∗−i. This
is because it is possible that some agent j ∈ N may deviate from g∗j and play
a strategy gj that is different from the prediction g∗j. Agent i must foresee these
possible deviations by other agents and determine his response to these deviations.
5We note that this is not an issue in dynamic teams. In dynamic teams, agents coordinate in
advance their choice of strategy profile g, and no agent has an incentive to (privately) deviate from
it. Hence, the agents’ strategy profile g is only needed to be defined on information sets of positive
probability under g.
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To determine his optimal strategy gi at any information set, agent i needs to first
form an appraisal about the history of the game at t as well as an appraisal about
the future of the game using the strategy prediction g∗−i. For an information set hit
that is compatible with the prediction g∗−i given his strategy gi at t ∈ T (i.e. hit
has positive probability of being realized under g∗), agent i can use Bayes’ rule to
derive the appraisal about the history of the game at t. However, for an information
set hit that has zero probability under the prediction g
∗−i given gi, agent i cannot
anymore rely on the prediction g∗ and use Bayes’ rule to form his appraisal about the
history of the game at t. The realization of history hit tells agent i that his original
prediction g∗−i1:t−1 is not (completely) correct, thus, he needs to revise his original
prediction g∗−i1:t−1 and to form a revised appraisal about the history of the game up
to t. Therefore, agent i must determine how to form/revise his appraisal about the
history of the game for every realization hit ∈ Hit, t ∈ T , that has zero probability
under g∗−i. We note that upon reaching an information set of measure zero, agent
i only revises his prediction g∗−i1:t−1 about other agents’ past strategies, but does not
change his prediction g∗−it:T about their future strategies. This is because we assume
that at equilibrium, the prediction g∗−it:T specifies a set of strategies for other agents
that are optimal in the continuation game that takes place after the realization of
the information set of zero probability under g∗1:t−1.
6
We now describe how we can formalize the above issues that we need to consider
in the study of dynamic games with asymmetric information. Following the game
theory literature [43], agents’ appraisals about the history and future of the game can
be captured by an assessment that all agents commonly hold about the game. We
6We note that in dynamic teams, agents only need to determine their optimal strategy g for
information sets that have positive probability of realizations under g. As a result, a collective choice
of strategy is optimal at every information set with positive probability if and only if it maximizes
the (expected) discounted utility of the team from t = 1 up to T . However, in dynamic games
agents need to determine their strategies for all information sets irrespective of whether they have
zero or positive probability of realization under g∗. Therefore, if a choice of strategy gi maximizes
agent i’s (expected) discounted utility from t = 1 to T = 1, it does not imply that it is also optimal
at all information sets that have zero probability of realization under {g∗−i, gi}. Consequently,
unlike team problems, in dynamic games a choice of agent i’s strategy must be optimal for all
continuation games that follow after a realization of an information set hit irrespective of whether
it has zero or positive probability of realization.
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define an assessment as a pair of mappings (g∗, µ), where g∗ := {g∗it , i ∈ N , t ∈ T },
g∗it : Hit → ∆(Ait) denotes a prediction about agent i’s strategy at t, and µ := {µit, i ∈
N , t ∈ T }, µit : Hit → ∆(Xt ×H−it ), denotes agent i’s belief about the system state
Xt and agents −i’s information H−it given his information H it . The collection of
mappings µ := {µit, i ∈ N , t ∈ T } is called a belief system. For every i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,
and hit ∈ Hit, µit(hit) denotes agent i’s belief about the history {Xt, H−it } of the game,
and g∗−it:T denotes agent i’s prediction about all other agents’ continuation strategy
from t onward. We note that µit(h
i
t) determines agent i’s appraisal about the history
of the game when hit has either positive or zero probability under g
∗. Therefore,
using an assessment (g∗, µ) each agent can fully construct at any t ∈ T appraisals
about the history and future of the game.
Using the definition of an assessment, we can extend the idea of Nash equilibrium
to dynamic games with asymmetric information. An equilibrium of the dynamic
game is defined as a common assessment (g∗, µ) among the agents that satisfies the
following conditions under the assumption that the agents are rational. (1) Agent
i ∈ N chooses his strategy gi1:T so as to maximize his total expected utility (5.4) in
all continuation games given the assessment (g∗, µ) about the game. Therefore, the
prediction g∗i1:T that other agents hold about agent i’s strategy must be a maximizer
of his total expected utility under the assessment (g∗, µ). (2) For all t ∈ T , agent i’s,
i ∈ N , belief µit(hit) at information set hit ∈ Hit that has positive probability under
g∗, must be equal to the conditional probability distribution of {Xt, H−it } given the
realization hit via Bayes’ rule when agents −i play according to g∗−i1:t . When hit has
zero probability under the assessment g∗, the belief µit(h
i
t) cannot be determined
via Bayes’ rule and must be revised. The revised belief must satisfy a certain set of
“reasonable” conditions so as to be compatible with agent i’s rationality. Various sets
of conditions have been proposed in the literature (see [43, 96]) to capture the notion
of ”reasonable” beliefs that are compatible with the agents’ rationality. Different
sets of conditions for off-equilibrium beliefs µit(h
i
t) result in the different equilibrium
concepts that are proposed for dynamic games with asymmetric information.
In this chapter, we consider Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) as the equi-
librium solution concept. In the next section we provide the formal definition of
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PBE.
5.4 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is a solution concept that has been widely
used in the economic literature for the study of dynamic games with asymmetric
information. The formal definition of PBE for dynamic games in extensive form can
be found in [96]. In this chapter, we use a state space representation for dynamic
games instead of an extensive game form representation, therefore, we need to adapt
the definition of PBE to this representation. We define a PBE as an assessment (g∗, µ)
that satisfies the sequential rationality and consistency conditions. The sequential
rationality condition requires that for all i ∈ N , the prediction g∗i is optimal for
agent i given the assessment (g∗, µ). The consistency condition requires that for all
i ∈ N , t ∈ T , and hit ∈ Hit, agent i’s belief µ(hit) must be compatible with prediction







{.|hit} denote the probability measure induced by the stochastic
process that starts at time t with initial condition {Xt, P−it , pit, ct}, hit = {ct, pit},
where {Xt, P−it } is distributed according to probability distribution µit(hit), assuming
that agents i and−i take actions according to strategies g∗it:T and g∗−it:T , respectively. In






there is no confusion.
Definition 5.1 (Sequential rationality). We say that an assessment (g∗, µ) is se-
















The sequential rationality condition (5.5) requires that, given the assessment
(g∗, µ), the prediction strategy gi∗t for agent i is an optimal strategy for him for
all continuation games after history realization hit ∈ H i, irrespective of whether
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hit has positive or zero probability under (g
∗, µ). That is, the common prediction
g∗i about agent i’s strategy must be an optimal strategy choice for him since it
is common knowledge that he is a rational agent. We note that the sequential
rationality condition defined above is more restrictive than the optimality condition
for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) which only requires (5.5) to hold at t = 1.
By the sequential rationality condition, we require the optimality of prediction g∗
even along off-equilibrium paths, and thus, we rule out the possibility of non-credible
threats. For example, an agent can threaten to play an action that is suboptimal for
himself upon a realization of a history that has zero probability under g∗. Such a
non-credible threat is not ruled out by considering only the optimality at t = 1 (see
[43] for more discussion).
The sequential rationality condition results in a set of constraints that the strategy
prediction g∗ must satisfy given a belief system µ. As we argued in Section 5.3,
the belief system µ must be also compatible with the strategy prediction g∗. The
following consistency condition captures such compatibility between the belief system
µ and the prediction g∗.
Definition 5.2 (Consistency). We say that an assessment (g∗, µ) is consistent if
i) For all i ∈ N , t ∈ T \{1}, hit−1 ∈ Hit−1, and hit ∈ Hit such that Pg
∗
µ {hit|hit−1} > 0,
the belief µit(h
i






Pg∗{hit, xt, p−it |hit−1}
Pg∗{hit|hit−1}
. (5.6)
ii) For all i ∈ N , t ∈ T \{1}, hit−1 ∈ Hit−1, and hit ∈ Hit such that Pg
∗






t ) > 0

















1:t−1){xt, p−it } > 0. (5.7)
The above consistency condition places a restriction on the belief system µ so
that it is compatible with the strategy prediction g∗. For information sets along
equilibrium paths, i.e. Pg
∗
µi1
{hit} > 0, µit(hit) must be updated according to (5.6) via
Bayes’ rule since the observations of agent i are consistent with the prediction g∗.
For information sets along off-equilibrium paths, i.e. Pg
∗
µi1
{hit} = 0, agent i needs to
revise his belief about the strategy of agents −i as the realization of hit indicates that
some agent has deviated from prediction g∗−i1:t . As pointed out before, the revised
belief µi(hit) must be “reasonable”. Definition 5.2 provides a set of such “reasonable”
conditions captured by (5.6) and (5.7) that we discuss further below.




{hit|hit−1} > 0. That is, conditioned on reaching information set hit−1 at t − 1,














{hit} = 0, we have P
g∗
µi1
{hit−1} = 0. There-
fore, hit−1 is also an information set along an off-equilibrium path, and µ
i(hit−1) is a
revised belief that agent i holds at t− 1. Note that if the assessment (g∗, µ) satisfies
the sequential rationality condition, g∗ is a best response for all agents in all contin-
uation games that follow the realization of every information set of positive or zero




{hit|hit−1} > 0, the realization of hit conditioned on
reaching hit−1 is consistent with the strategy prediction g
∗
t−1. Therefore, agent i does
not have any reason to further revise his belief about agents −i’s strategy beyond
the revision that results in µi(hit−1). As a result, agent i determines his belief µ
i(hit)
by utilizing his belief µi(hit−1) at t− 1 and updating it via Bayes’ rule assuming that
agents −i’ play according to the prediction g∗−it−1 (see (5.6) in part (i)).




{hit|hit−1} = 0. That is, conditioned on reaching information set hit−1 at t − 1,
hit has a zero probability of realization under the prediction g
∗. In this case, the
realization of hit indicates that agents −i have deviated from prediction g∗−i1:t−1, and
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this deviation has not been detected by agent i before. Therefore, agent i needs
to form a new belief on agents −i’s private information P−it and the state Xt by
revising µ(hit). Part (ii) of the consistency condition concerns such belief revisions
and requires that the support of agent i’s revised belief µ(hit) includes only the
states and private information that are feasible under the system and information







1:t−1). We note that since we are using a state represen-
tation of the dynamic game, we need to impose such a requirement, whereas in the
equivalent extensive form representation of the game such a requirement is satisfied
by the construction of the game-tree.
Remark 5.1. Under Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3, we have P(A1:t−1=â1:t−1)µ1 {x1:t, p−it } > 0
for all (A1:t−1 = â1:t−1). Therefore part (ii) of the consistency conditions is trivially
satisfied. In the rest of the chapter, we ignore part (ii) and only consider part (i)
of the consistency condition. In Section 5.8, we discuss the case where we relax
Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3.
We can now provide the formal definition of PBE for the dynamic game of Section
5.2.
Definition 5.3. An assessment (g∗, µ) is called a PBE if it satisfies the sequential
rationality and consistency conditions.
The definition of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium provides a general formalization
of outcomes that are rationalizable (i.e. consistent with agents’ rationality) under
some strategy profile and belief system. However, in the following we argue that
there are computational and philosophical reasons that motivate us to define a sub
class of PBEs that provide a simpler and more tractable approach to characterizing
the outcomes of dynamic games with asymmetric information.
There are two major challenges in computing a PBE (g∗, µ). First, there is an
inter-temporal coupling between the agents’ strategy prediction g∗ and belief system
µ. According to the consistency requirement, the belief system µ has to satisfy a
set of conditions given a strategy prediction g∗. On the other hand, by sequential
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rationality, a strategy prediction g∗ must satisfy a set of optimality condition given
belief system µ. Therefore, there is a circular dependency between a prediction
strategy g∗ and a belief system µ over time. For instance, by sequential rationality,
agent i’s strategy gi∗t at time t depends on the agents’ future strategies g
∗
t:T and
on the agents’ past strategies g∗1:t−1 indirectly through the consistency condition
for µit. As a result, one needs to determine the strategy prediction g
∗ and belief
system µ simultaneously for the whole time horizon so as to satisfy the sequential
rationality and consistency conditions, and thus, cannot sequentially decompose the
computation of PBE over time. Second, the agents’ information hit, i ∈ N , has
a growing domain over time. Hence, the agents’ strategies have growing domains
over time, and this feature further complicates the computation of PBEs of dynamic
games with asymmetric information.
The definition of PBE requires agents to keep track of all the observations they
acquire over time and form beliefs about the private information of all other agents.
As we show in the next section, agents do not need to keep track of all of their past
observations to reach an equilibrium. They can take into account fewer variables
for decision making purposes and ignore part of their past observations that are not
relevant to the continuation game at any time. As we argue in Section 5.7.2, the class
of simpler strategies proposed in this chapter characterize a more plausible prediction
about the outcome of the interaction among agents when the underlying system is
highly dynamic and there exists considerable information asymmetry among the
agents.
5.5 The Common Information Approach
We generalize the notion of Common Information Based PBE (CIB-PBE), first
introduced in [98, 97], and characterize a class of PBEs that utilize strategy choices
that are simpler than general behavioral strategies as they require agents to keep
track of only a compressed version of their information over time. We proceed as
follows. In Section 5.5.1 we provide sufficient conditions for the subset of private
information an agent needs to keep track of it over time for decision making pur-
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poses. In Section 5.5.2, we introduce the common information based belief as a
compressed version of the agents’ common information that is sufficient for decision
making purposes. Based on these compressions of the agents’ private and common
information, we introduce the notion of common information based assessments and
common information based perfect Bayesian equilibrium in Sections 5.5.3 and 5.5.4,
respectively.
5.5.1 Sufficient Private Information
The key ideas for compressing an agent’s private information appear in Defi-
nitions 5.4 and 5.5 below. We first characterize the subset of an agent’s private
information that is necessary for the agent’s decision making process, irrespective of
what strategies other agents play over time.




t , Ct) denote
a private signal that agent i ∈ N forms at t ∈ T based on his private information P it
and common information Ct. We say P
i,pr
t is a private payoff-relevant information
for agent i if for all open-loop strategies (A1:N1:T = â
1:N
1:T ), and for all t ∈ T ,









∣∣∣P it , Ct, at} = P(A1:N1:T =â1:N1:T ) {P i,prt+1 ∣∣∣P i,prt , Ct, at} w.p.1 (5.8)








∣∣∣ct, pit, at} = E(A−i1:t−1=â−i1:t) {uit(Xt, At)∣∣∣ct, pi,prt , at} .
(5.9)
By assuming that all other agents play open loop strategies we remove the inter-
dependence between agents −i’s strategy choices and agent i’s information structure,
thus, we eliminate signaling among the agents. Fixing the open-loop strategies of
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agents −i, agent i faces a centralized stochastic control problem. Definition 5.4 says
that P i,prt , t ∈ T , is a private payoff-relevant information for agent i if (i) it can be
recursively updated, (ii) P i,prt includes all information in P
i
t that is relevant to P
i,pr
t+1
and (iii) agent i’s instantaneous conditional expected utility at any t ∈ T is only a
function of Ct, P
i,pr
t , and his action A
i
t at t. These three conditions are similar to
properties (1)-(3), described in Section 5.1, that define an information state for a
centralized stochastic control problem [76], but they concern only agent i’s private
information P it instead of the collection H
i
t = {Ct, P it } of his private and common
information.7 We would like to point out that conditions (i)-(iii) can have many




While the definition of private payoff-relevant information suggests a possible
way to compress the information required for an agent’s decision making process, it
assumes that other agents play open-loop strategies and do not utilize the information
they acquire in real-time for decision making purposes. However, open-loop strategies
are not in general optimal for agents −i. As a result, to evaluate the performance of
any strategy choice gi agent i needs also to form a belief about the information that
other agents utilize to make decisions.




t , Ct), i ∈ N ,
t ∈ T , is sufficient private information for agents if,









∣∣∣Pt, Ct, At} = P{St+1, Zt+1∣∣∣St, Ct, At} w.p.1, (5.10)
(iii) for every strategy profile g̃∗ : {g̃∗it : S it×Ct → ∆(Ait), i ∈ N , t ∈ T } and at ∈ At,
7We note that if we interpret a centralized control problem as a special case of our model where
N = 1, H1t = Pt and Ct = ∅ for all t ∈ T , Definition 5.4 coincides with the definition of information
state for the single agent decision problem.
8An interesting research direction is to determine whether a minimal private payoff-relevant
information exists, and if so, characterize such a minimal payoff-relevant information. However,
such a direction is beyond the scope of this chapter, and we leave this topic for future research.
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∣∣∣ct, pit, at} = Eg̃∗−i1:t−1 {uit(Xt, At)∣∣∣ct, sit, at} , (5.11)
for all realizations {ct, pit} ∈ Ct × P it .
(iv) for every strategy profile g̃∗ : {g̃∗it : S it×Ct → ∆(Ait), i ∈ N , t ∈ T } and at ∈ At,








∣∣∣P it , Ct} = Pg̃∗−i1:t−1 {S−it ∣∣∣Sit , Ct} w.p.1, (5.12)
In general, the sufficient private information S1:Nt is more restrictive than that
of private payoff relevant information P 1:N,prt . This is because S
1:N
t , t ∈ T , needs to
satisfy condition (iv) in addition to conditions (i)-(iii). Moreover, condition (5.10)
requires that the belief about Zt+1 conditioned on {St, Ct, At} must be independent
of {Ht, At}. Furthermore, in contrast to condition (5.9) that assumes that agents
−i play open-loop strategies, condition (5.11) must be satisfied when agents play
closed-loop strategies. We note the definition of S1:T provides an interdependence
among agents’ sufficient private information S1:N1:T through condition (iii) and (iv).
Specifically, by condition (iv) agent i’s sufficient private information Sit must be rich
enough so that he can form beliefs about agents −i’s sufficient private information
S−it . Note that in (5.11) and (5.12) the conditional probability distributions do
depend on the strategy prediction g∗. As we pointed out in Section 5.4, the agents’
actual strategy profile g may be different from the prediction g∗. We will discuss
the robustness of sufficient private information to possible unilateral deviations of
agents from g∗ in Section 5.6. We would like to point out that conditions (i)-(iv) of




Definition 5.5 provides sufficient conditions under which agents can compress
their private information in a “mutually consistent’ manner. Below, we discuss a
9We do not discuss the possibility of finding a minimal set of sufficient private information in this
chapter, and leave it for future research as such investigation is beyond the scope of this chapter.
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few special instances of the general model 5.2, and identify the sufficient private
information S1:N1:T .
Special Cases:
1) Nested information structure: The uninformed agent (agent 2) has no private
information, P 2t = ∅. Thus, S2t = ∅. For the informed agent (agent 1) consider
P 1,prt = Xt. Consequently, we can set S
1
t = Xt. Note that P
2
t = ∅, thus, the
uninformed agent’s belief about P 1t is the same as common belief.
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions: Consider P i,prt = X
i
t . Note
that Xjt , j = 1, 2, ..., N have independent dynamics given the collective action At
that is commonly observable by all agents. Therefore, agent i’s belief about Xj,
j 6= i, is the same as common belief, Pg{Xjt |P it , Ct} = Pg{X
j
t |Ct}. Consequently, we
can set Sit = X
i
t .
3) Delayed sharing information structure: Consider P i,prt = {Y it−d+1:t}. Since we
do not assume any specific structure for system dynamics and agents’ observations,
agent i’s complete private information P it is payoff-relevant for him. Therefore, we
set St = P
i
t .
4) Perfectly controlled dynamics with hidden actions: Since agent i, i ∈ N ,
perfectly controls X it over time t ∈ T , we set Sit = {Ait−1, Y it }.
5.5.2 Common Information based Belief
Based on the characterization of sufficient private information, we present a statis-
tic (compressed version) of the common information Ct that agents need to keep track
of over time for decision making purposes.
Consider the sufficient private information S1:Nt , t ∈ T . Define S it to be the
set of all possible realizations of Sit , and St :=
∏N
i=1 S it . Let γt : Ct → ∆(Xt × St)
denote a mapping that determines a conditional probability distribution over the
system state Xt and the agents’ sufficient private information St given the common
information Ct at time t. We call the collection of mappings γ := {γt, t ∈ T } a
common information based belief system (CIB belief system). Note that γt is only
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a function of the common information Ct, and thus, it is computable by all agents.
Let Πγt := γt(Ct) denote the (random) common information based belief that agents
hold under belief system γ at t. We can interpret Πγt as the common belief that
each agent holds about the system state Xt and all the agents’ (including himself)
sufficient private information St at time t. In the rest of the chapter, we write Πt
and drop the superscript γ whenever such a simplification in notation is clear.
We show below that using the sufficient private information St along with the CIB
belief Πt, we can form a common information based assessment about the game. We
prove that such a common information based assessment is rich enough to capture a
subset of PBE.
5.5.3 Common Information based Assessment
As we discussed in Section 5.4, to form a prediction about the game we need to
determine an assessment about the game that is sequentially rational and consistent.
In the following we present an assessment that is based on the common information
based belief Πt and the sufficient private information S
i
t , i ∈ N .
Consider a class of strategies that utilize the information given by (Πt, S
i
t) for
agent i ∈ N at time t. We call the mapping σit : ∆(Xt × St) × S it → ∆(Ait) a
Common Information Based (CIB) strategy for agent i at time t. A CIB strategy
σi determines a probability distribution for agent i’s action Ait at time t given his
information (Πt, S
i
t). A CIB strategy is a behavioral strategy where agents only
use the common belief Πt = γt(Ct) (instead of the common information Ct), and
the sufficient private information Sit(P
i
t , Ct) (instead of complete private information
P it ). A collection of CIB strategies {σ11:T , ..., σN1:T} is called a CIB strategy profile σ.
The set of CIB strategies is a subset of behavioral strategies, defined in Section 5.2,












In Section 5.4, we defined a consistency condition between strategy prediction
g∗ and a belief system µ. Below, we provide an analogous consistency condition
149
between a CIB strategy prediction σ∗ and a CIB belief system γ.
Definition 5.6. A pair (σ∗, γ) of a CIB strategy prediction profile σ∗ and belief
system γ satisfies the consistency condition if














, ∀xt ∈ Xt,∀st ∈ St, (5.13)




πt−1{zt} = 0, we have
πt(xt, st) > 0, ∀xt ∈ Xt,∀st ∈ St,
only if there exists an open-loop strategy (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)π1
{ct−1, zt} > 0, and
P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)π1 {xt, st} > 0, (5.14)




πt−1{zt} = 0, we have∑
xt∈Xt
πt(xt, st) > 0, ∀st ∈ St
if there exists an open-loop strategy (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)π1
{ct−1, zt} > 0, and ∑
xt∈Xt
P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1)π1 {xt, st} > 0. (5.15)





Parts (i) and (ii) of Definition 5.6 follow from rationales similar to their analogues
in Definition 5.2, and require a CIB belief system to satisfy a sets of constraints
with respect to a CIB strategy profile that are similar to those for an assessment
(g∗, µ). Definition 5.6 requires an additional condition described by part (iii). By
(5.15), we require a CIB belief system γ consistent with the CIB strategy profile
σ∗ to assign a positive probability to every realization st of the agents’ sufficient
private information St that is “plausible” given the common information realiza-
tion ct = {ct−1, zt}; plausibility of st given ct means that there exists an open-loop
strategy profile (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) consistent with the realization ct that leads to the
realization of st with positive probability. Therefore, part (iii) ensures that there
exists no incompatibility between the CIB belief Πt and the agents’ sufficient private
information St+1. As we show later (Section 5.5.4), such a compatibility allows each
agent to refine the CIB belief Πt using his own private information S
i
t , and to form
his private belief about the game.
Remark 5.2. Similar to Remark 5.1, Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3 imply that (5.14)
holds for all (A1:t−1 = a1:t−1) such that P(A1:t−1=a1:t−1){ct} > 0. Therefore, in the rest
of the chapter, we ignore part (ii) of the consistency condition for CIB belief sys-
tems. Moreover, under Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3, condition (5.15) is always satis-
fied. Therefore, condition (iii) is equivalent to having
∑
xt∈Xt πt(xt, pt) > 0 whenever
Pσ∗πt−1{zt} = 0. In Section 5.8, we discuss the case where we relax Assumptions 5.2
and 5.3.
Given a CIB strategy profile prediction σ∗, a consistent CIB belief must satisfy
(5.13), which determines the CIB belief Πt at t in terms of the CIB belief Πt−1 at
t−1 and the new common information Zt at t. We define a CIB belief update rule as









t− 1.11 The superscript ψ in Πψt indicates that the CIB belief Π
ψ
t is generated using
the CIB update rule ψ. Let γψ denote the common belief system that is equivalent
to the CIB update rule ψ. We call a CIB belief update rule ψ consistent with a
CIB strategy profile σ∗ if the equivalent CIB belief system γψ is consistent with σ∗
(Definition 5.6).
Define a CIB assessment (σ∗, γ) as a pair of CIB strategy profile σ∗ and a CIB
belief system γ. Below, we show that a consistent CIB assessment (σ∗, γ) is equivalent
to a consistent assessment (g∗, µ) as defined in Section 5.4 (Definition 5.2).
Lemma 5.1. For any given CIB assessment (σ∗, γ), there exists an equivalent as-
sessment (g∗, µ) of a behavioral strategy prediction g∗ and belief system µ such that:




















for all i ∈ N , t ∈ T ,hit ∈ Hit, and s−it ∈ S−it .
Lemma 5.1 shows that the set of consistent CIB assessment (σ∗, γ) is equivalent
to a subset of consistent assessments (g∗, µ). That is, using the CIB belief system
γ and CIB strategy profile σ∗, agents can form a consistent assessment about the
evolution of the game. Moreover, condition (5.18) implies that the CIB belief Πt
along with agent i’s sufficient information Sit capture all the information in H
i
t that
is relevant to agent i’s belief about S−it .
11Upon reaching an information set of measure zero (parts (ii) and (iii) of Definition 5.6), the
revised CIB belief could be a function of Ct = {Ct−1, Zt}, not only Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt. Therefore,
the set of CIB belief systems that are generated from CIB update rules is a subset of all consistent
CIB belief systems given by Definition 5.6. However, we argue that upon reaching an information
set of measure zero, it is more plausible to revise the CIB belief only as a function of relevant
information Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt; Ct is irrelevant given Πt−1(Ct−1) and Zt.
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5.5.4 Common Information based PBE
Using the result of Lemma 5.1, we can define a class of PBE, called Common
Information based PBE (CIB-PBE), as a set of equilibria for dynamic games with
asymmetric information that can be expressed as CIB assessments.
Definition 5.7. A CIB assessment (σ∗, γ) is called a CIB-PBE if γ is consistent
with σ∗ (Definition 5.6), and the equivalent consistent assessment (g∗, µ), given by
Lemma 5.1, is a PBE.
In the following, we also call a consistent pair (σ∗, ψ) of a CIB strategy prediction
profile σ∗ and CIB belief update rule ψ a CIB-PBE if (σ∗, γψ) is a CIB-PBE.
Throughout Section 5.6, we assume that agents play according to the strategy
predictions g∗ (or CIB strategy predictions σ∗). However, an agent’s, say agent
i ∈ N ’s, actual strategy gi is his private information and could be different from
g∗ if such a deviation is profitable for him. The proposed class of CIB assessments
imposes two restrictions on agents’ strategies and beliefs compared to the general
class of assessment presented in Section 5.4. First, it requires that each agent i,
i ∈ N , must play a CIB strategy σ∗i instead of a general behavioral strategy g∗i.
Second, it requires that each agent i, i ∈ N , must form a belief about the status of
the game using only the CIB belief Πt along with his sufficient private information S
i
t
(instead of a general belief µit). A strategic agent i ∈ N does not restrict his choice
of strategy to CIB strategies, and may deviate from σ∗i to a non-CIB strategy gi if it
is profitable to him. Moreover, a strategic agent i, i ∈ N , does not limit himself to
form belief about the current status of the game only based on Πt and S
i
t , and may
instead use a general belief µi if it enables him to improve his expected utility. In
the next section, we address these strategic concerns, and show that no agent i ∈ N
wants to deviate from (Π, σ∗) and play a non-CIB strategy gi when all other agents
are playing according to CIB assessment (Π, σ∗). This result allows us to focus on
the class of CIB assessments, and develop a methodology to sequentially decompose
the dynamic game over time.
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5.6 Main Results
In this section, we show that the class of CIB assessments is rich enough to
capture the agents’ strategic interactions.We first show that when agents −i play
according to a CIB assessment (γt, σ
∗), agent i, i ∈ N , cannot mislead these agents
by playing a strategy gi different from σ∗i, thus, creating dual beliefs, one belief that
is based on the CIB assessment (γt, σ
∗) the functional form of which is known to all
agents, and another belief that is based on his private strategy gi that is only known
to him (Theorem 5.1). Then, we show that given that agents −i play CIB strategy
σ∗−i, agent i’s best response is a CIB strategy (Theorem 5.2).
We prove the result of Theorems 5.1 (resp. 5.2) for agent i ∈ N assuming that all
other agents −i are playing according to strategy prediction g∗−i (resp. σ∗−1). The
same results hold for every continuation game that starts at any time t ∈ T along
an off-equilibrium path; they can be proved by relabeling time t as time 1, and using




t), defined by Lemma 5.1, as
the initial common belief for the continuation game.
Using the results of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2, we present a methodology to deter-
mine the set of CIB-PBEs of stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric informa-
tion (Theorem 3). The proposed methodology leads to a sequential decomposition of
stochastic dynamic games with asymmetric information. This decomposition gives
rise to a dynamic program that can be utilized to compute CIB-PBEs via backward
induction. We proceed to formally states these results. All the proofs can be found
in the Appendix.
Theorem 5.1 (Policy-independence belief property). Consider a consistent assess-
ment (g∗, µ). If agents −i play according to strategy prediction g∗−i, then for every






∣∣∣hit} = Pg∗−i {xt, h−it ∣∣∣hit} . (5.19)
Theorem 5.1 provides a generalization of the standard policy-independence belief
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property in the centralized control literature [67] into multi-agent decision making
problems. It states that under perfect recall agent i’s belief is independent of his
actual strategy gi. Therefore, agent i cannot mislead agents −i by deviating from
the CIB strategy prediction g∗i to a behavioral strategy gi so as to create dual beliefs
(described above) that he can use to his advantage.
Using the result of Theorem 5.1, we show that agent i ∈ N does not gain by
playing a non-CIB strategy g̃i when all other agents −i are playing CIB strategies
σ∗−i.
Theorem 5.2 (Closeness of CIB strategies). Consider a consistent CIB assessment
(σ∗, γ). If every agent j ∈ N , j 6= i plays the CIB strategy σ∗j, then, there exists a
CIB strategy σi for agent i that is a best response to σ∗−i.
The results of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 address the two restrictions (discussed above)
imposed in CIB assessments on the agents’ beliefs and strategies, respectively.
Based on these results, we restrict attention to CIB assessments, and provide a
sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information. A CIB-
PBE is CIB assessment that is a fixed point under the best response map for all
agents. Below, we formulate a dynamic program that enables us to compute CIB-
PBEs of dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Consider a dynamic program over time horizon T ∪ {T + 1} with information
state {Πt, St}, t ∈ T . Let Vt := {V it : ∆(Xt ×St)×St → R, i ∈ N} denote the value
function that captures the continuation payoffs for all agents, for all realizations
of the CIB belief Πt and the agents’ private sufficient information St, t ∈ T . Set
V iT+1 = 0 for all i ∈ N . For each stage t ∈ T of the dynamic program consider the
following static game.
Stage game Gt(πt,Vt+1, ψt+1): Given the value function Vt+1 and CIB update
rule ψt+1, we define the stage game Gt(πt, Vt+1, ψt) as a static game of asymmetric
information among agents for every realization πt. Each agent i ∈ N has private in-
formation Sit that is distributed according to πt, which is common knowledge among
the agents. Given a realization at of the agents’ collective action profile and a re-
alization st of the agents’ sufficient private information, agent i’s utility is given
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by
Ū it (at, st, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1) := Eπt
{
uit(Xt, at) + V
i
t+1 (ψt+1(πt, Zt+1), St+1)
∣∣∣πt, st, at} .
(5.20)
BNE correspondence: We define the correspondenceBNEt (Vt+1, ψt+1), t ∈ T ,
as the correspondence mapping that characterizes the set of BNEs of the stage game
Gt(πt,Vt+1, ψt+1) for every realization of πt; this correspondence is given by
BNEt (Vt+1, ψt+1) := {σ∗t : ∀πt ∈ ∆(Xt × St), σ(πt, ·) is a BNE of Gt(πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)} .
(5.21)
We say σ∗(πt, ·) is a BNE of the stage game Gt(πt, Vt+1, ψt) if for all agents i ∈ N ,
and for all sit ∈ S it ,
σ∗i(πt, s
i




Ū it ((α, σ
∗−i(πt, S
−i
t )), St, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣πt, sit} . (5.22)
Below, we provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric
information using the stage game and the BNE correspondence defined above.
Theorem 5.3 (Sequential decomposition). A pair (σ∗, ψ) of a CIB strategy profile
σ∗ and a CIB update rule ψ (equivalently, a CIB assessment (σ∗, γψt )) is a CIB-PBE
if (σ∗, ψ) solves the following dynamic program:
V iT+1(·) := 0 ∀ i ∈ N , (5.23)
(5.24)
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for t ∈ T ,
σ∗t ∈ BNEt (Vt+1, ψt+1) , (5.25)
ψt+1 is consistent with σ
∗, (5.26)





∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣πt, sit} , i ∈ N . (5.27)
5.7 Discussion
Using the notion of CIB-PBE proposed in Sections 5.5 and 5.6, we provide a
sequential decomposition of dynamic games with asymmetric information over time.
The set of CIB-PBEs characterizes a set of equilibria in which the agents compress
their private and common information, thus, they play simpler strategies whose
domains do not grow as rapidly as those of behavioral strategies. We also identified
a special cases of the general model of Section 5.2, where the domain of CIB strategies
is time-invariant. In the following, we elaborate further on the notion of CIB-PBE. In
Section 5.7.1, we discuss the connections between the common information approach
to dynamic games presented in this chapter and the existing results on the common
information approach to dynamic teams. We show that the approach proposed in
this chapter to compress the agents’ private and common information extends to
dynamic teams. In Section 5.7.2, we discuss the relation between CIB-PBEs and
other equilibrium concepts for dynamic teams. We argue that the notion of CIB-PBE
provides a more plausible and robust characterization of the outcomes in dynamic
games where the information asymmetry among agents is high and the underlying
system is highly dynamic.
5.7.1 Dynamic Games vs. Teams
As pointed out in Section 5.1, the approach proposed in this chapter is inspired
by the common information approach proposed in [91, 90]. However, in dynamic
games among strategic agents there are additional challenges that are not present in
dynamic teams where agents cooperate. We discussed these challenges in Section 5.3,
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and presented an approach to address them in Sections 5.5 and 5.6. The approach
proposed to compress the agents’ private information (Definitions 5.4 and 5.5) can
be also applied to dynamic team problems, thus, it provides a new result and insight
on the common information approach to dynamic teams.
Consider a setting where each agent i ∈ N commits to play strategy gi; that is,
he is non-strategic and his strategy gi is known to all the other agents. Moreover,
assume that the agents have access to a public randomization device; that is at every
time t ∈ T they observe a public random signal ωt that is uniformly distributed on
[0, 1] and is independent across time. At each time t ∈ T , all agents can condition
their actions on the realization of ωt. We can then establish the following result.
Theorem 5.4. Assume that the agents are non-strategic and have access to a pub-
lic randomization device. Then, for any strategy profile g there exists an equiv-

















τ (Πτ , S
1:N
τ ), Xτ )
}
, for all i ∈ N
and t ∈ T .
Consider the team problem that corresponds to the model of Section 5.2, where
all agents have the same utility uit(·, ·) = uteamt (·, ·). For this dynamic team problem,
the result of Theorem 5.4 implies that we can restrict attention to the set of CIB
strategies without loss of generality. The result of Theorem 5.4 extends the results
of [91, 90] in two directions. First, it states that the restriction to the set of CIB
strategies is without loss of generality, while the results of [91, 90] only states that
this restriction is without loss of optimality. Second, the definition of CIB strategies
first presented in [91, 90] requires the agents to use all of their private information P it ,
i ∈ N (or all their private memory that is a predetermined function of their private
information if they do not have perfect recall); the result of Theorem 5.4 holds
for CIB strategies where the agents’ private information is effectively compressed
, thus, it generalizes the definition of CIB strategies. We would also like to note
that to achieve a general expected flow of utility agents may need to utilize a public
randomization device to construct correlated strategies. However, when our objective
is to determine an optimal strategy profile, we can restrict attention to CIB strategies
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without a public randomization device; this is because in dynamic teams we can
restrict attention to deterministic strategies without loss of optimality.
The results of Theorem 5.4 for dynamic teams along with the results in Section
5.6 for dynamic games, provide a general approach for the study of dynamic decision
problems with many agents and asymmetric information. As a result, our results
also extend to dynamic games among teams of agents and characterize a set of
information states for each agent in a mutually consistent manner.
5.7.2 CIB-PBE vs. Other Notions of Equilibrium
In Section 5.6, we showed that CIB assessments proposed in this chapter are
rich enough to capture a set of PBE. However, we would like to point out that the
concept of CIB-PBE does not capture all PBEs of a dynamic game in general. We
expand on the relation between the of CIB-PBE and PBE below. We argue that the
set of CIB-PBEs are more plausible to arise as the information asymmetry among
the agents increases and the underlying system is dynamic.
In Sections 5.5, we presented an approach to compress the agents’ private and
common information by providing conditions sufficient to characterize the informa-
tion that is relevant for decision making purposes. Such information compression
means that the agents do not incorporate into their decision making processes their
observations that are irrelevant to the continuation game. As we showed in Section
5.7.1, this information compression is without loss of generality for dynamic team
problems. However, this is not the case in dynamic games. In general, the set of
CIB-PBEs of a dynamic game is a subset of all PBEs of that game. This is be-
cause in a dynamic game agents can incorporate their past irrelevant observations
into their future decisions so as to create rewards (resp. punishments) that incen-
tivize the agents to play (resp. not play) specific actions over time. By compressing
the agents’ private and common information in CIB assessments, we do not capture
such punishment/reward schemes that are based on past irrelevant observations. Be-
low, we present an example where there exists a PBE that cannot be captured as a
CIB-PBE.
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Consider a two-agent repeated game with T = 2 and a payoff matrix given in
Table 5.1. At each stage, agent 1 chooses from {U,D}, and agent 2 chooses from
{L,M,R}. We assume that agents observe each others’ actions. Therefore, the
agents have no private information, and the sufficient private information and CIB
belief are trivial. The stage game has two equilibria in pure strategies given by
(D,M) and (U,R). Using the results of Theorem 3, we can characterize four CIB-
PBEs of the repeated game that correspond to the different combinations of the
two equilibria of the stage game as follows: (DD,MM), (UU,RR), DU,MR), and
(UD,RM). However, there exists an another PBE of the repeated game that cannot
be captured as a CIB-PBE. Consider the following equilibrium: Play (U,L) at t = 1.
If agent 2 plays L at t = 1 then play (U,R); otherwise, play (D,M) at t = 2. Note
that the agent 1’s decision at t = 2 depends on the agent 2’s action at t = 1, which
is a payoff-irrelevant information since the two stages of the game are independent.
L M R
U (8,3) (0,2) (2,10)
D (0,1) (1,2) (0,0)
Table 5.1: Payoff matrix
We would like to point out that there are instances of dynamic games with asym-
metric information, such as zero-sum dynamic games [109], where the equilibrium
payoffs for the agents are unique. In these games it is not possible to incorporate pay-
off irrelevant information so as to construct additional equilibria where the agents’
payoffs are different from the ones corresponding to CIB-PBEs; this is clearly the case
for zero-sum games since the agents do not cooperate on creating punishment/reward
schemes due to the zero-sum nature of the game.12
While it is true that in general, the set of PBEs of a dynamic game is larger
than the set of CIB-PBEs of that game, in the remainder of this section, we provide
three reasons on why in a highly dynamic environment with information asymmetry
among agents, CIB-PBEs are more plausible to arise as an outcome of a game.
12See Section 5.9 for the proof of existence for CIB-PBEs in zero-sum games.
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First, we argue that in the face of a highly dynamic environment, an agent with
partial observations of the environment should not behave fundamentally different
whether he interacts in a strategic or cooperative environment. From the single-
agent decision making point of view (i.e. control theory), CIB strategies are the
natural choice of an agent for decision making purposes (See Theorem 5.4). The
notion of CIB-PBE proposed in this chapter for dynamic games along with the
CIB approach to dynamic teams proposed in [91, 90] and extended in Section 5.7.1
provide a universal foundation for agents’ behavior in a dynamic environment with
information asymmetry among agents.
Second, we argue that in a highly dynamic environment with information asym-
metry among the agents, the formation of punishment/reward schemes that utilize
the agents’ payoff-irrelevant information requires prior complex agreements among
the agents; these complex agreements are sensitive to the parameters of the model
and are not very plausible to arise in practice when the decision making problem for
each agent is itself a complex task. We note that the set of PBEs that cannot be
captured as CIB-PBEs are the ones that utilize payoff-irrelevant information to cre-
ate punishment/reward schemes in the continuation game as in the example above.
However, such punishment/reward schemes require the agents to form a common
agreement among themselves on how to utilize such payoff-irrelevant information
and how to implement such punishment/reward schemes. The formation of such a
common agreement among the agents is more likely in games where the underlying
system is not highly dynamic (as in repeated games [79]) and there is no much infor-
mation asymmetry among agents. However, in a highly dynamic environment with
information asymmetry among agents the formation of such common agreement be-
comes less likely for the following reasons. First, in those environments each agent’s
individual decision making process is described by a complex POMDP; thus, strategic
agents are less likely to form a prior common agreement (that depend on the solution
of the individual POMDPs) in addition to solving their individual POMDPs. Second,
as the information asymmetry increases among agents, punishment/reward schemes
that utilize payoff-irrelevant information require a complex agreement among the
agents that is sensitive and not robust to changes in the assumptions on the infor-
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mation structure of the game. For instance, consider the example described above,
but assume that agents observe imperfectly each others’ actions at each stage (As-
sumption 5.3). Let 1− ε, ε ∈ (0, 1), denote the probability that agents observe each
others’ actions perfectly, and ε denote the probability that their observation is differ-
ent from the true action of the other agent. Then, the described non-CIB strategy
profile above remains as a PBE of the game only if ε ≤ 1
5
. The author of [86] provides
a general result on the robustness of above-mentioned punishment/reward schemes
in repeated games; he shows that the set of equilibria that are robust to changes in
information structure that affect only payoff-irrelevant signals does not include the
set of equilibria that utilize punishment/reward schemes described above.
Third, the proposed notion of CIB-PBE can be viewed as a generalization of
Markov Perfect Equilibrium [81] to dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Therefore, a similar set of rationales that support the notion of MPE also applies
to the notion of CIB-PBE as follows. First, the set of CIB assessments describe the
simplest form of strategies capturing the agents’ behavior that is consistent with the
agents’ rationality. Second, the class of CIB assessments captures the notion that
“bygones are bygones”, which also underlies the requirement of subgame perfection
in equilibrium concepts for dynamic games. That is, the agents’ strategies in two
continuation games that only differ in the agents’ information about payoff-irrelevant
events must be identical. Third, the class of CIB assessments embodies the principle
that “minor changes in the past should have minor effects”. This implies that if
there exists a small perturbation in the specifications of the game or the agents’ past
strategies that are irrelevant to the continuation game, the outcome of the continu-
ation game should not change drastically. The two-step example above presents one





In the model of Section 5.2, we presented a class of finite horizon dynamic games
under Assumptions 5.1-5.3. Assumption 5.1 enables us to avoid measure-theoretic
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technical difficulties and to provide a simple but comprehensive presentation of the
key ideas of the common information approach to dynamic games along with the
notion of CIB-PBE. Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3 enable us to simplify the computation
of beliefs along off-equilibrium paths. Below, we discuss Assumptions 5.1-5.3 and
present extensions of our results. In Section 5.8.1, we extend our results to infinite
horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information (i.e. T =∞). In Section 5.8.2,
we argue that when the agents’ action are observable we can relax Assumptions
5.2 and 5.3, and obtain a result similar to that of Theorem 5.3. In Section 5.8.3,
we discuss the assumption that is most crucial to the development of the common
information approach to dynamic games proposed in this chapter.
5.8.1 Infinite Horizon Games
In the model of Section 5.2, we assume that the horizon T is finite. Below, we
present a model similar to that of Section 5.2 with infinite horizon, i.e. T =∞.
Infinite Horizon Dynamic Game: There are N strategic agents who live in
a dynamic Markovian world over an infinite horizon. We consider a time-invariant
model where the system state, actions, and observations spaces are finite and time-
invariant, i.e. Xin = Xt, Ain = At, Zin = Zt, and Yin = Yt for all t ∈ N. Let Xt ∈ Xin
denote the system state at t ∈ N. Given the agents’ actions At at t, the system state
evolution is given by
Xt+1 = fin(Xt, At,W
x
t ), (5.28)
where {W xt , t ∈ N} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables. The initial state X1 is a random variable with probability distribution
η ∈ ∆(Xin) with full support that is common knowledge among the agents.
At every time t ∈ N, each agent i ∈ N , receives a noisy observation Y it given by





where {W it , t ∈ N, i ∈ N} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed
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random variables.







where {W ct , t ∈ N} is a sequence of independent and identically distributed random
variables; the sequences {W xt , t ∈ N}, {W ct , t ∈ N}, and {W it , t ∈ N, i ∈ N} and the
initial state X1 are mutually independent.
Similar to the model of Section 5.2, let P it and Ct denote agent i’s, i ∈ N , private
and common information at t ∈ T , respectively. Agent i chooses his strategy so as





where δ denotes the discount factor. We assume that Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3 are
satisfied.
We provide an extension of our results to infinite horizon dynamic games. For
that matter, we need the following definition.
Definition 5.8 (Time-invariant sufficient private information). We say Sit, i ∈ N ,
t ∈ N is a time-invariant sufficient private information if it is a sufficient private
information and has a time-invariant domain denoted by S iin, i ∈ N .
We note that for the special cases presented in Section 5.5 the characterized
sufficient private information is time-invariant. Let Πt denote the CIB belief about
(Xt, St) at t. Consider a class of CIB strategies that are based on time-invariant
sufficient private information. We call the mapping σis : ∆(Xt×Sin)×S iin → ∆(Aiin)
a stationary CIB strategy for agent i if Sit , i ∈ N , t ∈ T , is a time-invariant sufficient
private information. Similarly, we define a stationary CIB update rule as a time-
invariant mapping ψs : ∆(Xin×Sin)×Zt13 → ∆(Xin×Sin), that recursively determines
13Note that Zt is time-invariant.
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the CIB belief for all t ∈ T .
Definition 5.9. We say that a pair (σ∗s , ψs) of a CIB strategy profile σ
∗
s and a CIB
update rule ψin is a stationary CIB-PBE if (σ
∗
s , ψs) is a CIB-PBE, σ
∗
s is a stationary
CIB strategy profile, and ψs is a stationary update rule.
Based on Definition 5.9, we provide a sequential decomposition of dynamic games
with infinite horizon below.
Let Vs := {V is : ∆(Xt×Sin)×S iin → R, i ∈ N} denote a stationary value function
that captures the continuation payoff for all agents. Given a value function Vs and
a stationary update rule ψs, for every realization πt define the stationary stage game
Gs(πt, Vs, ψs) as a static game of asymmetric information among agents, where the
agents’ utilities are given by
Ū is(at, st, πt, Vs, ψs) := Eπt
{
uiin(Xt, at) + V
i
s (ψs(πt, Zt+1), St+1)
∣∣∣πt, st, at} , (5.32)
for every realization of st ∈ Sin and at ∈ Ain.
Similar to (5.21), define the correspondence BNEs (Vt+1, ψt+1) as the stationary
correspondence that characterizes the set of BNEs of the stationary stage game
Gs(πt,Vs, ψs) for every realization of πt; this correspondence is given by
BNEs (Vs, ψs) := {σ∗s : ∀πs ∈ ∆(Xt × St), σ∗(πs, ·) is a BNE of Gs(πs, Vs, ψs)} .
(5.33)
The following theorem extends the result of Theorem 5.3 to dynamic games with
infinite horizon
Theorem 5.5. Consider a infinite-horizon dynamic game with asymmetric infor-
mation where there exists a time-invariant sufficient private information St ∈ Sin,
t ∈ N, for all agents. Then, a pair of (σ∗s , ψs) of a stationary CIB strategy profile σ∗s
and a stationary CIB update rule ψs is a stationary CIB-PBE if there exist a value
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function Vs(·, ·) that satisfies the following set of equations:
σ∗s ∈ BNEs(Vs, ψs), (5.34)
ψs is consistent with σ
∗
s , (5.35)




∗(π, S)), S, π, Vs, ψs)
∣∣∣π, si} ,∀i ∈ N , s ∈ Sin, π ∈∆(Xin×Sin).
(5.36)
5.8.2 Signaling-free Beliefs
In the model of Section 5.2, we assume that P{xt|a1:t−1} > 0 (Assumption 5.2)
and P{y1:t|a1:t} > 0 (Assumption 5.3) for all t ∈ T . In the following we argue that
if the agents’ actions are observable these assumptions can be relaxed and a result
similar to that of Theorem 5.3 can be obtained.
As mentioned in Remark 5.2, condition (ii) of Definition 5.6 is trivially satisfied
under Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3. However, when we relax Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3,
we need to make sure that the solution of dynamic program described in Theorem
5.3 satisfies condition (ii) of Definition 5.6. To do so, we need to: (1) keep track of
the set of system states xt ∈ Xt and sufficient private information st ∈ St that are
feasible under the common information ct over time, i.e. they satisfy condition (ii)
of Definition 5.6 (see (5.14)), and (2) assert that this feasible set can be recursively
updated. These two conditions are required because in a dynamic program similar
to that of Theorem 5.3 we need to ensure the consistency conditions based on update
rule ψt+1, which utilizes the new common information Zt+1 at t + 1; see (5.26). For
that matter, we need to make the following assumption.
Assumption 5.4. (Observable Actions) At every time t ∈ T the agents’ actions At
are commonly observable by all agents, i.e. At ∈ Zt+1 for all t ∈ T \{T}.14
14We would like to point out that in the absence of Assumption 5.4 the set of feasible system
states cannot be updated recursively in general. For instance, consider a dynamic game with delay-
sharing information structure, where the agents observe At−d at time t with d delay, d > 1. In this
case, the set of feasible system states cannot be updated recursively since the agents’ actions At−d
observed at t affect the set of feasible system states at time t− d+ 1 < t.
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With Assumption 5.4 replacing Assumptions 5.2 and 5.3, we propose an approach
to keep track of feasible system states over time, and accordingly, present a result
similar to that of Theorem 5.3.
For every t ∈ T , let γft : Ct → ∆(Xt × St), be such that γ
f
t (ct) assigns a positive
probability to every system state xt ∈ Xt and sufficient private information st ∈ St
that are feasible under ct ∈ Ct. We note that under Assumption 5.4, the history of
all actions A1:t−1 ∈ Ct. We call the collection of mappings γft , t ∈ T a signaling-free
CIB belief system. Let Πft := γ
f
t (Ct) denote the (random) signaling-free CIB belief
at t. Note that by using the realization πft of the signaling-free CIB belief Π
f
t , we
can rewrite condition (ii) of Definition 5.6 as
πt(xt, st) > 0 only if π
f
t (xt, st) > 0. (5.37)
Under Assumption 5.4, Πft can be updated recursively as a function of Π
f
t−1 and
the new common information Zt at t. Define the signaling-free CIB update rule as
a sequence of mappings ψf := {ψft : ∆(Xt−1 × St−1)×Zt → ∆(Xt × St), t ∈ T \{1}}
that are given by
πf1 (x1, s1) := π1(x1, s1),






πft−1(xt−1, st−1)P{xt, st, zt\at−1|xt−1, st−1, at−1}∑
xt−1,st−1
πft−1(xt−1, st−1)P{zt\at−1|xt−1, st−1, at−1}
, (5.38)
for all xt ∈ Xt, st ∈ St, zt ∈ Zt, At−1 ∈ At−1, and t ∈ T \{1}. We note that the
signaling-free CIB update rule ψf does not depend on the agents’ strategy prediction
σ∗ or actual strategy σ.
Using (5.38), we can write the consistency condition (Definition 5.6) between σ∗t−1
and ψt in terms of Πt−1 and ψ
f
t , ∀t ∈ T \{1}. Therefore, we can present a dynamic
program similar to that of Theorem 5.3 by modifying the information state to be
{Πt,Πft , St}. Accordingly, for all realizations of Πt, Π
f
t , and St, t ∈ T , we define
the value function V̂t := {V̂ it : ∆(Xt × St) × ∆(Xt × St) × St → R, i ∈ N} as the
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continuation payoffs for all agents, and obtain the following result.
Theorem 5.6. A pair (σ∗, ψ) of a CIB strategy profile σ∗ and a CIB update rule ψ
(equivalently, a CIB assessment (σ∗, γψt )) is a CIB-PBE if (σ
∗, ψ) solves the following
dynamic program:
V̂ iT+1(·) := 0 ∀ i ∈ N , (5.39)
(5.40)






ψt+1 is consistent with σ
∗ and ψft+1 (5.42)
V̂ it (πt, π
f





∗(πt, St)), St, πt, π
f
t , V̂t+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣πt, πft , sit} , i ∈ N .
(5.43)
We note that the dynamic program presented above is different from the one
described in Theorem 5.3 in two aspects. First, the information state {Πt,Πft , St}
in Theorem 5.6 has an additional component, given by the signaling-free belief Πft ,
compared to the information state {Πt, St} in Theorem 5.3. Second, the consistency
condition (5.42) is in terms of σ∗t , ψt+1, and ψ
f




5.8.3 Common Observation of Deviations
In Sections 5.8.1 and 5.8.2, we demonstrated how our results can be extended to
infinite horizon dynamic games and to instances where we relax Assumptions 5.2-5.3.
In this section, we discuss the crucial assumption in our model that is necessary for
our results to hold.
In the common information approach presented in Section 5.5, we utilize the CIB
belief system γ to form a CIB assessment about the status of the game. As shown by
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Lemma 5.1, every agent i ∈ N can use the CIB belief system γ along with the agents’
CIB strategy σ∗ and his sufficient private information Sit to form his private belief
µi about the status of the game. The crucial requirement for the result of Lemma
5.1 to hold is that every realization sit ∈ S it of agent i’s sufficient private information









t ) > 0.
This requirement is satisfied by condition (iii) in Definition 5.6 for realizations zt
of the new common information at t that have zero probability under πt−1, i.e.
Pσ∗πt−1{zt} = 0. However, for realizations zt that have positive probability under πt−1,
i.e. Pσ∗πt−1{zt} > 0, the compatibility condition between agent i’s sufficient private
information sit and the common belief π
i
t is not satisfied in general. Therefore, we
argue that the crucial requirement that underlies our results and guarantees the
compatibility between the CIB belief Πt and the sufficient private information S
i
t ,
i ∈ N , at every t ∈ T can be summarized by the following assumption.15
Assumption 5.5. For all t ∈ T , a1:t ∈ A1:t, i ∈ N , pit ∈ P it and ct ∈ Ct,
Pπ1{pit, ct|a1:t} = 0 only if Pπ1{ct|a1:t} = 0.
Assumption 5.5 implies that every deviation that can be detected by agent i at
t must be also detectable by all agents at the same time t based on the common
information Ct. We note that Assumption 5.5 is satisfied under Assumptions 5.2
and 5.3, or Assumption 5.4. We do not provide a formal proof for the sufficiency of
Assumption 5.5, however, we provide an informal argument below.
Consider a dynamic game with unobservable actions where Assumption 5.5 is not
satisfied, that is, there exist i ∈ N , t ∈ T , pit ∈ P it , cit ∈ Cit , and a1:t ∈ A1:t such that
P{pit, ct|a1:t} = 0 and P{ct|a1:t} > 0. In this game, agent i can detect deviations from
a1:t at t when he observes {pit, ct}. Upon detecting the deviation, agent i needs to
revise his belief µit. However, if at time t no deviation can be detected based on the
common information ct, the CIB belief πt is not revised. Therefore, agent i cannot
rely anymore on the CIB belief πt to form his private belief µ
i
t using the construction
described by Lemma 5.1. Under Assumption 5.5, it is guaranteed that agent i wants
15As noted before, we maintain our assumptions that the system state, actions, and observations
spaces are finite.
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to revise his belief µit whenever the CIB belief Πt is revised. Therefore, for all t ∈ T ,
every realization of agent i’s sufficient private information Sit is compatible with
CIB belief Πt. Consequently, the result of Lemma 5.1 holds, and we can utilize the
CIB assessments to provide a decomposition of the dynamic game similar to that of
Theorem 5.3.
5.9 Existence
As we discussed in Section 5.7, there exist PBEs that cannot be described as
CIB-PBEs in general. Therefore, the standard results that guarantee the existence
of a PBE for dynamic games with asymmetric information [96, Proposition. 249.1]
cannot be used to guarantee the existence of a CIB-PBE in these games. In this
Section, we discuss the existence of CIB-PBEs for dynamic games with asymmetric
information. We provide conditions that are sufficient to guarantee the existence
of CIB-PBEs (Lemmas 5.2 and 5.3). Using the result of Lemma 5.2, we prove the
existence of CIB-PBEs for zero-sum dynamic games with asymmetric information
(Theorem 5.7). Using the result of Lemma 5.3, we identify instances of non-zero-sum
dynamic games with asymmetric information where we can guarantee the existence
of CIB-PBEs.
Lemma 5.2. The dynamic program given by (5.25)-(5.27) has at least one solution
at stage t if the value function Vt+1 is continuous in Πt+1.
We note that the condition of Lemma 5.2 is always satisfied for t = T by definition
of VT+1; see (5.20) and (5.23). However, for t < T , it is not straightforward to prove
the continuity of the value function Vt in πt in general. Given Vt+1 is continuous
in πt+1, the result of [85, Theorem 2] implies that the set of equilibrium payoffs for
the state game at t is upper hemicontinuous in πt. Therefore, if the stage game
Gt(πt,Vt+1, ψt+1) has a unique equilibrium payoff for every πt, we can show that
Vt is continuous in πt for t < T . Using this approach, we prove the existence of
CIB-PBEs for zero-sum games below, where the equilibrium payoff is unique.
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Theorem 5.7. For every dynamic zero-sum game with asymmetric information there
exists a CIB-PBE that is a solution to the dynamic program given by (5.25)-(5.27).
For dynamic non-zero-sum games, it is harder to establish that Vt is continuous in
πt for t < T since the set of equilibrium payoffs is not a singleton in general. However,
we conjecture that for every dynamic game with asymmetric information described
in Section 5.2, at every stage of the corresponding dynamic program, it is possible
to select a BNE for every realization of πt so that the resulting Vt is continuous in
πt.
In addition to the results of Lemma 5.2 and Theorems 5.7, we provide another
condition below that guarantees the existence of CIB-PBEs in some instances of
dynamic games with asymmetric information.
Lemma 5.3. A dynamic game with asymmetric information described in Section
5.2 has at least one CIB-PBE if there exits sufficient information S1:N1:t such that the
CIB update rule ψ1:T is independent of σ
∗.
The independence of CIB update rule from σ∗ is a condition that is not satisfied
for all dynamic games with asymmetric information. Nevertheless, we present below
special instances where this condition is satisfied.
1) Nested information structure with one controller: Consider the nested
information structure case described in Section 5.2. Assume that the evolution of
the system state is controlled only by the uniformed player and is given by Xt+1 =
ft(Xt, A
2
t ,Wt). For S
1
t = Xt and S
2
t = 0, it is easy to check that Pσ
∗{πt+1|πt, at} =
P{πt+1|πt, at} for all πt+1, πt ,at and t ∈ T .
2) Independent dynamics with observable actions and no private val-
uation: Consider the model with independent dynamics and observable actions
described in Section 5.2. Assume that agent i’s, i ∈ N , instantaneous utility is given
by uit(At, X
−i
t ) (no private valuation); that is, agent i’s utility at t does not depend
on X it . It is easy to verify that S
i
t = ∅ is sufficient private information for agent i.
Hence, the condition of Lemma 5.3 is trivially satisfied.
3) Delayed sharing information structure with d = 1 Consider the delayed
sharing information structure described in Section 5.2 when delay d = 1 [7, 6]. Thus,
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P it = {Y it }. Let Sit = P it = Y it . Then, it is easy to verify that the condition of Lemma
5.3 is satisfied.
4) Uncontrolled state process with hidden actions: Consider an N -player
game with uncontrolled dynamics given by Xt+1 = ft(Xt,Wt), t ∈ T . At every time
t ∈ T , agent i, i ∈ N , receives a noisy observation Y it = Oit(X it , Zit). The agents’
actions are hidden. Thus, P it = {Y i1:t, Ai1:t−1} and Ct = ∅. Hence, the condition
of Lemma 5.3 is trivially satisfied. We note that in the case where a subset of the
agents’ observation reveals to all agents’ with some delay, {i.e.} Ct ⊆ {Y1:t}, the
condition of Lemma 5.3 is also satisfied.
5.10 Conclusion
We proposed a general approach to study a dynamic game with asymmetric
information with finite or infinite time horizon. We presented a set of conditions suf-
ficient to characterize an information state for each agent that effectively compresses
his common and private information in a mutually consistent manner. We showed
that the above-mentioned information state provides a sufficient statistic for decision
making purposes in strategic and non-strategic settings. We introduced the notion
of Common Information based Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium that characterizes a set
of outcomes for the dynamic game. We provided a sequential decomposition of the
dynamic game over time, which leads to a dynamic program for the computation of
the set of CIB-PBEs of the dynamic game. We determined conditions under which
we can guarantee the existence of CIB-PBEs. Using these conditions, we proved the
existence of CIB-PBE for dynamic zero-sum games and special instances of dynamic
non-zero sum games.
For future research, we will investigate the problem of determining the mini-
mal information state in a dynamic game with asymmetric information. In the
examples presented in this chapter, we only characterized an information state that
compresses an agent’s private information by discarding a subset of his private in-
formation. Therefore, it will be interesting to identify instances of dynamic games
with asymmetric information where we can find an information state that compresses
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an agent’s information by applying a functional transformation on his private and
common information. As another direction for future research, we will study the
development of a computationally efficient algorithm to solve the dynamic program
presented in this chapter and determine the set of CIB-PBEs for a general dynamic




6.1 A Brief Summary
In this dissertation, we investigated problems arising in the design and analysis
of CPSs with strategic agents. We provided a general framework that captures a
broad range of CPSs with strategic agents. In a CPS, strategic agents may have
control over the decisions and/or possess information that is not available to the
designer. Accordingly, we identified two classes of design problems. In the first
class, the designer has control over decisions and resources but the strategic agents
possess private information that is crucial for the efficient operation of the CPS.
In the second class, the designer has superior information about the current status
of the system but strategic agents have control over decisions and resources in the
system. We identified specific design problems in power systems and transportation
networks that can be formulated according to the above classification in Chapters
2-4.
Motivated by the increasing integration of renewable energy and flexible loads into
power grids, we studied the design of electricity markets for renewable energy and
flexible loads in Chapters 2 and 3 as instances of the first class of design problems
described above. We proposed a stylized two-time step model that captures the
dynamic and uncertain nature of the generation from renewable resources and the
availability of flexible loads. We studied the design of forward bilateral contracts
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in Chapter 2 and showed that the optimal contract is a contingent contract that
allows a renewable generator/flexible load to adjust its commitment according to
the new information he receives over time. In Chapter 3, we studied the problem
of designing a pooling market for wind energy. Assuming that wind generators
receive private information about their generation capacity over time, we proposed a
dynamic market mechanism that outperforms the existing sequence of static markets,
e.g. the day-ahead market followed by the real-time market. We showed that the
main advantage of the dynamic mechanism is due to the designer’s ability to price
discriminate sellers with different levels of uncertainty in their generation and to
expose them to the risk of penalty charge. We characterized the benefit of wind
monitoring on the overall performance of the market and showed that it vanishes as
the number of possible generation technologies increases.
As an instance of the second class of design problems, we studied the problem
of optimal information provision in a transportation network in Chapter 4. We
investigated the design of public and private information disclosure mechanisms in
a parallel two-link network where the designer can provide information to drivers
about the condition of one of the links. We showed that the designer can improve
the social welfare by strategically disclosing information to the drivers. In particular,
we identified conditions under which the designer can achieve the socially efficient
outcome. We also investigated the design of information disclosure mechanisms in
a two-step dynamic setting where the condition of the network has an uncontrolled
Markovian dynamics and the drivers can learn from their past experience. Using
numerical simulations, we examined the effect of different pieces of information,
from which the drivers can learn, on the designer’s optimal information disclosure
mechanisms and its performance.
We investigated the analysis of CPSs with strategic agents in Chapter 5. We
consider a general dynamic game of asymmetric information with controlled Marko-
vian dynamics where strategic agents make private observations and take actions
over time. We presented a set of conditions sufficient to characterize an informa-
tion state for each agent that effectively compresses the agent’s private and common
information. We showed that the characterized information state provides a suffi-
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cient statistics for decision making purposes in strategic and non-strategic settings.
Consequently, the proposed methodology in this dissertation provides a universal ap-
proach to study dynamic games and teams including dynamic games among teams
of agents. Using the above-mentioned information state, we introduced the notion
of CIB-PBE which characterizes a subset of PBE of dynamic games. We provided a
sequential decomposition of the dynamic game and formulated a dynamic program
to determine the set of CIB-PBEs via backward induction.
6.2 Future Directions
The emergence of CPSs with strategic agents has created new challenges due to
the decentralizations of decisions and information as well as the agents’ autonomous
selfish behavior. In this dissertation, we studied specific design problems that are
motivated by applications in power systems and transportation networks and pro-
posed a general approach to determine a set of outcomes in these systems. Below,
we discuss s few directions which in our opinion provide valuable insights into the
design and analysis of CPSs with strategic agents.
6.2.1 Games among Teams of Agents
Throughout this dissertation, we assumed that agents are selfish and have ob-
jectives that are different from each other and that of the designer. While this
framework provides a general model to study CPSs with strategic and cooperative
(non-strategic) agents, it does not consider explicitly situations where a group of
agents have selfish objectives at a lower level but share a common objective at a
higher level. For instance, in a networked system each agent/community might have
a selfish objective at the microscopic level but all agents act as a team to protect
the overall operation of the networked system against external attacks at the macro-
scopic level; e.g. in a power grid, every generator tries to maximize his own revenue,
but at a network level all generators try to ensure the stability and reliability of the
power grid and protect it against malicious and/or accidental disruptions.
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A possible approach to study this class of problems is to investigate the problem
at the microscopic level as a game among agents, and the problem at the macroscopic
level as a game among teams of agents (e.g. attacker vs. defender). As we discussed
in Chapter 5, the methodology proposed in this dissertation can be used to study
dynamic games among teams of agents. We believe that investigations of this class
of problems can provide valuable insights towards a better design of resilient CPSs
that effectively respond to external disruptions.
6.2.2 Cyber-Physical-Social Systems and Bounded Rationality
Over the last few years, the emerging CPSs cease to be merely technological
systems as they interact more than ever with human users and can be viewed as
cyber-physical-social systems. In this dissertation, we attempted to study this new
class of socio-technological systems assuming that the users in these systems act as
rational Bayesian agents. This assumption enabled us to formulate stylized models
and provide analytical results that help to better understand the key ideas in the
design and analysis of CPSs with strategic agents. However, in many of these sys-
tems, the assumption that a normal human user acts as a rational Bayesian agent
is inaccurate. For instance, a human user tends to develop habits over time or does
not form his belief according to Bayesian inference methods [110, 107]. Therefore,
it is important to develop models that take into account the human users’ bounded
rationality, validate the models with real-data, and investigate how existing results
for rational Bayesian agents translate into these models.
6.2.3 Learning in CPS and Strategic Experimentation
The recent advances in data collection, storage, and processing technologies have
created new opportunities for the application of data-driven techniques in the de-
sign and analysis of CPSs. However, many of these techniques assume a passive
data generation process that is not affected by the design and the agents’ strategic
responses to it. In many of CPSs with strategic agents, the data available to the
designer is generated by the agents’ strategic behavior that incorporate the various
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effects of the data they generate on the overall characteristics of the CPS. For in-
stance, there are empirical evidences about fake user-generated data in Waze App
that attempt to trick the system into keeping the traffic out of certain residential
areas [52, 94, 103] or hiding the police locations [45]. Therefore, it is important
to consider the agents’ strategic behavior when we use data-driven methods for the
analysis and design of CPSs with strategic agents. Investigating agents’ incentives
in various environments where they strategically experiment and try to influence the
outcome these methods [54, 22] would provide valuable insights into the design and





Proofs of Chapter 2




EW {t(x′)− C(q(x′),x,W )} (A.1)
By applying the envelope theorem [84] on (A.1), we get
∂U
∂xi






The above equation along with the assumption on the monotonicity of the marginal
expected cost c(q,x) with respect to xi gives
∂U
∂xi
≤ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m (A.3)
∂U
∂xi
≥ 0,m < i ≤ n. (A.4)
Proof of lemma 2.2. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that there exist x,x′ ∈ χ
such that q(x) = q(x′) but t(x′) > t(x). Then a seller with type x is always better off
by reporting x′ instead of her true type x, which contradicts the IC constraint.
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Proof of Lemma 2.3. Consider the buyer’s objective (2.7). For any function t(·), we
can determine from (2.14) the cumulative distribution function for q∗, called Fq∗ .
Consequently, we can rewrite the buyer’s objective as













(Fq∗(l)− 1) (V(l)− t(l))|∞0 = −t(0) (A.6)
because V(0) = 0 by assumption, and (Fq∗(∞)− 1) = 0.
Because of (A.6), we can rewrite (A.5) as
Eq∗ [V(q∗)− t(q∗)] =
∫ ∞
0
P (q∗ ≥ l) (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl
−t(0) (A.7)
where V ′(l) = dV(l)
dl
.
We can rewrite P (q∗ ≥ l) as







We implicitly assume that the seller’s problem given by (2.14) is continuous and







Therefore, from the optimality of q∗(x) and the quasi-concavity of (2.14), we must
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have p(l) > c(l; x) and p(l) < c(l; x) for l < q ∗ (x) and l > q∗(x), respectively. That
is, each type of the seller wishes to produce more than quantity l if and only if the
marginal price p(q) that she is paid at l is higher than the expected marginal cost of
production c(l,x) that she incurs at l. Consequently, combining (A.8) and (A.9) we
obtain
P (q∗ ≥ l) = P [x∈χ|p(l) ≥ c(l,x)] . (A.10)






(V ′(l)−p(l)) dl− t(0). (A.11)
Proof of lemma 2.4. Let x,x′ ∈ χ, where x is a better type than x′. From IC for




Similarly from IC for seller’s type x′ we have
t(q(x′))− EW {C(q(x′),x′,W )}
≥
t(q(x))− EW {C(q(x),x′,W )} (A.13)
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Subtracting (A.13) from (A.12), we get
EW {C(q(x),x′,W )} − EW {C(q(x′),x′,W )}
≥
EW {C(q(x),x,W )} − EW {C(q(x′),x,W )} (A.14)





if x is a better type than x′. Therefore,
(A.14) holds if and only if
q(x) ≥ q(x′). (A.15)
Proof of corollary 2.2. Because of corollary 2.1, the VP constraint implies
U(x) = t(q(x))− EW [C(q∗(x),x,W )] = 0, (A.16)




p(l)dl = EW [C(q∗(x),x,W )] . (A.17)
Furthermore, from Lemma 2.4 it follows that if the worst type wishes to produce
more than q∗(x), then all types produce more than q∗(x). Therefore,
P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l,x)] = 1, for l ≤ q∗(x). (A.18)















P [x ∈ χ|p(l) ≥ c(l,x)] (V ′(l)− p(l)) dl. (A.19)
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The term t(0) +
∫ q∗(x)
0
p(l)dl appears in both the objective (A.19) and the VP
constraint (A.17). Therefore, without loss of optimality, we can assume t(0) =
C(0,x), and set t(q(x)) = EW {C(q(x),x,W )}.
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter 3
B.1 Proofs of the Main Results
The proofs of Theorems 3.1-3.5 are based on Lemmas B.1-B.7 that we state below.
The proofs of Lemmas B.1-B.7 are given in Appendix B.2.




First, we prove the following sufficient and necessary condition for the IC2 con-
straint (reporting the true ω) for the dynamic mechanism.
Lemma B.1 (revenue equivalence). If the dynamic mechanism is incentive compat-
ible, and the allocation rule q(τ, ω) is continuous in ω, then, for all ω and ώ,
Rτ,ω = Rτ,ώ −
∫ ω
ώ
Cθ(q(τ, ω̂); Θ(τ, ω̂))Θω(τ, ω̂)dω̂, (B.1)
and q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω. Moreover, if (B.1) holds and q(τ, ω) is increasing in
ω, then IC2 is satisfied.
We can now provide the proof for Theorem 3.1 using the result of Lemma B.1.
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Proof of Theorem 3.1. We note that the IC constraint (3.8) for the real-time
mechanisms implies the IC2 constraint for the dynamic mechanism (given by (3.11)),
by setting τ̂ = τ . By Lemma B.1, the IC2 constraint for the dynamic mechanism is
satisfied only if equation (3.13) holds.
Lemma B.1 characterizes the seller’s revenue in the dynamic mechanism given
that he tells the truth at T = 1 about his technology τ . To complete the charac-
terization of the seller’s optimal strategy at T = 2, we show, via Lemma B.2 below,
that if the seller misreports his technology at T = 1 (off-equilibrium path), he later
corrects his lie at T =2.
Lemma B.2. Consider the dynamic mechanism that satisfies the IC constraints for
ω and τ . If a seller with technology τ misreports τ̂ , τ̂ 6= τ , at T = 1, then, for every
wind realization ω at T = 2, he corrects his lie by reporting ω̂ = σ∗(τ̂ ; τ, ω) such that,
Θ(τ, ω) = Θ(τ̂ , ω̂). (B.2)
Remark: Note that by Assumption 3.2 on non-shifting support, for any τ, τ̂ , ω,
there exists a unique ω̂ (given the strict monotonicity of Θ(τ, ω) in ω) that satisfies
equation (B.2), and σ∗(τ̂ ; τ, ω) is well defined.
Using the results of Lemmas B.1 and B.2, we characterize below the seller’s
expected gain by misreporting his technology at T =1 in the dynamic mechanism.
Lemma B.3. For the dynamic mechanism that satisfies the set of IC constraints for
ω and τ , the maximum utility of the seller with technology τ reporting τ̂ at T = 1 is
given by,
Eω{t(τ̂ , σ∗(τ̂ ; τ, ω))− C(q(τ̂ , σ∗(τ̂ ; τ, ω)); Θ(τ, ω))}
= Rτ̂−
∫ ∫ σ∗(τ̂ ;τ,ω)
ω
Cθ(q(τ̂ , ω̂); Θ(τ̂ , ω̂))Θω(τ̂ , ω̂)dω̂dG(ω) (B.3)
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The following result, for the dynamic mechanism, characterizes the payments
that incentivize the seller to report truthfully his technology τ and wind speed ω.
Lemma B.4. For the dynamic mechanism, the set of IC constraints for τ , given by
(3.10), can be replaced by the following inequality constraints,
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj, τi; q)+RW(τj, τi; q) ∀i, j∈{2, ..,M}, i>j.
To provide the proof for Theorems 3.2-3.3, we need the following results for the
forward and the real-time mechanisms.
Lemma B.5. For the forward mechanism, the set of IC constraints and IR con-
straints, given by (3.6) and (3.7), respectively, can be replaced by the following con-
straints,
q(τ) only depends on τ
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M},
Rτ1 ≥ 0.
Lemma B.6. For the real-time mechanism, the set of IC and IR constraints given
by (3.8) and (3.9), respectively, can be replaced by the following constraints,
q(τ, ω) only depends on Θ(τ, ω)
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q)+RW(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M − 1},
Rτ1 ≥ RP (τ1; q),
and the seller’s revenue satisfies (3.13).
Using the result of Lemmas B.4-B.6, we first provide the proof for Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. We first show that RT(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 and RW(τj,τi;q)≥ 0 for
i, j ∈ {1, ...,M}, i > j (strict if q(τj,ω) 6=0 for some ω).
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First, note that by Assumption 3.1 we have Θ(τi, ω) < Θ(τj, ω) for i > j. Thus,





with strict inequality if q(τj, ω) > 0 for a set of ω’s with positive probability.
Second, we have Cθ(q(τj, ω); Θ(τj, ω̂)) ≤ Cθ(q(τj, ω̂); Θ(τj, ω̂)) for ω ≤ ω̂ since
q(τ ; ω̂) is increasing in ω̂ by Lemma B.1 and C(q, θ) is increasing in q by Assumption







since Θω(τj,ω̂)<0; the inequality is strict if q(τj, ω) > 0 for a set of ω’s with positive
probability.
In the following, we provide the proof for each part of Theorem 3.2 separately.
a) The proof for part (a) directly follows from the result of Lemma B.5.
b) The proof for part (b) directly follows from the result of Lemma B.6.
c) By the result of Theorem 3.1, the set of IC constraints (3.11) can be replaced by
(3.21,3.22). Moreover, by the result of Lemma B.4, we can reduce the set of IC
constraints (3.10) to the set of inequality constraints (3.23).
Furthermore, set of inequality constraints (3.23) implies that Rτ1 ≤ Rτ2 ≤ ... ≤
RτM since RT (τi−1, τi; q) ≥ 0 and RW (τi−1, τi; q) ≥ 0. Thus, the set of IR con-
straints (3.12) can be reduced to Rτ1 ≥ 0.
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Next, we provide the proof for Theorem 3.3.
Proof of Theorem 3.3. The proof directly follows from the result of Theorem 3.2.
We note that the objective functions in all the mechanism design problems are W ,
and the problems differ only in the set of constraints they have to satisfy.
• The set of constraints for the real-time mechanism, given by part (b) of Theo-
rem 3.2, is more restrictive than the set of constraints for the dynamic mech-
anism given by part (c) of Theorem 3.2. Therefore, the designer’s objective
Wdyanmic is higher than his objective Wreal-time.
• The set of constraints for the forward mechanism, given by part (a) of Theorem
3.2, is more restrictive than the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanisms,
given by part (c) of Theorem 3.2. Therefore, the designer’s objective Wdyanmic
is higher than his objective W forward.
We now provide the proof of Theorem 3.4 on the dynamic mechanism with no
penalty.
Proof of Theorem 3.4. (i) We note that the set of IC constraints (3.27,3.28)
for the dynamic mechanism with no penalty is identical to the set of IC constraints
(3.27,3.28) for dynamic mechanism. Therefore, constraints (3.30-3.32) directly follow
from the result of part (c) of Theorem 3.2.
Next, we show that the set of IR constraints (3.29) is satisfied if and only ifRτi,ω ≥
RP (τi; q) and the seller’s revenue satisfies (3.13). First, by part (i) of Theorem 3.1,
we have Rτ,ω is increasing in ω. Hence, the set of IR constraints (3.29) is satisfied
if and only if Rτi,ω ≥ 0, for all i ∈ {1, ...,M}. Second, using (3.13) along with
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[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τi, ω̂); Θ(τi, ω̂))Θω(τi, ω̂)dω̂
= RP (τi; q).
Thus, the set of IR constraints (3.29) is satisfied if and only if (3.33) is satisfied.
(ii) We note that the objective functions in all the mechanism design problems are
W , and the problems differ only in the set of constraints they have to satisfy. The set
of constraints for the real-time mechanism, given by part (b) of Theorem 3.2, is more
restrictive than the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty,
given by part (i) above. Therefore, the designer’s objectiveWdyanmic no penalty is higher
than his objective Wreal-time. Moreover, the set of constraints for the dynamic mech-
anism, given by part (c) of Theorem 3.2, is less restrictive than the set of constraints
for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty, given by part (i) above. Therefore,
the designer’s objective Wdyanmic no penalty is lower than his objective Wdynamic.
To provide the proof for Theorem 3.5, we need the following result for the dynamic
mechanism with monitoring.
Lemma B.7. For the dynamic mechanism with monitoring, the set of IC and IR
constraints, given by (3.34) and (3.35), respectively, can be replaced by the following
constraints,
Rτi−Rτi−1 =RT(τi−1, τi; q) ∀i∈{2, ..,M − 1},
Rτ1 ≥ 0.
Using the result of Lemma B.7, we provide the proof of Theorem 3.5 below.
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Proof of Theorem 3.5. (i) The proof for part (i) directly follows from the result
of Lemma B.7.
(ii) The objective functions in all the mechanism design problems are W , and
the problems differ only in the set of constraints they have to satisfy. The set of
constraints for the dynamic mechanism, given by part (c) of Theorem 3.2, is more
restrictive than the set of constraints for the dynamic mechanisms with monitoring,
given by part (i) above. Therefore, the designer’s objective Wdyanmic with monitoring is
higher than Wdynamic. Moreover, by the result of Theorems 3.3 and 3.4, we have
Wdynamic ≥ Wdynamic no penalty ≥ Wreal-time and Wdynamic ≥ W forward.
(iii) Define the following modified payment function:
t̂(τ,ω) :=Eω{t(τ,ω)}+(C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))−Eω{C(q(τ,ω);Θ(τ,ω))}) .
We have Eω{t̂(τ, ω)} = Eω{t(τ, ω)}. Thus, the seller’s strategic report for τ at T =1
does not change. Consider a modified mechanism with the modified payment function
t̂(τ, ω) and the original allocation function q(τ, ω). This modified mechanism satisfies
the set of IC constraint for τ and it satisfies the ex-post IR constraint, i.e.,
Rτ,ω = Eω{t(τ, ω)} − Eω {C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))} = Rτ ≥ 0.
We note that with the monitoring of ω, the modified mechanism keeps the same
allocation function, and therefore, results in the same designer’s objectiveW , seller’s
revenue R, and buyer’s utility U .
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B.2 Proof of Lemmas
Proof of Lemma B.1. Assume that the IC for ω and ω̆ is satisfied. Then,
t(τ, ω)− C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)) ≥ t(τ, ω̆)− C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω)),
t(τ, ω̆)− C(q(τ, ω̆; Θ(τ, ω̆)) ≥ t(τ, ω)− C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω̆)).
Therefore,
C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω̆))−C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω))≤Rτ,ω−Rτ,ω̆
≤C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω̆))−C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω)). (B.4)
Set ω̆ = ω− ε where ε→ 0. We have ∂Rτ,ω
∂ω
=Cθ(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))Θω(τ, ω).
Moreover, (B.4) implies that q(τ, ω̆) < q(τ, ω) for ω̆ < ω, since by assumption
Θ(τ, ω) is decreasing in ω and C(q̂; θ) is convex and increasing in q̂.
To prove the converse, assume that (B.1) holds and q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω.
Then, for any τ, ω, ω̆, we have
Rτ,ω−[t(τ, ω̆)− C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω))]= (B.5)




Cθ(q(τ, ω̂); Θ(τ, ω̂))Θω(τ, ω̂)dω̂
−[C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω̆))−C(q(τ, ω̆); Θ(τ, ω))] ≥ 0,
where the last last inequality is true since Cθ(q; θ) is increasing in θ, Θ(τ, ω) is
decreasing in ω, and q(τ, ω) is increasing in ω.
Proof of Lemma B.2. We first note that by Assumption 3.2 and the monotonicity
of Θ(τ̂ , ω̂) in ω, there exists a unique ω̂ such that Θ(τ, ω) = Θ(τ̂ , ω̂), i.e. σ∗(τ̂ ; τ, ω)
is well defined.
Now, consider a seller with technology τ̂ and wind realization ω̂. Then, the IC2
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constraint requires
t(τ̂ , ω̂)−C(q(τ̂ , ω̂);Θ(τ̂ , ω̂))≥ t(τ̂ , ω′)−C(q(τ̂ , ω′);Θ(τ̂ , ω̂)) ∀ω′.
Replacing Θ(τ̂ , ω̂) by Θ(τ, ω) in the above equation, we get
t(τ̂ , ω̂)−C(q(τ̂ , ω̂);Θ(τ, ω))≥ t(τ̂ , ω′)−C(q(τ̂ , ω′);Θ(τ, ω)) ∀ω′.
Now, consider a seller with technology τ that misreported τ̂ at T =1, and has a wind
realization ω at T = 2. The above inequality asserts that it is optimal for him to
report ω̂ at T =2 so that Θ(τ, ω) = Θ(τ̂ , ω̂).
Proof of Lemma B.3. We have,




Using Lemma B.2, we get∫






Rτ̂ ,σ∗(τ̂ ;τ,ω)dG(ω). (B.7)
Then, by Lemma B.1,∫














Cθ(q(τ̂ , ω̂); Θ(τ̂ , ω̂))Θω(τ̂ , ω̂)dω̂dG(ω). (B.9)
The assertion of Lemma B.3 follows from (B.6)-(B.9).
Proof of Lemma B.4. We first prove that the set of IC constraints for τ given by
(3.10) can be reduced to Rτi−Rτj ≥RT(τj, τi; q)+RW for all i, j∈{2, ..,M}. Next,
we show that the set of IC constraints for τ can be further reduced to Rτi−Rτj ≥
RT(τj, τi; q)+RW(τj, τi; q) for only i>j, i, j∈{2, ..,M}.






















Cθ(q(τj, ω); Θ(τj, ω̂))Θω(τj, ω̂)dω̂dG(ω), (B.11)
where the third equality results from a change of variable from θ̂ to ω̂ as θ̂ := Θ(ω̂, τj).
Note that Θ(τi, ω) = Θ(τj, σ
∗(τj; τi, ω)) by Lemma B.2, thus, the new boundaries of
integration with respect to ω̂ in (B.11) are given by σ∗(τj; τi, ω) and ω .
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Adding RT(τj, τi; q), given by (B.11), to R
W (τj, τi; q), we obtain,




Cθ(q(τj, ω̂); Θ(τj, ω̂))Θω(τj, ω̂)dω̂dG(ω), (B.12)
which is equal to RHS of (B.10).
Now we show that the set of IC constraints for τ can be further reduced to
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj, τi; q)+RW(τj, τi; q) for only i>j, i, j∈{1, ..,M}.
Using (B.12), we can write the set of inequality constraints (B.10) as,
RT (τj, τi; q)+RW (τj, τi; q)
≤Rτi−Rτj≤
−RT (τi, τj; q)−RW (τi, τj; q) ∀i, j∈{1, ...,M}, i>j, (B.13)
where the lower bound is from IC1 constraint that ensures τi does not report τj, and
the upper bound is from the IC1 constraint that ensures τj does not report τi. We
note that allocation q(τ, ω) is implementable if and only if the set of constraints de-
scribed by (B.13) has a feasible solution for Rτi , i∈{1, 2, ..,M}. Given an allocation
rule q(τ, ω), the set of constraints given by (B.13), has a feasible solutions only if for














≤ −RT(τkm,τk1 ;q)−RW(τkm,τk1 ;q). (B.14)
In the following, we show that for a given implementable allocation q(τ, ω), the
set of constraints (B.13) can be reduced to
Rτi−Rτj≥RT(τj,τi;q)+RW(τj,τi;q) ∀i,j∈{1, ...,M}, i>j. (B.15)
We note thatW = S − (1−α)R, for α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, for a given allocation
function q(τ, ω), the designer wants to minimize R. Let R∗τ denote the optimal
seller’s revenue that satisfies (B.15) for a given implementable allocation function
q(τ, ω). Construct a graph with M nodes, where there is an edge between node i
and j if (B.15) is binding for i and j, i > j.
First, we note that the resulting graph must be connected. If not, then there exist
at least two unconnected clusters of nodes. Consider a cluster that does not include
node 1. Then one can reduce the value of R∗τ by ε > 0 for all the nodes in that
cluster without violating any of the constraints (B.15), and improve the outcome of
the mechanism by reducing the seller’s revenue R.
Now, assume that the optimal seller’s revenue R∗τ that is determined by only
considering the set of constraints (B.15), does not satisfy the set of constraints (B.13).
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 −RT (τi, τj; q)−RW (τi, τj; q).
Let C = {(i, k1), (k1, k2), · · · , (km, j)} denote a path between node i and node j in







RT (τk̂, τk; q) +R
W (τk̂, τk; q)
 −RT (τi, τj; q)−RW (τi, τj; q), (B.16)
which contradicts (B.14).







=Rτj+RT (τj,τi; q) ∀i, j ∈ {1, ...,M},
where the last equality holds by definition. We proceed as follows. We first consider a
relaxed version of the forward mechanism design problem. We determine the solution
to the relaxed problem, and show it is also a feasible solution for the original forward
mechanism design problem.
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Rτi ≥ 0, i∈{1, ...,M}, (B.18)
where we only include the set of IC constraints that ensures a seller with type τi does
not report type τi−1, and the other IC constraints are omitted.
Note that Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi−1,ω))} ≥ Eω{C(q(τi−1);Θ(τi,ω))} since Θ(τi−1,ω) ≥
Θ(τi,ω) by Assumption 3.1. Thus, from (B.17) we have Rτi ≥ Rτj for i > j. The
designer’s objective is W = S − (1−α)R. Therefore, for a given allocation function
q(τ, ω), the designer wants to minimize Rτi i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}. Therefore, at the
















Substituting Rτi , 1≤ i≤M , we get















































By maximizing the above expression with respect to q(τi) and using the first-order











The above equation has a unique solution since the LHS is decreasing in q by the
concavity of V(q), and the RHS is increasing in q by Assumption 3.1. Moreover, note
that the RHS is decreasing in i by Assumption 3.1, therefore, q(τi) > q(τj) for i > j.
Now, we show that the optimal solution to the relaxed problem satisfies the
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omitted constraints. Consider the IC constraint for type τi reporting τj. We need to
show that the utility of a seller with technology τi is higher when he reports truthfully
than his utility from misreporting τj. That is,
Rτi − [t(τj)− Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}] =Rτi−Rτj
+[Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τi, ω))}−Eω{C(q(τj); Θ(τj, ω))}]≥0.
For i > j, we can write,





















since q(τk) ≥ q(τj) and C(q̂; Θ(τk, ω)) − C(q̂; Θ(τk+1, ω)) is increasing in q̂ by As-
sumption 3.1.
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Similarly for i < j, we have,
























where the last inequality is true since q(τk) ≤ q(τj) for k ≤ j, and C(q̂;Θ(τk,ω))−
C(q̂;Θ(τk+1,ω)) is increasing in q̂ by Assumption 3.1.
Proof of Lemma B.6. First we note that in the real-time mechanism the seller
reports τ and ω simultaneously, and his cost only depends Θ(τ, ω). Therefore, al-
location function q(τ, ω) and payment function t(τ, ω) must only depend on Θ(τ, ω)
rather than exact values of τ and ω. Therefore, the mechanism design problem can
be written only in terms of θ, where the buyer designs {q(θ), t(θ)}, and asks the seller
to report θ instead of (τ, ω). The reformulation of the real-time mechanism in terms





IC : Rθ ≥ t(θ̂)− C(q(θ̂); θ), ∀θ, (B.22)
IR : Rθ ≥ 0, ∀θ. (B.23)
Claim B.1. The sets of IC constraints (B.22) and IR constraints (B.23) are satisfied
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if and only if
∂Rθ
∂θ
= −Cθ(q(θ); θ), (B.24)
Rθ ≥ 0, (B.25)
and q(θ) is decreasing in θ.
We prove the result of Claim B.1 below. Assume (B.22) is true. Consider the
following two IC constraints, where the first one requires that a seller with type θ
does not gain by misreporting θ̂, and the second one requires that a seller with true
type θ̂ does not gain by misreporting θ.
t(θ̂)− C(q(θ̂); θ̂) ≥ t(θ)− C(q(θ); θ̂),
t(θ)− C(q(θ); θ) ≥ t(θ̂)− C(q(θ̂); θ).
By subtracting the above two IC constraints, we obtain,
C(q(θ̂); θ̂)−C(q(θ̂); θ)≤Rθ−Rθ̂≤C(q(θ); θ̂)−C(q(θ); θ). (B.26)
Let θ̂ = θ + ε and take ε→ 0. Then ∂Rθ
∂θ
= −Cθ(q(θ); θ). Moreover, by (B.26),
C(q(θ̂); θ̂)−C(q(θ̂); θ)≤C(q(θ); θ̂)−C(q(θ); θ),
which along with Assumption 3.1, implies that q(θ)>q(θ̂) for θ<θ̂.
Furthermore, by Assumption 3.1 ∂Rθ
∂θ
= −Cθ(q(θ);θ) ≤ 0. Therefore, (B.23) is
satisfied if and only if Rθ≥0.
To prove the converse, assume that (B.24) and (B.25) hold and q(θ) is decreasing



















where the second equality follows from (B.24) and the last inequality is true since
Cθ(q̂; θ) is decreasing in θ by Assumption 3.1, and q(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Moreover, we have Rθ = Rθ −
∫ θ
θ
Cθ(q(θ̂); θ̂)dθ̂≥ 0. This completes the proof of
Claim 1.
We note that q(τ, ω) only depends on Θ(τ, ω). Thus, the sets of constraints given
by (B.24) and (3.13) are equivalent.
Next, we show that we can replace the set of IR constraints (3.9) by Rτ1 =
RP (τ1; q). Equation (B.26) implies that Rθ ≥ Rθ̂ for θ < θ̂, since q(θ) is decreasing
in θ. That is, RΘ(τ1,ω) ≤ Rθ̂ for all θ̂. Thus, the set of IR constraints (3.9) is satisfied


















[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τ1, ω̂); Θ(τ1, ω̂))Θω(τ1, ω̂)dω̂
= RP (τ1; q).



















Cθ(q(τ̂ , ω̂); Θ(τ̂ , ω̂))Θω(τ̂ , ω̂)dω̂dG(ω)
which is the same as the RHS of (B.10). Thus, from the proof of Lemma B.4, we
have Rτi −Rτi−1 = RT (τi−1, τi; q) +RW (τi−1, τi; q).
Proof of Lemma B.7. The IC constraint (3.34) for the dynamic mechanism with
monitoring is given by,
Eω{Rτi,ω}≥Eω{t(τj, ω)−C(q(τj,ω);Θ(τi,ω))} ∀τ,τj.
We can rewrite the above IC constraint as,




= RT (τj, τi; q) ∀τi,τj.
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Therefore, we can replace the set of IC constraints (3.34) by Rτi−Rτi ≥ RT (τj, τi; q)
for all i, j ∈ [1, ...,M ].
Using an argument similar to that of the proof of Lemma B.4, we can further
reduce the set of IC constraints to Rτi−Rτj ≥ RT(τj, τi; q) for only i > j, i, j ∈
{1, ..,M}.
205
B.3 Closed Form Solutions
In this appendix, we provide closed form solutions for the mechanism design
problems formulated in Sections 3.4 and 3.6.
B.3.1 The forward mechanism
Using the results of Lemmas B.5, the optimal allocation q(τ) is given by the
unique solution to the following equation,




















Proof. The proof follows directly from equations (B.19,B.20) (in the proof of Lemma
B.5), which determine the optimal allocation function q(τ) and the seller’s revenue
Rτ .
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B.3.2 The real-time mechanism
Using the result of Lemma B.6, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is given by the
unique solution to the following equation,1
v(q) = c(q; Θ(τ, ω)) + (1− α)F (Θ(τ, ω))
f(Θ(τ, ω))
cθ(q; Θ(τ, ω));
the optimal payment function t(τ, ω) is given by,
t(τ, ω)=C(q(τ, ω); Θ(τ, ω))+Rτ,ω









by setting Rθ = Rτ1,ω = 0. Let F (θ) :=
∑M
i=1 piFi(θ) and f(θ) :=
∑M
i=1 pifi(θ).
Then, we can write,

























1We assume that c(q; θ) + (1−α)F (θ)f(θ) cθ(q; θ) is increasing in q for all θ.
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Hence, using Claim B.1 in the proof of Lemma B.6, we can rewrite the optimization










q(θ) is decreasing in θ.
Consider a relaxed version of the above optimization problem by ignoring the mono-
tonicity constraint on q(θ). The optimal solution q(θ) to the relaxed problem is
determined by maximizing the integrand in (B.28) for each θ, and is given by unique
solution to the following equation,
v(q) = c(q; θ) + (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
cθ(q; θ). (B.29)
We note that if c(q; θ) + (1−α)F (θ)
f(θ)
cθ(q; θ) is increasing in θ, then the optimal q(θ)
determined above is decreasing in θ, and thus, automatically satisfies the ignored
monotonicity condition on q(θ).
B.3.3 The dynamic mechanism with monitoring
Using the results of Lemma B.7, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is given by the











the optimal payment function t(τi, ω), i∈ {1, 2, ...,M} is given by,
t(τi, ω)=C(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))+Rτi,ω








Proof. Using the result of Lemma B.7, the dynamic mechanism with monitoring is
given by the solution to the following optimization problem,
max W
subject to
Rτi −Rτi−1 = RT (τi−1, τi; q), i∈{2, ...,M},
Rτ1 ≥ 0.
Note that W = S − (1−α)R. As a result, at the optimal solution of the relaxed
problem we have,
Rτi = Rτi−1 +RT (τi−1, τi; q), i∈{2, ...,M},
Rτ1 = 0.
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Substituting Rτi , 1≤ i≤M , we obtain,























































By maximizing the integrand point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω) and using the first-
order condition, we find that the optimal value of q(τi, ω) is determined by the
following equation,









The above equation has a unique solution since the LHS is decreasing in q by the
concavity of V(q), and the RHS is increasing in q by Assumption 3.1.
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B.3.4 The dynamic mechanism
For the dynamic mechanism there exists no closed form solution for arbitrary M
and parameters of the model, since the set of binding constraints from the inequal-
ity constraints given by (3.23) cannot be determined a priori, and depends on the
allocation function q(τ, ω) (see [12] for more discussion). However, for the case with
two possible technologies, i.e. M = 2, we provide the closed form solutions for the
dynamic mechanism in the following.





cθ(q̂;Θ(τ1,ω)) is increasing in q̂, for all
ω, the optimal allocation q(τ, ω) is given by the unique solution to the following
equations,
v(q(τ2,ω))=c(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω)) (B.30)










the optimal payment function t(τi, ω), is given by,












[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τ2, ω̂);Θ(τ2, ω̂))Θω(τ2, ω̂)dω̂, (B.32)








[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τ1, ω̂);Θ(τ1, ω̂))Θω(τ1, ω̂)dω̂. (B.33)
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Proof. The designer’s objective isW = S−(1−α)R. Therefore, given an allocation
function q(τ, ω), the designer wants to minimize the information rent Rτ such that
it satisfies the conditions of part (c) of Theorem 3.2. For M = 2, we have Rτ1 = 0
and Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q). Using the results of Lemma B.1 and B.4, we
can rewrite the dynamic mechanism design problem as,
max
q(·,·),t(·,·)
pτ2Sτ2 − (1− α)pτ2Rτ2 + pτ1Sτ1
subject to
Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q),
∂Rτ2,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ2, ω); Θ(τ2, ω))Θω(τ2, ω), (B.34)
∂Rτ1,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τ1, ω); Θ(τ1, ω))Θω(τ1, ω), (B.35)
q(τ2, ω) and q(τ1, ω) are increasing in ω. (B.36)




pτ2Sτ2 − (1− α)pτ2Rτ2 + pτ1Sτ1 (B.37)
subject to
Rτ2 =RT (τ1, τ2; q)+RW (τ1, τ2; q). (B.38)
Below, we determine the solution to the above relaxed problem and show that its
optimal solution also solves the original dynamic mechanism design problems. Using
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where the second equality results from changing the order of integration and
σ∗(τ1;τ2,σ


























By maximizing the integrands point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω) and using the first
order condition, i = 1, 2, we obtain equations (B.30) and (B.31). We note that the






Cθ(q;Θ(τ1,ω)) is increasing in q. Moreover,
the allocation function q(τ2, ω), given by (B.30), is increasing in ω by Assumption
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3.1. Therefore, the omitted constraint (B.36) in the original optimization problem is
satisfied automatically.
Below, we construct payment function t(τi, ω), i = 1, 2, such that the omit-
ted constraints (B.34) and (B.35) are satisfied, Eω{t(τ2,ω)−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))} =
RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q), and Eω{t(τ1,ω)−C(q(τ1,ω);Θ(τ1,ω))}=0. Define,








[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τ2, ω̂);Θ(τ2, ω̂))Θω(τ2, ω̂)dω̂, (B.39)








[1−G(ω̂)]Cθ(q(τ1, ω̂);Θ(τ1, ω̂))Θω(τ1, ω̂)dω̂. (B.40)
By the above definition, we have
∂Rτi,ω
∂ω
= Cθ(q(τi, ω); Θ(τi, ω))Θω(τi, ω) for i = 1, 2.





















where the second equality results from changing the order of integration. Similarly,
Eω{t(τ2,ω)−C(q(τ2,ω);Θ(τ2,ω))} = RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q).
Substituting RT(τ2,τ1;q)+RW(τ2,τ1;q) in (B.39) using (B.12), we obtain (B.32) and
(B.33).
B.3.5 The dynamic mechanism with no penalty
Similar to the dynamic mechanism, for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty
there exists no closed form solution for arbitrary M and parameters of the model,
since the set of binding constraints from the inequality constraints, given by (3.32),
cannot be determined a priori, and it depends on allocation function q(τ, ω). More-
over, for the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty, we face additional difficulties by
imposing ex-post individual rationality, which results in the additional set of con-
straints (3.33) on the information rent. As a result, unlike the dynamic mechanism,
we cannot determine a priori the set of binding constraints from the ones given by
(3.32) and (3.33) even for M = 2.
For M = 2, the dynamic mechanisms with no penalty is given by the solution to


















[1−G(ω)]Cθ(q(τ2,ω̂);Θ(τ2,ω̂))Θω(τ2,ω̂)dω̂ ≥ 0. (B.44)
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The last two constraints result from using the results of part (d) of Theorem 3.2
(equation (3.33)) along with the result of Lemma B.1, and setting Rτi,ω ≥ 0, for
i = 1, 2. We note that constraint (B.43) is written as an equality (binding) constraint
(unlike (B.44)) since for any value of Rτ1 that does not bind (B.43), we can reduce
the value of Rτ1 by ε > 0 without violating any other constraints and improve the
objective function (B.41).
In the following, we determine the solution to the above optimization problem
for the specific example considered in Section 3.7. We have, C(q; θ) = θq, Θ(τ1, ω) =
(1− ω), Θ(τ1, ω) = (1− ω)2, V(q) = q − 12q
2, and G(ω) = ω for ω ∈ [0, 1].




q(τ1, ω)(1− ω)dω. (B.45)
It can be shown that constraints (B.44) is binding at the optimal solution.2 When




q(τ2, ω)2(1− ω)2dω. (B.46)



















1− ω̂ − (1− ω̂)
]
q(τ1, ω̂)dω̂, (B.47)
where the first equality results from (B.12), and the second equality results from
changing the order of integration.
2To show this, one can solve the optimization problem (B.41) relaxing the constraint (B.44),
and show that the optimal solution violates the constraint (B.44).
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Using (B.45) and (B.46), we can rewrite (B.47) as,∫ 1
0
[




dω ≥ 0. (B.48)




























where we replaced constraint (B.42) by (B.48).

























Maximizing the integrands point-wise with respect to q(τi, ω), i = 1, 2, using the
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first order conditions and setting V(q) = q − 1
2
q2, we obtain,
q(τ2, ω) = max{1− (3−2α−2λ)(1−ω)2, 0}, (B.50)
q(τ1, ω) = max{1− (2−α)(1−ω)−λ
√
1− ω, 0}. (B.51)









dω = 0. (B.52)
By numerical evaluation, λ = 0 for α ≥ 0.07 and λ > 0 for α ≤ 0.07.






Therefore, for α = 0.5, we have,
q(τ2, ω) = max{1−2(1−ω)2, 0}, (B.53)
q(τ1, ω) = max{1− 1.5(1−ω), 0}. (B.54)











Proofs of Chapter 4
Proof of Theorem 4.1. Given a public information disclosure mechanisms (M, ψ),
define W̄ (m) as the expected social welfare conditioned on the realization of message






































W = E{W̄ (M)} = E
{














where the last equality holds by the smoothing property of conditional expectation.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. We have xr(θ) = 1− xs(θ). Thus,
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Uσ(s, θ) = a− xs(θ) = a− 1 + xr(θ),
Uσ(r, θ) = θ − xr(θ) = θ − 1 + xs(θ).





















− xs(θ)) ≥ 0.
Similarly, obedience condition (4.19) is satisfied if and only if,∑
θ∈Θ
pθx

















− xr(θ)) ≥ 0.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. By Lemma 4.1, the efficient routing policy in implementable
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2∆ + ∆2 + σ2 ≥ 0,
and
− 2∆ + ∆2 + σ2 ≥ 0.
By combining the last two inequalities, we establish the result.
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Appendix D
Proofs of Chapter 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. For any given consistent CIB assessment (σ∗, γ), let g∗ denote
the behavioral strategy profile constructed according to (5.17). In the following, we
construct recursively a belief system µ that is consistent with g∗ and satisfies (5.18).
For t = 1, we have P i1 = Y
i











For t > 1, if Pg
∗
µit−1
{hit|hit−1} > 0 (i.e. no deviation from g∗t−1 at t − 1), define µit














For t > 1, if Pg
∗
µit−1
























t , ct) for all j ∈ N .
At t = 1, (5.18) holds by construction from (D.1).
For t > 1,
Pg∗{S−it |hit} = Pg
∗{S−it |pit, ct}


















= P{S−it |sit, πt}
where the second equality follows from (5.12). Therefore, (5.18) holds for all t ∈
T .
Proof of Theorem 5.1. We prove the result by induction.
For t = 1 the result holds since the agents have not taken any action yet. Suppose







































































t−1|hit−1, ait−1, yit, zt
}





















































where the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis (5.19) for t − 1. We

























































where the last equality follows from the induction hypothesis (5.19) for t− 1.
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t−1|hit−1, ait−1, yit, zt
}
. (D.7)






∣∣∣hit} = Pg∗−i {xt, h−it ∣∣∣hit} ,
which establishes the induction step for t.
To provide the proof for Theorems 5.2 and 5.4, we need the following result.
Lemma D.1. Given a CIB strategy profile σ∗ and update rule ψ consistent with σ∗,
Pσ∗ψ {St+1,Πt+1|pt, ct, at} = Pσ
∗
ψ {St+1,Πt+1|st, πt, at}. (D.8)
for all st, πt, at.
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Proof of Lemma D.1. We have,
Pσ∗ψ {st+1, πt+1|pt, ct, at} = Pσ
∗
ψ {st+1, πt+1|pt, ct, at, πt}





Pσ∗ψ {st+1, ψt+1(πt, zt+1)|pt, ct, at, πt}
=∑
yt+1,xt+1,xt,zt+1∈Ẑ
Pσ∗ψ {st+1, πt+1, yt+1, zt+1, xt+1, xt|st, ct, at, πt}












































Pσ∗ψ {st+1, πt+1|st, πt, at}.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. Consider a “super dynamic system” as the collection of the
original dynamic system along with agents −i who play according to CIB assessment
(σ∗, γ). We establish the claim of Theorem 5.2 in two steps: (i) we show that the
super dynamic system is a POMDP, and (ii) we show that {Πt, Sit} is an information
state for agent i when he faces the super dynamic system with the original utility
ui1:T (·, ·). Therefore, without loss of optimality, agent i can choose his best response
from the class of strategies that depend on the information state {Πt, Sit}, i.e. the
class of CIB strategies.
To establish step (i), consider X̃ := {Xt,Πt, St,Πt−1, St−1} as the system state
at t for the super dynamic system. Agent i’s observation at time t is given by
Ỹ it := {Y it , Zt}. To show that the super dynamic system is a POMDP, we need to
show that it satisfies the following properties:
(a) it has a controlled Markovian dynamics, that is,
Pσ∗ψ {x̃t+1|x̃1:t, ai1:t, ỹi1:t} = Pσ∗ψ {x̃t+1|x̃t, ait}, ∀t ∈ T , (D.9)
(b) agent i’s observation Ỹ it is a function of system state X̃t along with the previous
action Ait−1, that is,
Pσ∗ψ {ỹit|x̃1:t, , ai1:t−1, ỹi1:t−1} = Pσ∗ψ {ỹit|x̃t, ait−1}, ∀t ∈ T , (D.10)
(c) agent i’s instantaneous utility at t ∈ T can be written as a function ũt(x̃t, ait) of









t), ∀t ∈ T . (D.11)
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Condition (a) is true because,
Pσ∗ψ {x̃t+1|x̃1:t, ai1:t, ỹi1:t}
=
Pσ∗ψ {xt+1, πt+1, st+1, πt, st|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t, z1:t, ai1:t}
=∑
a−it ,zt+1,yt+1
Pσ∗ψ {xt+1, πt+1, st+1, a−it , zt+1, yt+1|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t, z1:t, ai1:t}




Pσ∗ψ {πt+1, st+1|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t, z1:t, ai1:t, a−it , , xt+1, zt+1, yt+1}
P{zt+1, yt+1|xt+1, at}P{xt+1|xt, at}σ∗−it (πt, s−it )(a−it )
]
























Condition (b) is true because
Pσ∗ψ {ỹit|x̃1:t, , ai1:t−1, ỹi1:t−1}
=
Pσ∗ψ {yit, zt|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t−1, z1:t−1, ai1:t−1}
=∑
a−it−1
Pσ∗ψ {yit, zt, a−it−1|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t−1, z1:t−1, ai1:t−1}
=∑
a−it−1
Pσ∗ψ {yit, zt|x1:t, π1:t, s1:t, yi1:t−1, z1:t−1, ai1:t−1, a−it−1}σ∗−it (πt−1, st−1)(a−it−1)
by system dynamics (5.2)
=∑
a−it−1
Pσ∗ψ {yit, zt|xt, ait−1, a−it−1}σ∗−it (πt−1, st−1)(a−it−1)
=
Pσ∗ψ {yit, zt|xt, πt−1, st−1, ait−1}
=
Pσ∗ψ {ỹit|x̃t, ait−1}.
Condition (c) is true because
Eσ∗ψ
{
























To establish step (ii), that it, to show that {Πt, Sit} is an information state for
agent i, we need to prove that (1) it can be updated recursively at t, i.e. it can be
determined using {Πt−1, Sit−1} and {Ỹ it , Ait} = {Y it , Zt, Ait}, (2) agent i’s belief about
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{Πt+1, Sit+1} conditioned on {Πt, Sit , Ait} is independent of H it , and (3) it is sufficient
to evaluate the agent i’s instantaneous utility at t for every action ait ∈ T , for all
t ∈ T .




t−1, {Y it , Zt, Ait})
for t ∈ T \{1}; see part (i) of Definition 5.5 and (5.16).









for all j ∈ N and t ∈ T . Then condition (2) is satisfied since





Pσ∗ψ {sit+1, πt+1, h−it , a−it |hit, ait}





Pσ∗ψ {sit+1, πt+1|ht, at}Pg







Pσ∗ψ {sit+1, πt+1, s−it+1|ht, at}Pg
∗−i{h−it |hit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )










Pσ∗ψ {st+1, πt+1|st, πt, at}Pg
∗−i{s−it |hit}g∗−it (h−it )(a−it )















Pσ∗ψ {sit+1, πt+1, s−it+1|ht, at}P{s−it |sit, πt}σ∗−it (πt, s−it )(a−it )
=
Pσ∗ψ {sit+1, πt+1|sit, πt, ait}
.
1Note that πt(x̃t, s̃t) = Pσ
∗{x̃t, s̃t|ct}, that is, given σ∗, πt is a function of ct.
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To prove condition (3), we need to show that for all ait ∈ Ait,
Eg∗−i{uti(Xt, A−it , ait)|hit} = Eg
∗−i{uti(Xt, A−it , ait)|πt, sit}, (D.13)
for all hit, πt, s
i
t, t ∈ T .
By Lemma 5.1,
Pg∗−i{s−it |hit} = P{s−it |πt, sit}. (D.14)






Eσ∗ψ {uit(Xt, A−it , ait)|hit} = Eσ
∗
ψ {uit(Xt, σ∗−it (πt, S−it ), ait)|hit}
= Eσ∗ψ
{








Eσ∗{uit(Xt, σ∗−it (πt, S−it ), ait)|S−it , πt, sit, ct}
∣∣∣hit}
= Eσ∗ψ {uit(Xt, σ∗−it (πt, S−it ), ait)|πt, sit}. (D.15)




t ). The second
equality follows from the smoothing property of conditional expectation. The third
equality holds by condition (iii) of Definition 5.5. The fourth equality holds since for
every xt, st, πt, ct,








The last equality is true by (D.14). By (D.15) we prove condition (3) for {Πt, Sit} to
be an information state, and thus establish the result of Theorem 5.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.3. Let (σ∗, ψ) denote a solution of the dynamic program. We
232
note that the CIB update rule ψ is consistent with σ∗ by requirement (5.26). There-
fore, we only need to show that the CIB assessment (σ∗, ψ) is sequentially rational. To
prove it, we use the one-shot deviation principle for dynamic games with asymmetric
information [51]. To state the one-shot deviation, we need the following definitions.
Definition D.1 (One-shot deviation). We say g̃i is a one-shot deviation from g∗i if
there exists a unique hit ∈ Hi such that g̃it(hit) 6= g∗it (hit), and g̃iτ (hiτ ) 6= g∗iτ (hiτ ) for all
hiτ 6= hit, hiτ ∈ Hi.
Definition D.2 (Profitable one-shot deviation). Consider an assessment (g∗, µ).
We say g̃i is a profitable one-shot deviation for agent i if g̃i is a one-shot deviation
















uiτ (Xτ , Aτ )
∣∣∣hit
}
One-shot deviation principle [51]: A consistent assessment (g∗, µ) is a PBE
if and only if there exists no agent that has a profitable one-shot deviation.
Below, we show that the consistent CIB assessment (σ∗, ψ) satisfies the sequential
rationality condition using the one-shot deviation principle.
Consider an arbitrary agent i ∈ N , time t ∈ T , and history realization hit ∈ Hit.
Agent i has a profitable one-shot deviation at hit only if
σ∗it (πt, s
i







∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣hit} .
Given (πt, Vt+1, ψt+1, σ
∗
t ), the expected value of the function Ū
i
t conditioned on
hit is only a function of s
i
t, agent i’s belief about S
−i
t , as well as agent i’s strategy
g̃it(h
i




t is only a function of s
i
t and πt (see (5.18)).
Therefore, any solution to the maximization problem above can be written as a
function of πt and s
i




t) for agent i. Consequently,
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agent i has a profitable one-shot deviation only if
σ∗it (πt, s
i







∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣πt, sit} .











∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vt+1, ψt+1)
∣∣∣πt, sit} .





there exists no agent that has a profitable one-shot deviation. Hence, by one-shot
deviation principle, the consistent CIB assessment (σ∗, ψ) is sequentially rational,
and thus, it is a CIB-PBE.
Proof of Theorem 5.4. Consider an arbitrary strategy profile g. We prove the exis-
tence of CIB strategy profile that is equivalent to g by construction.
With some abuse of notation, let σi(Πt, S
i
t , ω) denote agent i’s strategy using the
public randomization device ω. We construct a CIB strategy profile σt that has the
following properties:
(a) the induced distribution on {Πt+1, St+1} under σ coincides with one under g, i.e.
Pσ1:t {πt+1, st+1} = Pg1:t {πt+1, st+1} . (D.16)












uiτ (Xτ , στ (Πτ , Sτ , ω))
}
, ∀i ∈ N .
(D.17)
We prove condition (a) with forward induction and condition (b) by backward
induction. We note that condition (a) is satisfied for t = 1, since at t = 1 no action
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has been taken. Moreover, condition (b) is satisfied for t = T + 1 since there is no
future.
Assume that condition (a) is satisfied from 1 to t, t ∈ T . We construct σt below
such that condition (a) is satisfied at t+ 1.
For every t ∈ T and i ∈ N , let Kit denote the dimension of Hit ⊆ RK
i
t , i.e.




t , ..., H
i,Kit
t }. Let F
g
Hi,kt |Πt,Sit
(·|·, ·), 1 ≤ k ≤ Kit , denote the cumulative
distribution function of H i,kt conditional on Πt and S
i
t when the agents play according
to g. Define Ri,kt := F
g
Hi,kt |Πt,Sit
(H i,kt |Πt, Sit). The random variable R
i,k
t , 1 ≤ k ≤ KiT ,
is uniformly distributed on [0, 1], and it is independent of Πt and S
i





t , ..., R
i,Kit
t ). We note that H
i










































(ĥi,kt |Πt, Sit) ≥ R
i,k
t },
for 1 ≤ k ≤ Kit .
We show below that Rit is independent of St.
Lemma D.2. The random variable Rit, i ∈ N , is independent of Πt and St for all
t ∈ T .
Proof of Lemma D.2. To prove that Rit is independent of Πt and St, we need to
show that Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, S−it ∈ S̃−it , Sit ∈ S̃ it} = Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it} for all Π̃t ∈
B(∆(Xt × St))2, S̃−it ∈ 2S
−i
t 3, S̃ it ∈ 2S
i
t , and R̃it ∈ B([0, 1]).
2For any uncountable set Λ, B(Λ) denotes the Borel σ-field on Λ.
3For any finite set Λ, 2Λ denotes the power set of Λ.
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First, we note that















= P{s−it |st, πt}.
(D.18)
Therefore, we can write
Pg{S−it ∈ S̃−it |Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it}
by (D.18)
= Pg{S−it ∈ S̃−it |Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it , Rit ∈ R̃it}
=
Pg{S−it ∈ S̃−it , Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it}
Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it}
=
Pg{S−it ∈ S̃−it , Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it}
Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it}
=
Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, S−it ∈ S̃−it , Sit ∈ S̃ it}Pg{S−it ∈ S̃−it |Πt ∈ Π̃t, Sit ∈ S̃ it}
Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it}
⇐⇒
Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it} = Pg{Rit ∈ R̃it|Πt ∈ Π̃t, S−it ∈ S̃−it , Sit ∈ S̃ it}.
(D.19)





versa. The second equality is by Bayes’ rule. The third equality is true since Rit is
independent of Πt and S
i
t . The fourth equality is true by Bayes’ rule. By (D.19), R
i
t
is independent of Πt and St for all i ∈ N .
Using the result of Lemma D.2, we construct a CIB strategy profile σt equivalent
to gt as follows. Let R̂
1:N
t (ω) denote a random vector the agents construct using the
public randomization device ω that has an identical joint cumulative distribution to
that of R1:Nt . Note that by Lemma D.2, the distribution of R
1:N















Pg1:t{πt+1, st+1|Ht} =Pg1:t{πt+1, st+1|Πt, St, Rt}
distribution
= Pg1:t{πt+1, st+1|Πt, St, R̂t}
=Pσ1:t{πt+1, st+1|Πt, St, R̂t}.
Taking the expectation of the left and right hand sides with respect to ω and Rt,
respectively, and using the fact that R̂(ω) and Rt are independent of St and Πt
(Lemma D.2), we obtain
Pσ1:t {πt+1, st+1|Πt, St} = Pg1:t {πt+1, st+1|Πt, St} w.p.1. (D.21)
By induction hypothesis, we have Pσ1:t−1 {πt, st} = Pg1:t−1 {πt, st}. Therefore,
taking the expectation from both sides of (D.21) with respect to Πt, St, we establish
that condition (a) holds for time t+ 1.
Next, assume that condition (b) is satisfied from t + 1 to T , t ∈ T . We prove
below that condition (b) is satisfied at t.
We have,
Eg{uit(Xt, At)|Ht} =Eg{uit(Xt, At)|Πt, St, Rt}
distribution
= Eg{uit(Xt, At)|Πt, St, R̂t}
=Eσ{uit(Xt, At)|Πt, St, R̂t}
Therefore, using condition (a) at time t, i.e Pσ1:t−1{st, πt} = Pg1:t−1{st, πt}, the
induction hypothesis on condition (b) for t + 1, and the fact that Rt and R̂t are
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uiτ (Xτ , στ (Πτ , Sτ , ω))
}
,
where the last equality is true by induction hypothesis on (b) at t+ 1.
Proof of Theorem 5.5. The proof of Theorem 5.5 follows from an argument similar
to that of Theorem 5.3 using the one-shot deviation principle.
Let (σ∗s , ψs) denote a solution of the dynamic programming given by (5.34)-(5.36).
The CIB assessment (σ∗s , ψs) is consistent by construction. We prove that (σ
∗
s , ψs)
satisfies sequential rationality by using the one-shot deviation principle.
Agent i has a profitable one-shot deviation at hit only if
σ∗is (πt, s
i








s(πt, St)), St, πt, Vs, ψs)
∣∣∣hit} . (D.22)
Given (πt, Vs, ψs, σ
∗
s), the expected value of the function Ū
i
s conditioned on h
i
t is
only a function of sit, agent i’s belief about S
−i





By part (ii) of Lemma 5.1, agent i’s belief about S−it given h
i
t is only a function of s
i
t
and πt. Therefore, any solution to the maximization problem above can be written
as a function of πt and s
i











∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vs, ψs)
∣∣∣πt, sit} . (D.23)
By (5.34), σ∗s is BNE of the stage game Gs(πt, Vs, ψs) at t, i.e.
σ∗is (πt, s
i







∗(πt, St)), St, πt, Vs, ψs)
∣∣∣πt, sit} . (D.24)





one-shot deviation principle, the consistent CIB assessment (σ∗s , ψS) is sequentially
rational, and thus, is a PBE.
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Proof of Theorem 5.6. The proof of Theorem 5.6 follows from an argument similar
to that of Theorem 5.3.
Proof of Lemma 5.2. We prove below that if Vt+1(·, st+1) is continuous in πt+1, then
the dynamic program has a solution at stage t, t ∈ T ; that is, there exists at least
one σ∗t such that σ
∗
t ∈ BNEt(Vt+1, ψt+1), where ψt+1 is consistent with σ∗t .
For every πt, define a perturbation of the stage game Gt(πt,Vt+1, ψt+1) by re-
stricting the set of strategies of each agent to mixed strategies that assign probability
of at least ε > 0 to every action ait ∈ Ait of agent i ∈ N ; for every agent i ∈ N we




t × . . .×Σ
ε,N
t . In the
following we prove that, for every ε > 0, the corresponding perturbed stage game
has an equilibrium σ∗,εt along with a consistent update rule ψ
ε
t+1.
We note that when the agents’ equilibrium strategies are perfectly mixed strate-
gies, then the update rule ψεt+1 is completely determined via Bayes’ rule. Therefore,
for every strategy profile σ∗,εt ∈ Σεt we can write ψεt+1 := βt+1(σ∗,ε), where βt+1(σ∗,ε)
is Bayes’ rule where σ∗,ε is utilized (see (5.13))


























which determines the set of all agent i’s best responses within the class of ε-restricted








t ) is non-empty,


































t{Ū it (At, St, πt, Vt+1, βt+1(σ
∗,ε
t ))|sit, πt}.
Therefore, for every πt, s
i




















t) is a linear program,
thus, by Theorem 16 of [93], the set of agent i’s best responses BRi,εt (σ
∗,ε
t ) is closed
and convex. If Vt+1 is continuous in πt+1 then Vt+1 is continuous in agent i’s strategy
σit. Moreover, the instantaneous utility u
i
t is continuous in agent i’s strategy σ
i
t.
Therefore, Ū it , given by (5.20), is continuous in agent i’ strategy σ
i
t. Therefore, by
the maximum theorem [95] the set of i’s best responses in upper hemicontinuous in
σ∗,εt and non-empty.
Consequently, we establish that for every i ∈ N , BRi,εt (σ∗t ) is closed, convex,
upper hemicontinuous, and non-empty for every σ∗t ∈ Σεt. Define BRεt := ×i∈NBR
i,ε
t
where × denotes the Cartesian product. The correspondence BRεt(σ∗t ) is closed,





is closed, convex, upper hemicontinuous, and non-empty for every σ∗it ∈ Σ
i,ε
t for
all i ∈ N . Therefore, by Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem [23, Corollary 15.3], the
correspondence BRεt has a fixed point. Therefore, every perturbed stage game has
an equilibrium σ∗,εt along with a consistent update rule ψt+1 = βt+1(σ
∗,ε
t ).
Now consider the sequence of these perturbed games when ε → 0. Since the
set of agents’ strategies is compact, there exists a subsequence of these perturbed
games whose equilibrium strategies converge, say to σ∗t . Similarly let ψ
∗
t+1 denote
the convergence point of βt+1(σ
∗,ε
T ). We note that ψ
∗





∗) (i.e. Bayes’ rule) is continuous in σ∗t . We show below that for every agent
i ∈ N , σ∗it is a best response for him given Vt+1, ψ∗t+1 when he chooses his strategy
from the unconstrained class of CIB strategies.
As we proved above, the set of agent i’s best responses BRit(σ
∗
t ) is upper hemicon-
tinuous and closed given ψ∗t+1. Therefore, σ
∗
t (πt, ·) is also a best response for agent i




t ∈ BNEt(Vt+1, ψ∗t+1) where
ψ∗t+1 is consistent with σ
∗
t .
Proof of Theorem 5.7. We have a Bayesian zero-sum game with finite state and ac-
tion spaces. By [34, Theorem 1] the equilibrium payoff is a continuous function of
the agents’ common prior/belief. Using this result, we prove, by backward induction,
that every stage of the dynamic program described by (5.25)-(5.27), has a solution
and Vt is continuous in πt for all t.
For t = T + 1 the dynamic program has a solution trivially since the agents
have utility for time less than or equal to T . Moreover, VT+1(., .) = 0 is trivially
continuous in πT+1.
For t ≤ T , assume that Vt+1 is continuous in πt+1. Then, by Lemma 5.2 the
dynamic program has a solution at t. We note that the continuation game from t
to T is a dynamic zero-sum game with finite state and actions spaces. Therefore, as
we argued above, by [34, Theorem 1] the agents’ equilibrium payoff at t (i.e. Vt) is
unique and is continuous in the agents’ common prior given by πt.
Therefore, by induction we establish the assertion of Theorem 5.7.
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Assume that ψ1:T is independent of σ. Then, the evolution
of Πt is independent of σ
∗ and known a priori. As a result, we can ignore the
consistency condition (5.26) in the dynamic program. Given ψt+1, the stage game
Gt(πt,Vt+1, ψt+1) is a static game of incomplete information with finite actions
(given by A1:Nt ) and finite types (given by S1:Nt ) for every πt. Therefore, by the
standard existence results for finite games [43, Theorem 1.1], there exists an equi-
librium for the stage game BNEt(Vt+1, ψt+1). Consequently, the correspondence
BNEt(Vt+1, ψt+1) is non-empty for every t ∈ T , thus, the dynamic programming
given by (5.25-5.27) has a solution.
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Markov perfect equilibria for stochastic games with asymmetric information:
Finite games. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 59(3):555–570, March
2014.
[90] A. Nayyar, A. Mahajan, and D. Teneketzis. Optimal control strategies in de-
layed sharing information structures. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Con-
trol, 56(7):1606–1620, 2011.
[91] A. Nayyar, A. Mahajan, and D. Teneketzis. Decentralized stochastic control
with partial history sharing: A common information approach. IEEE Trans-
actions on Automatic Control, 58(7):1644–1658, 2013.
[92] A. Nayyar, K. Poolla, and P. Varaiya. A statistically robust payment shar-
ing mechanism for an aggregate of renewable energy producers. In European
Control Conference (ECC), 2013.
[93] A. Nedich. Optimization i. Lecture Notes, 2008.
[94] L. Nelson. New traffic apps may be pushing cars into residential areas, January
5 2015. [Online; posted 5-January-2015].
[95] E. Ok. Real Analysis with Economic Applications, volume 10. Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2007.
249
[96] M. J Osborne and A. Rubinstein. A Course in Game Theory. MIT press,
1994.
[97] Y. Ouyang, H. Tavafoghi, and D. Teneketzis. Dynamic oligopoly games with
private Markovian dynamics. In 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Con-
trol (CDC), 2015.
[98] Y. Ouyang, H. Tavafoghi, and D. Teneketzis. Dynamic games with asymmet-
ric information: Common information based perfect Bayesian equilibria and
sequential decomposition. IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, 2017.
[99] A. Ozdaglar and R. Srikant. Incentives and pricing in communication networks.
Algorithmic Game Theory, pages 571–591, 2007.
[100] R. Radner. Team decision problems. The Annals of Mathematical Statistics,
33(3):857–881, 1962.
[101] J. Renault. The value of Markov chain games with lack of information on one
side. Math. Oper. Res., 31(3):490–512, 2006.
[102] J. Renault. The value of repeated games with an informed controller. Mathe-
matics of Operations Research, 37(1):154–179, 2012.
[103] G. Richards. Is Googles Waze app making traffic worse?, January 21 2016.
[Online; posted 21-January-2016].
[104] R. Rosenthal. A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria. In-
ternational Journal of Game Theory, 2(1):65–67, 1973.
[105] R. Rosenthal. Arbitration of two-party disputes under uncertainty. The Review
of Economic Studies, 45(3):595–604, 1978.
[106] T. Roughgarden. Routing games. Algorithmic Game Theory, 18:459–484,
2007.
[107] A. Rubinstein. Modeling Bounded Rationality. MIT press, 1998.
[108] A. Sinha and A. Anastasopoulos. Structured perfect Bayesian equilibrium
in infinite horizon dynamic games with asymmetric information. American
Control Conference, 2016.
[109] S. Sorin. A First Course on Zero-sum Repeated Games, volume 37. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2002.
250
[110] R. Spiegler. Bounded Rationality and Industrial Organization. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011.
[111] T. Sugaya. Efficiency in Markov games with incomplete and private informa-
tion. working paper, 2012.
[112] C. Swamy. The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network
congestion games. ACM Transactions on Algorithms (TALG), 8(4):36, 2012.
[113] C. Tan and P. Varaiya. Interruptible electric power service contracts. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1993.
[114] W. Tang and R. Jain. Stochastic resource auctions for renewable energy inte-
gration. In 49th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing, pages 345–352. IEEE, 2011.
[115] W. Tang and R. Jain. Market mechanisms for buying random wind. To appear
in IEEE Transactions on Sustainable Energy, 2016.
[116] H. Tavafoghi, Y. Ouyang, and D. Teneketzis. On stochastic dynamic games
with delayed sharing information structure. In 55th IEEE Conference on De-
cision and Control (CDC), pages 7002–7009. IEEE, 2016.
[117] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Optimal energy procurement from a strategic
seller with private renewable and conventional generation. arXiv:1401.5759.
[118] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Optimal contract design for energy procure-
ment. In 52nd Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and
Computing, pages 62–69. IEEE, 2014.
[119] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Sequential contracts for uncertain electric-
ity resources. 10th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and
Computation (NetEcon), 2015.
[120] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Dynamic market mechanisms for wind energy.
arXiv:1608.04143, 2016.
[121] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Informational incetives in congestion games.
In to appear in 55th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control,
and Computing. IEEE, 2017.
251
[122] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis. Multi-dimensional forward contracts under
uncertainty for electricity markets. IEEE Transactions on Control of Network
Systems, 2017.
[123] D. Teneketzis. On the structure of optimal real-time encoders and decoders in
noisy communication. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 52(9):4017–
4035, 2006.
[124] J. Thai, N. Laurent-Brouty, and A. Bayen. Negative externalities of gps-
enabled routing applications: A game theoretical approach. In 19th Inter-
national Conference on Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITSC), pages 595–
601. IEEE, 2016.
[125] Report to the US Congress U.S. Department of Energy. 2010 Smart Grid
System Report. February 2012.
[126] P. Varaiya, F. Wu, and J. Bialek. Smart operation of smart grid: Risk-limiting
dispatch. Proceedings of the IEEE, 2011.
[127] D. Vasal and A. Anastasopoulos. Signaling equilibria for dynamic LQG games
with asymmetric information. In 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Con-
trol (CDC), pages 6901–6908. IEEE, 2016.
[128] W. Vickrey. Congestion theory and transport investment. The American Eco-
nomic Review, 59(2):251–260, 1969.
[129] R. Vohra. Mechanism Design: a Linear Programming Approach, volume 47.
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[130] M. Vrakopoulou, J. Mathieu, and G. Andersson. Stochastic optimal power flow
with uncertain reserves from demand response. In 47th Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 2014. IEEE, 2014.
[131] J. Walrand and P. Varaiya. Optimal causal coding-decoding problems. IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 29(6):814–820, 1983.
[132] J. Watson. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium: general definitions and illustrations.
working paper, 2016.
[133] R. Wilson. Nonlinear Pricing. Oxford University Press, 1997.
[134] R. Wilson. Architecture of power markets. Econometrica, 70(4):1299–1340,
2002.
252
[135] H. Witsenhausen. Separation of estimation and control for discrete time sys-
tems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 59(11):1557–1566, 1971.
[136] H. Witsenhausen. On the structure of real-time source coders. The Bell System
Technical Journal, 58(6):1437–1451, 1979.
[137] S. Yüksel and T. Başar. Stochastic Networked Control Systems: Stabilization
and Optimization under Information Constraints. Springer Science & Business
Media, 2013.
[138] S. Zamir. Repeated games of incomplete information: Zero-sum. Handbook of
Game Theory, 1:109–154, 1992.
[139] Y. Zhao, J. Qin, R. Rajagopal, A. Goldsmith, and V. Poor. Wind aggregation
via risky power markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2014.
253
